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CHRISTIAN PACIFISM RE-EXAMINED

Christian Pacifism Re-examined

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DEDICATED TO
LEYTON RICHARDS, M.A.,
WHOSE FRIENDSHIP HAS LONG
STOOD ME IN SUCH GOOD STEAD

PREFACE

THE origin and purpose of this book are sufficiently described in the course of its first chapter (pp. 7 ff.); but the precise circumstances of its publication need to be briefly explained here. I began to write it in the first month of the war, finished the draft in January, and had corrected the proofs by the middle of May. A copy was then submitted to the Government's Press and Censorship Bureau, which "passed" it early in June. But by that time the military situation had become so alarming that the publishers felt it would be best to suspend the production of the book: and in the circumstances I acquiesced.

Now that the war-position has become somewhat more stable, it has been decided to proceed with the publication. The book appears, therefore, over seven months after the writing of it was completed. During this interval such upheavals have taken place that one or two of the things I had written are now out-of-date. Rather than re-write these passages (the whole book being already in page-proof), I have let them stand; but I draw attention to them here, and trust that the retention of them will not be thought seriously to affect the main argument. Had I been drafting the book now, for instance, I should have had to give greater prominence, in my description of war (pp. 26 f.), to air-fighting. More seriously out-of-date, perhaps, will appear the discussion (pp. 212 ff.) of the Armistice- and Peace-terms, the military position having made it for the present less easy to imagine that these will be as much at the discretion of Germany's enemies as was the case in 1918-19. In particular, the paragraph about the probable attitude of France (p. 214) would need now to be very differently framed.

The reader should not, however, too hurriedly assume that Germany's brutal invasion of Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium in April and May constitutes a devastating disproof of what I have written on pp. 103 f. in answer to the plea that, if a state is to function at all, it must be strong enough to resist aggression. One friend observes that this paragraph "has been proved ludicrously untrue by" the invasions referred to: and Lord Caldecote told the Free Church

Council on the 16th of April that "Denmark is the acid test of an outworn pacifism". Such judgments rest on a misunderstanding. I have nowhere contended that military weakness guarantees a country against foreign aggression. What I have written on pp. 103 f. was written in view of the palpable, indeed the mathematical, impossibility of every state being strong enough to offer effectual resistance to every other state. This impossibility, coupled with the fact that numbers of states do in fact function successfully without possessing the means of warding off a strong aggressor, justifies one in demurring to the plausible contention that, if a state is to function at all, it must needs possess sufficient armaments to guarantee its security in the event of attack.

I want to touch next on a few passages to which exception has been taken (apart from the pacifist issue) by certain friends who have seen the proofs.

It has been complained, for instance, that the evidence adduced for the savage character of bayonet-fighting (pp. 27-29) is all drawn from American, British, and Dutch—to the exclusion of German—sources. But this is due simply to the exigences of procuring evidence, and was never intended to imply that German soldiers are any less violent in the actual business of fighting than are the soldiers of other states: only no German military manuals were accessible for quotation.

Exception has been taken to my statement on p. 29 that evidence exists to the effect that in the war of 1914-18 our soldiers were sometimes encouraged to kill wounded Germans. I had, however, already on the previous page quoted one such item of evidence. In saying that there was more I was depending on what Mr. Stephen Graham has written on p. 219 of his book, *A Private in the Guards* (Macmillan, 1919)—to which the doubting reader may be referred. The whole of this author's chapter entitled 'War the Brutaliser' (pp. 212-222) makes painful and very instructive reading. But here again, one can well imagine that occasional brutality of this sort was by no means confined to the British Army: the oft-attested machine-gunning of civilians and refugees by German airmen during the present war seems to lay our enemies open to a similar or even a graver charge.

One critic demurred to my stress on the food-shortage in Germany (pp. 34 f., 160 f.) on the ground that I made in connexion with it no allusion to her nearly-successful attempt to starve out the population of Britain. But on pp. 34 f. I was engaged in describing war in general, not in comparing British with German methods of war: and since the German attempt to starve Britain did not succeed, its effect could not very well be quoted in an account of the evil effects of war. On pp. 160 f. I was not referring to what was done during the war, when the effort to starve the enemy was mutual, but to our treatment of the German population after Germany had laid down her arms. To justify that treatment on the strength of what both sides did *during the war* is obviously unfair: to excuse it by reference to Germany's territorial greed in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk is to commit an irrelevance: while to justify it on the strength of what we imagine Germany might have done to us after the war, had she been the victor, is simply gratuitous.

Riper reflection since I finished working on the book has strengthened my conviction that, amid all the admitted perplexities of the situation, the Christian pacifist case has not yet been answered. Viewing the controversy as a whole, I believe the three crucial points to be these:

(1) that the activities of fighting men cannot be harmonized with any standard of conduct reasonably describable as Christian (pp. 26 ff., 62 f.);

(2) that war inevitably tends to lead on to further war, and to worse war (pp. 39 f., 113-115) ;

(3) that the Christian ethic definitely inculcates on its adherents the policy of overcoming evil *with good*, and of making the sacrifices incidental to any temporary failure in so doing (pp. 105-112).

Non-pacifists are having an easy task just now in patronizingly exposing amid general applause the obvious shortsightedness of doubtless well-intentioned but misguided young conscientious objectors. But unless and until they can show that their own position takes proper account of the three facts just stated, they are wasting their powder and shot on comparatively minor points, and not getting down to the

real problem. Thus it is that the Christian pacifist case remains with us as a challenge that is not to be put by.

Opinions of course are bound to differ, even among quite fair-minded men, as to the legitimacy of publishing an apologia for pacifism with Hannibal at the gates. I have not been unconscious of the probability of criticism along that line; and I have written with the object, not of irritating or obstructing my harassed fellow-countrymen, but of serving them and also learning from them. But Hannibal or no Hannibal, it must be remembered that the Christian ethic is essentially one which has to deal with the rampant evil of the world. To call for a moratorium in the serious discussion of Christian issues because the situation is unusually threatening resembles the shortsighted exegesis of those who would postpone obedience to the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount to the Golden Age (p. 85)—a proceeding equivalent to excluding the Christian way of life from the very situation it was designed to meet.

Men of all views, finally, can unite in the effort to keep the spirit of the British public as far as possible up to the level of sanity and magnanimity which marked it during the first few months of the war. There are signs that under the prolonged stress of the conflict we are in danger of falling into that bitter and vindictive attitude which prevailed during the Great War, and which proved our undoing in the months succeeding the Armistice. One unpleasant indication of this gradual lapse is the frequent dismissal from their employment of conscientious objectors who have already through the Tribunals properly come to terms with the Government as to their national responsibilities. This form of petty persecution has incurred the strong condemnation of the Minister of Labour and of the Archbishop of York, as well as of other authorities and organs of opinion. Divergence of judgment regarding Christian pacifism must not be allowed to divide the forces and weaken the influence of those who long that at all costs British wisdom and magnanimity shall be maintained notwithstanding the heat of the struggle.

C.J.C.

September 1940.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

WHEN Mr. Asquith on the 5th of January 1916 introduced the first Conscription-Bill in the House of Commons, he explained that the Government, aware of the existence of certain religious sects and certain schools of thought which held participation in warfare to be morally wrong, proposed to allow a measure of exemption from compulsory military service to those men who conscientiously objected to it. His announcement was greeted with derisive laughter; and although Mr. Asquith succeeded in legalizing the exemption of conscientious objectors, the behaviour of many of the tribunals to which the detailed application of the law was entrusted, and still more the attitude of the general public, soon proved that the mockers in Parliament had correctly anticipated the judgment of society at large. Throughout the Great War, the objectors to military service were, except in certain special circles, extremely unpopular; and even in most Christian Churches they rarely received anything better than a sort of cold tolerance.

Within a few years, however, of the restoration of peace, a very marked change in public opinion had set in. Just as in the years prior to 1914 some had remarked a noticeable increase in the prevalence of antagonism to war, so after 1918 a similar trend of feeling soon made itself apparent, and eventually resulted in completely revolutionizing the esteem in which the pacifists of War-time and pacifism in general were publicly held. There soon came to exist a group of pacifist members in the House of Commons; others of the same way of thinking came more and more to fill positions of public responsibility; while in nearly all the religious denominations there were formed strong peace-groups, which were bent on persuading their respective co-denominationalists to issue corporate manifestoes condemning all war. The change in public feeling may be tested by the creation of the saying, "We are all pacifists now", which, though it serves to illustrate the ambiguity of the term, reveals

also the extent to which sympathy has replaced contempt in the regard in which enthusiasts for peace are held. The same phenomenon shows itself in the comparative gentleness and respect with which conscientious objectors to military service in the present war are being treated in many quarters.

Three reasons for this extraordinary swing-over in the normal judgment of society may be distinguished.

Firstly, there was the very widespread disappointment over the results of the Great War, in comparison with the high hopes prevalent at its commencement. This disappointment was, of course, reinforced by the war-weariness and the natural reaction after four years of incessant strain; but it represented something deeper than either of these. There had been in the minds of many a real disillusionment, under the stress of which they felt moved to vow that they would never participate in or support war again. The general recoil from war, on the part of the rank and file of the nations (even those governed by dictators), and the general longing for peace can also be viewed as reflecting the same disillusionment regarding the value of military conflict.

Secondly, the startling increase in the destructive efficiency of modern weapons (in particular, of bombs dropped by aircraft) has caused profound alarm in all directions, and has compelled many who do not perhaps feel the ethical question very deeply to realize the gravity of the problem, and to show some degree of sympathy for any effort that is being made to prevent a recurrence of international strife. For even when we have put ourselves on our guard against exaggeration, and have recalled the comforting fact that science has increased man's powers to heal as well as his powers to destroy, the prospect remains sufficiently appalling. In fact, so formidable and terrifying now is the vision of a really violent contest between the air-forces of two or more great powers that the relative importance or pertinence of the various arguments involved in the controversy has with many been to a considerable degree modified.

A third factor was the development of a new moral disapproval of the destructive operations customary in warfare. This uneasiness in regard to the ethical legitimacy of such

operations forms a very distinct phase in that widespread horror of war, which, despite the growth of armaments, is so marked a feature of modern thought. The curious fact that war-memorials are invariably silent about the soldier's work of slaughter, and confine themselves to praising his courage and self-sacrifice, is a silent witness to some measure of uneasiness in the public conscience as to the moral legitimacy of bloodshed: a Roman general of ancient times, for instance, would have been far less squeamish. In particular the conviction has forced itself on men's minds that war and Christianity are fundamentally incompatible; and quite a number of important Christian assemblies, such as the C.O.P.E.C. Conference held at Birmingham in 1924, and the Lambeth Conference of Anglican Bishops in 1930, not to mention innumerable gatherings of a less comprehensive kind, have formally declared in various terms that they regard war as contrary to the mind and spirit of Christ. It is quite true that such declarations were by many not intended to imply the wrongness of all participation in warfare. On the contrary, quite a number of Christian ministers have felt compelled to insist that, notwithstanding the un-Christian character of war as an institution, circumstances may arise under which Christian men are justified in fighting. Nevertheless, even with this qualification, the almost unanimous condemnation of war by the Christian community, on the ground that it is an un-Christian proceeding, and the analogous condemnation of it by mankind generally, shows how far the conscience of the Church and of the British public has moved since the time when Francis Bacon, in his Essay on 'The True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates', compared foreign war to healthy exercise, and urged that a great nation should not be reluctant to enter upon it (see below, p. 98)—or even since the far more recent time when I myself heard a worthy and responsible citizen express exactly the same opinion. The readiness of certain non-pacifist scholars like Harnack and Windisch to acknowledge that the teaching of Jesus really does forbid all bloodshed, including that incidental to war, helps to account (from a special angle) for the modern Christian's sense of the incongruity between his religious faith and military service. This progressive revolt of the Christian

conscience against the usages of war bears some resemblance to its revolt against the employment of torture and against the institution of chattel-slavery.

For these reasons, then, the vogue of pacifism increased steadily in Britain during the fifteen years following the termination of the Great War. It became quite a power in the life and policy of the country, and evoked a certain measure of response among the nationals of other lands. The partial reduction of armaments by the British Government and the measure of support which it gave to the Disarmament-Conference in 1932-4 doubtless owed much to this striking trend in the feeling of the British public, particularly in that of its younger constituents. The pacifists' hope was that, with the growth of their influence in this country, the peaceableness of other countries of the world would also grow *pari passu*, until by the all-round reduction of armaments resort to war would in the fairly near future become a virtual impossibility.

But things, alas!, did not work out in that way. During the last eight years, the international situation has gone steadily from bad to worse. Italy, Germany, and Japan have all left the League of Nations, and taken the way of chauvinistic militarism. Japan has launched her murderous attacks on China, disregarding the protests of the European powers. Italy, bent on enlarging her African Empire, has blotted out the ancient kingdom of Abyssinia in blood, refusing all the pleas of its rulers that the quarrel should be settled by arbitration, and defying the feeble efforts of the League to impose sanctions upon her. Germany, aggrieved by the loss of the Great War and by the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles, has found in Adolf Hitler a leader who has enabled her to disregard the displeasure of England and France, and who has restored her prestige by steadily breaking one after another of her Treaty-commitments. Both Italy and Germany, while officially professing neutrality, participated indirectly in the brutal destruction of Spanish democracy by General Franco. Hitler's employment of violent unilateral methods of settling his country's problems moved Britain to enter upon a vigorous policy of rearmament, and has now provoked both this country and France to declare war on him. Needless to say, he has long ago completely silenced—by

means of the Gestapo and the Concentration-Camps—all overt expression of pacifist sentiments in Germany.

The whole process means an acutely painful disappointment of the pacifist's hope and expectation, and a temporary extinction of his public influence. Not a few pacifists have felt so shocked at the course of events in the international field that they have abandoned their pacifism in favour of some scheme for collective security. It was during the monstrous attack of Italy on Abyssinia that a veteran Christian remarked to me that there were a good many people who thought they were pacifists, but who now find that they are not. A recent author quotes a caustic report from Spain: "The pacifists from the English universities made excellent machine-gunners".

It would, however, be a grave mistake to infer from the virtual unanimity of the people of this country in regard to the righteousness of the British cause, and the inevitability of an armed struggle with Hitler, that the pacifist case has been laid low, to rise no more. The state of public feeling in a country shortly after the outbreak of war is a very imperfect criterion of its judgment in the period following its conclusion. Be the numbers and the audibility of pacifists and conscientious objectors at the moment never so small, the questions they have raised still remain to be answered, and the ethical problem which they have set to the Christian Church still awaits its solution.

No one who has followed at all closely the course of the discussion, ever since—shortly after the commencement of the Great War—it began to attract general attention, and particularly no one who has himself participated in it, can have failed to observe the melancholy tendency of the controversialists on both sides of the middle wall of partition to wax impatient with one another, and to level at one another hard words and question-begging accusations. Representatives of either side have been prone at times to speak as if representatives of the other were actuated by unworthy motives, were incapable of seeing the obvious, and had not got a leg to stand on.

Pacifists have been accused of cowardice, sentimentality, indifference to righteousness, heresy of a Marcionite, Manichean, or Pelagian type, literalism, legalism, evasion, intellec-

tual confusion, and inconsistency: they have been insultingly dubbed "pseudo-Quakers": jokes have been made about their pugnacity as sadly out of keeping with their peace-principles: their zeal for peace has been censured as a claim that none but they were zealous for it: their tendency to vehemence and exaggeration has been gravely indicated by critics as the actual reason why they (the critics) refuse to agree with them. Bitter words against them are naturally liable to be most plentiful in time of war, but they are not spoken only then.

In return pacifists have at times reproached their critics with being grossly inconsistent, with disobeying in the matter of war the clear teaching of the Christ whom they profess to serve, with evading the issue, encouraging men in bloodshed, lapsing as war-mongers into a sub-Christian standard, and even apostatizing from and betraying their faith. They have spoken scornful words of "politicians", "capitalists", "imperialists", "militarists", and so forth, who, they contend, mischievously disguise the real causes of war, as if, in the ranks of those who disagreed with them, there were no distinctions to be drawn, but all stood condemned as a single massa perditionis.

All this outpouring of strong language and harsh reproach is greatly to be deplored. It is not, of course, necessary to maintain that the accusations enumerated are totally groundless in the case of all against whom they are directed: the very fact that severity has been used by both sides suggests of itself that neither is wholly guiltless. But whatever shortcomings in the method of controversy may characterize individual champions of the opposing camps, the exposure of these is usually irrelevant to the consideration of the merits of the case, while censure cast in sweeping terms constitutes a serious hindrance to the discussion. It produces no conviction; it wounds feelings, wastes time, space, and energy, confuses the issues at stake, and destroys the only atmosphere in which discussion can lead to any beneficial result. On both sides we need to keep our heads, to avoid exaggeration and impatience, to be respectful, tolerant, and deferential to the opinion of others, and to give them credit at least for sincerity and normal intelligence. By patient and careful argument, we may achieve something worth while; by strong language we shall effect nothing but mutual irritation.

Truth to tell, the arguments advanced from both quarters represent between them every degree of value from extreme vagueness and superficiality on the one hand to quite respectable cogency on the other. The whole topic is beset with a good deal of roughness and generality as to the meaning of terms and the significance of arguments, so that one may hear some militarists conceding that "War never does any good" or that "We are all pacifists nowadays", and some pacifists sadly remarking that they suppose the war had got to come and the country must now go through with it. Much of what is said about right and might is vitiated by a failure to distinguish clearly between fact and value. In so far as the discussion has been capably and intelligently conducted, the conclusion has hitherto resulted in complete deadlock. Advocates of both the main opposing positions are themselves convinced that they have made out their case; but they have failed to satisfy one another with the answers they give to the objections brought against their respective positions. For neither side, it may be said, is it a matter of a "walk-over". Sometimes a controversialist will be willing to acknowledge that, though provisionally clear as to where he stands, yet he is conscious that there are difficulties inherent in his case which he has not yet succeeded in completely unravelling. Such acknowledgements, however, are rare.

Yet in the nature of things a deadlock on an important question of Christian ethics cannot be allowed to go on for ever. Even the most confident of disputants must recognize that it is an unfortunate and disquieting thing that many others, no less intelligent and sincere than himself, pointedly differ from him—and this on a matter which has engaged the concentrated thoughts of Christian men for the past twenty-five years, and was debated off and on for many centuries before that. It verily looks as if a still deeper analysis of the issues at stake were called for, and a synthesis sought which shall do better justice than has yet been done to the truth inherent in *both* positions, and which may well prove that neither side is quite so right as it thought itself to be, or quite so mistaken as it was adjudged by the other. The existence of several varieties of pacifism and of non-pacifism is of itself a sure reminder that a more thorough

and adequate investigation is needed. There can certainly be no doubt as to the magnitude and urgency of the problem: it is in fact, for the Christian community of to-day, *the* problem; and it is high time that yet another determined attempt was made to reach a real solution.

Whether or not I possess the qualifications needed for the discovery and dissemination of the desired synthesis remains, of course, to be seen. I can say only that the question has been for over thirty years a major issue in my life and thought. When in 1902 I entered the Admiralty as a Civil Servant, I had no uneasiness whatever as to the ethical justifiability of the British Navy. A year later I took up work as an officer in The Boys' Brigade, again with no compunctions as to any conflict between its military associations and the Christianity which it was intended to foster. But a re-examination of the Synoptic Gospels, coupled with the perusal of a little book by Tolstoy, quite casually picked up for sixpence off a bookstall, ere long profoundly disturbed my serenity in both provinces. The stress and tension remained unrelieved until my admission to a theological college in 1911 solved the practical problem for the time being. When the Great War came, I was from the first a member of the pacifist "Fellowship of Reconciliation", which was founded at Cambridge in December 1914; and I have remained in membership with it ever since. For several years, besides producing a number of pacifist books, I contributed off and on to the Fellowship's magazine, served on its General Committee, and was for a considerable time its Chairman. For various reasons I discontinued this work at the headquarters of the Fellowship in 1932; but I remained a convinced pacifist, and assisted from time to time in the local activities of the Fellowship and other pacifist agencies. I had always been very willing to argue *ad infinitum* in defence of Christian pacifism as I understood it; and there were indeed times when I felt and spoke slightly of those who rejected it. Yet I do not think I ever imagined that the problem was a perfectly simple one, such as many of my fellow-pacifists often seemed to assume; nor did I disguise from myself my awareness of the existence of certain unresolved difficulties in the pacifist position, which, while not sufficing to refute it, served as a warning against intolerance

towards those who differed from me. I did not want to evade these difficulties: but I covered myself by quoting the artist's plea in Samuel Johnson's 'Rasselas', "Nothing will ever be attempted, if all possible objections must be first overcome"; and I held myself justified in defending a position the objections to which clearly seemed to me far less serious than those which could be brought against any alternative position.

In process of time, however, I found myself very distinctly among those who felt the course of European politics during the last six or seven years to constitute an increasingly serious challenge to my pacifism; and I have therefore been driven to undertake a re-examination of the whole problem, as the only course which could justify me in remaining a pacifist. I have even had to ask myself whether, if this re-examination were to show me that I had been mistaken, I should have the courage to abandon a position which I have for so many years strenuously defended. What has in this way become a necessity for my own mental peace, happens now, as I have argued above, to be a necessity for the thought of many other Christians also. Whether I can contribute materially to the working-out of a view which, while defending pacifism, shall contain a satisfying answer to the objections brought against it, readers must judge for themselves. Possibly my efforts will result in satisfying myself and in failing to satisfy others: for even to be crystal-clear in one's own mind is not the same thing as convincing one's fellows. And when the complexity of the problem and the tangle of interlocking arguments has somewhat dimmed the crystal clarity itself, one is still less confident of being able to evoke agreement. A further possibility to be reckoned with is that advancing years and somewhat impaired physical health and vigour may be casting a cloud of conservatism over the idealistic vision of my earlier years. Altogether, therefore, it is with no little diffidence that I enter upon the task I have set myself.

My prime concern is that my discussion shall be, within the limits set me by the subject itself, complete. A simplification of the problem which enables one to form a decision in regard to it on the strength of a single argument or a single principle, is all right for the person who lacks either the time or the capacity

requisite for a thorough analysis: he is justified in taking the line indicated by such power of conscientious judgment as is for the time-being available for him. But if, as in this case, the problem is one on which, because of its complexity, the consciences of men are found to be leading in widely different directions, such a simplification is clearly inadequate as a *final* solution. All the generalities on the question have already been uttered over and over again; and it would serve little or no purpose to repeat them. But an attempt to survey afresh the whole field of the argument, with the intention of taking all the relevant considerations into account and evading none of the difficulties, and in the hope of constructing a synthesis that shall be a synthesis indeed—here is an enterprise worthy of our best and most consecrated efforts, even though complete success be still for a time beyond our reach, and all we can achieve be to make it a little more possible for others to find that success later.

I referred a moment ago to the limits set for me by the subject with which I am dealing. I am not undertaking to study war in general, or even pacifism in general, but war and pacifism only as they constitute a problem in Christian ethics. I am aware that much has been said both for and against pacifism with little or no reference to Christianity. Pacifism has, for instance, been defended on scientific grounds, and still more frequently on socialistic or broadly humanitarian grounds: and it has been refuted by arguments drawn from history (showing that by a sort of political necessity wars are bound to recur), from biology (to the effect that man is by nature an incurably pugnacious animal), and from sociology (with its awareness of the need of some artificial check to the indefinite increase of the earth's population). I pass these arguments by, not because I regard them as trivial, but because I am not writing for the persons for whom they are of prime importance. I believe the purely socialistic objection to war, notwithstanding the numbers and zeal of those who advance it, to be based, partly at least, on a one-sided view of the economic causes of war. I respect the merely humanitarian objection to war, and honour those who are actuated by it: but I fail to see how a complete apologetica for it can be framed without appealing to that positive

influence of self-sacrifice whereof Christianity can rightly claim to be the only convincing exponent (see below, p. 48). The scientific and sociological arguments on this side and on that are outside my province; but I gravely doubt whether at this time of day they count for very much in human judgments. The historical argument for the perpetuity of war I regard as refuted by the disappearance of slavery, duelling, torture, and animal-sacrifice from the life of all civilized peoples. What I am concerned with is the ethical argument; and as that is incomplete until account is taken of the bearing of Christianity upon it, my problem can be correctly defined as that of Christian pacifism.

All would agree that, even as so defined, the subject with which I have to deal is vitally related to the whole question of the Christian attitude to society at large and to its institutions, and that the treatment of it can never be quite complete until the difficult and thorny problems of matter and spirit, absolute and relative standards of conduct, the limits of compromise, the nature of property, and in particular the economic system, have been thoroughly probed and finally settled. The undeniable inter-relatedness of these grave questions seems to some a valid ground for pleading that the single issue of war and peace cannot be satisfactorily dealt with in isolation from those other urgent problems with which it is connected. They deprecate, therefore, the advocacy of any solution of it taken by itself, and are prone to block the attempt to formulate any definite decision, theoretical or practical, in regard to it, on the ground that such a decision will have repercussions and implications in other fields of thought and conduct, and that, until these are fully tested out, no decision on war and peace can avoid inconsistency. This plea is especially attractive to socialists of a certain type, who are convinced that it is the capitalist system which is the cause of all wars, and who argue that pacifism is impossible until that system is destroyed or revolutionized, and that at any rate it is unreasonable to refuse to compromise temporarily with the institution of war, if one continues to compromise temporarily with so evil an institution as the economic system.

Without, however, denying or forgetting the close connexion of our present problem with questions of property and economics,

I take my stand with those who hold that it is permissible and right to deal with the former by itself. The problems of practical Christian living are both numerous and complex; and they neither come home to the Christian conscience, nor do they yield to conscientious scrutiny, all at once. While Christian individuals vary greatly one from another in their sensitiveness to this or that ethical issue, ethical issues have a way of becoming generally ripe for solution one at a time; and the actual method by which ethical advance has been made in the past has been by the concentrated treatment of various ethical issues in turn, each by itself, notwithstanding the fact that every solution has involved remoter consequences which for the moment had to be left unconsidered. So it has been, surely, with the passing-away of witch-burning, religious persecution, torture, duelling, and slavery. Nor is it unreasonable to suppose, though it might not perhaps be easy to demonstrate, that the actual achievement of a solution of one such problem both sharpens the moral sense of mankind, and clarifies the practical issues raised by the solution in question, in such a way as to make the next solution clear and feasible. A man walking through a mist may be aware in a general way of the direction he ought to take, but may see clearly nothing beyond the next step or two: yet it is by taking the only steps that are clear to him that he is enabled to see how to go further. So the Christian mind, by grappling determinedly with the particular issue which from time to time obtrudes itself most formidably, acquires step by step fresh measures of insight such as facilitate further successes. And there is good ground for believing that it is the ethical problem of war that is the next on our list.

It may perhaps have occurred to some of my readers ere this that, undertaking to write on "Christian pacifism", I ought at the outset to offer definitions of both terms. My reason for not defining "pacifism" here is that, while the general sense of the word is sufficiently well known, the precise sense in which the thing it designates can be described and defended as "Christian" is the very question which my whole book will endeavour to investigate and to answer (see below, pp. 65f.) In regard to the term "Christian", that again—although no one yet has produced a universally acceptable answer to the old query, "What

is Christianity?"—is sufficiently well-understood to be at least provisionally intelligible: and in so far as the word needs more precise elaboration as characterizing an ethical position, I shall endeavour to meet the need, so far as I am able, in my third chapter.

No one needs to be told that the literature on our subject, especially that produced within the last twenty-five years, is enormous. The outbreak of the present war has brought the stream almost to flood-level. I cannot claim to have read it all: but I have tried to keep in touch with the course of the discussion; and for the purpose of this present work I made a selection of the most representative books and pamphlets which have appeared since the Great War, and have worked carefully through them, as well as through a huge collection of articles and press-cuttings, in order to make sure, so far as I could, of not omitting to notice any material item in the argument. In the interests, however, of simplicity and brevity, I do not propose to quote references, except sparingly; and I shall make a special effort to be concise whenever I am reproducing thoughts and ideas which are already well-known and well-worn through having been expressed on countless earlier occasions.

One last request I make to the reader, especially if he be already adversely critical of the pacifist position. The case which I have to examine and which I propose to defend can be understood and fairly judged only as a whole. If therefore, at any particular point, a reader feels that he can see through my argument, and knows an answer which will completely disprove my conclusion, may I beg him to suspend judgment until he has read the whole book? Every man must take his own line if he is to set forth his case to the best advantage; and it will necessarily happen that some relevant considerations may seem to other minds to have been here and there overlooked. It may indeed happen that they have actually been so: but, in view of the complexity and ramifications of the argument, one may plead that the charge of oversight or evasion should not be made until the other parts of the essay have been taken into account.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

THE first requisite for an adequate solution of our problem is that we should get clear as to precisely what it is that we are to discuss. The problem arises from the Christian's sense of responsibility for the welfare of his fellow-men. In his well-known book, 'Ecce Homo', Sir J. R. Seeley rightly observed, regarding the advent of the early Church, "Henceforth it became the duty of every man gravely to consider the condition of the world around him". And whatever ill-favour the personal shortcomings of sundry philanthropists may have brought upon the eager desire to reform the world, that desire remains—as we all know—an inseparable item in any truly Christian world-view.

The Christian's efforts at reforming the world have, of course, to begin with the reformation of himself. The world-reformer's first contribution must be the consecration of his own conduct (in the widest sense of that term, and understood both positively and negatively) to the Christian standard. But inseparably linked with this personal consecration is his concern regarding the conduct of others. None of us can, or should, help wishing that our fellow-men may behave in this way rather than in that. And up to a certain point, we know we ought to make efforts to cause them in some way to comply with that wish. In the interests of the peaceful ordering of our social life, and for the defence of those unable to defend themselves, we desire our fellow-men to refrain from committing crime and to attain at least some moderate standard of decency, charity, and uprightness. And we acknowledge our obligation to make some effort, and to exert some degree or variety of pressure, with a view to the attainment of that end.

Nor is this sense of obligation a purely individual matter. It has a bearing upon the part we have to take in the corporate life of the family, the municipality, the nation, and the family

of nations. Nor, however real be the dangers incidental to any interference with the ways of others, can we be happy, either domestically or politically, with a purely isolationist attitude. It is only an unhealthy or undeveloped conscience that strives to silence the sense of corporate responsibility by asking, "Am I my brother's keeper?"

We do not need in this place to spend time examining further the motives behind this widely-felt desire in some way to control or influence our fellows. We must assume for the purpose of the argument that in Christian people it arises from a loving concern for our fellows, both for those whom we wish to change, and for those whom they might otherwise harm. We can pass on to consider what is for us the real problem, that is to say, the question as to what form or forms of pressure it is ethically legitimate for a Christian man to use, in his individual and also in his corporate capacity, as a means of causing others to act in ways which he deems essential to their own and to the general welfare.

I have hitherto used the word "pressure", in order to cover *all* methods whereby we endeavour to cause our neighbour to act or to refrain in a certain way. I have chosen it in preference to the ambiguous and therefore misleading term "force", around which the controversy has so often raged. True, indeed, it is, as James Martineau used to argue, that the essential nature of "force" is cause, and the essential nature of "cause" is will: and if, whenever the word "force" were used, we could be sure that it meant quite generally one person's will becoming a cause why another person should behave in a certain way, there would not be so strong an objection to our using it, though even so it would be less suitable than "pressure", because it suggests a *successful* attempt, whereas "pressure" is non-committal on the point of success or failure. But apart from that, the word "force" is in usage highly ambiguous: it is employed sometimes to designate the physical overcoming of violent resistance at the cost of injury and bloodshed; at other times it stands for coercion of any kind exercised on an unwilling subject; then again it can describe the gentle manipulation of an invalid or an infant; and, finally, in phrases like "the force of example" or "a forceful character", the word denotes

willingly-accepted influence. It has been plausibly urged that "force" as such is non-moral, and that its rightness or wrongness depends on the motive with which it is used. This plea is true only if the word is being used in its vaguest sense, and even then it must not be taken to prove that, provided the motive be right, no form of force is illegitimate. In view therefore of this variableness of its meaning, it is better not to use the word "force" for the purposes of argument, but to substitute for it in its general sense the word "pressure", and to make use of more precise descriptions of the varying forms of such pressure when we have occasion to discuss them.

When we come to enumerate and examine these forms, we find that they range over a wide scale, at one end of which is so gentle and unaggressive a treatment as that of personal example and magnetism, and at the other end things like torture, capital punishment, and war. Between these extremes there lie an indefinite number of varieties of pressure that can be exercised upon others, each variety differing only by infinitesimal degrees from those immediately adjoining it. I have in my possession a great accumulation of quotations and examples illustrating all these distinguishable methods of pressure. I hasten to reassure the anxious reader that I have no intention of presenting this material in extenso here: to do that would occupy too much space, and is furthermore unnecessary for the purpose of our discussion. What is necessary is that we should note the range and variety of the processes to be included—and furthermore the fact that, so far as effectiveness is concerned, while they may all be described as in some measure effective, absolutely certain effectiveness characterizes only some of the most violent methods, and even then only in a very negative and limited way. (For instance, if you generously forgive a man, you cannot be sure he will reform: if you imprison him for life, or execute him, you can be sure that he will be stopped from doing certain things you do not want him to do, but you cannot be sure that he will obey or please you in any positive way). Preliminary note must also be taken of the fact that nearly all these methods can be employed by groups of various sizes, as well as by individuals: when we come to consider their ethical quality, we shall find that this corporate

factor introduces considerable complication into the enquiry.¹

First on the list, as embodying a minimum of aggressiveness, there stands the automatic tendency of good conduct as such to reproduce itself in those who witness it—what we call “the force of example”. Closely akin to it is that rare quasi-magnetic gift which enables an individual here and there to exercise without effort a sway or authority over others,

“the power in his eye
That bow’d the will”.

With these we may place the leverage residing in intercessory prayer, whereby a man puts himself at God’s disposal for the service of others, and thus acquires added power (no less Divine for operating, as it often may, telepathically) to influence and control their lives. The force of example is powerfully reinforced by love and kindness. To trust the apparently untrustworthy is one way of calling forth honesty in him; to forgive the offender one way of converting him into a friend. What is so often called simply “non-resistance” is really only the negative accompaniment (in the form of a refusal to restrain or resist by physically violent means) of an active love for the wrongdoer. As such, it has often proved not only an effective defence against dangerous personal assault, but a powerful check to others’ undesired actions generally. On the other hand, it runs the risk of failing through being mistaken for cowardice. It can operate collectively as well as individually: it constituted the Christian Church of past days an anvil which broke many hammers; and it may yet make some unarmed or martyrdom a vanquisher of the fleets and armies of its foes. Efforts have sometimes been made, not altogether without success, to enhance the power of these non-aggressive means of securing influence by the display of unsought suffering for the purpose of moving others to shame, pity, or sympathy: at times suffering has been intentionally self-inflicted with the same end in view.

Next in point of directness would seem to stand the appeal

¹ The tabular statement at the end of this chapter (p. 45) is not intended to furnish an exact and complete enumeration and classification of the various types of pressure now to be mentioned, but only to illustrate in a rough and approximate way the broad lines of the scheme, and to assist the reader to grasp the main ideas behind it, in so far as these are integral to the argument.

made to the feelings or the judgment of others by some argument embodied in a scenic exhibition or in spoken or written words. A public procession, a military, naval, or aeronautic display, the attractive exhibition of goods in a shop-window, are all calculated to have an effect on the thoughts and behaviour of those who see them. But the spoken or written appeal covers an enormously wider variety of methods of pressure. Suggestion, advice, request, flattery, rebuke, protest, petition, advertisement, persuasion, denunciation, argument, agitation, "et hoc genus omne", embodied in conversation, letter, speech or sermon (eloquent or otherwise), lesson, pamphlet, lecture, poster, or book, are habitually used by all sorts and conditions of men with the object of causing their fellows to think and act in various special ways. Varied as are these appeals in form, they are equally varied in effectiveness. All degrees of success and failure attend them, their results depending on the infinitely diverse psychological states of those appealed to. There is thus no constancy in the relation between this or that verbal appeal and this or that consequence.

A still more active means of exerting pressure, applicable in particular to the attitude of persons under authority towards those in authority over them, is the refusal to co-operate, in one or other of its different forms. An official or an employee, for instance, may resign his post because he feels he cannot allow others to use him as their instrument or agent in some work to which he objects to being a party. More commonly, non-co-operation consists simply of disobedience to the orders of the Government or of some other authoritative body. Examples are plentiful. There were the early Christians, faced with the demand for sacrifice to the heathen gods; the conscientious objectors during the last war, faced with the Government's order to join up; the followers of Gandhi, faced with what they regarded as the generally unrighteous rule of Britain in India. It is, of course, quite conceivable that this form of pressure might be applied to a foreign invading army, as it was by the Germans when the French occupied the Ruhr-valley in 1923. Such non-co-operation, if practised on a wide scale, is a weapon of tremendous power: but it is very apt to pass over into violent resistance, and also to destroy the valuable along with the

harmful restraints which the authority defied may be exercising.

The strike and boycott are special examples of the collective use of the principle of non-co-operation, usually (though not exclusively) applied to the spheres of industry and commerce. They are so familiar as to need no description. Their strength and their weakness have been illustrated by several episodes in the history of the present century. An instance of a boycott being instituted by a national group against the domination of the foreigner is provided by the stand taken in 1919 by Korea against the Japanese: owing to the lack of foreign support, it failed of its prime object.

Classification becomes difficult as we advance, for we have now to speak, firstly, of promises and threats, and after that, of rewards and punishments, whereas some at least of the proceedings already mentioned might quite fairly be described as punishments, and the declaration of an intention to use them would, of course, constitute a threat. Nevertheless, promises and threats are worthy of separate note, as constituting distinctive types of pressure. Along with threatening we may naturally group the manifestation of anger. Here we touch on a very important instrument in the moral education of humanity. Consider the influence exerted over children and elementary persons generally by the extent to which those nearest them show pleasure or wrath at what they do. One of the basic factors in man's progressive realization of the distinction between morally worthy and morally unworthy conduct is his discovery that certain modes of behaviour evoke the approval of his more-experienced fellows, while other modes rouse their indignant resentment. Doubtless this discovery may sometimes mean that an individual is simply intimidated into avoiding what is purely unpopular or uncustomary, but not necessarily objectionable in the moral sense: none the less, the wide prevalence of moral interests among human beings generally ensures that this method of education should involve a very considerable ethical element.

Before proceeding to speak of reward and punishment, it is as well that we should ask at what point the successive methods we are describing become coercive. The question is not quite so easily answered as might at first seem possible. Clearly coercion

is not limited to physical pressure. But what precisely is it? Truth itself has been described as coercive, because human beings are normally obliged to believe it whenever it is clearly and intelligibly put before them. Yet a writer writing the truth or a preacher speaking it would not usually be described as coercing his readers or hearers. Perhaps the essence of coercion lies in the fact that it is exercised in defiance of the sustained unwillingness and resentment of him who is subjected to it. Moreover, coercion proper ordinarily designates *successful* pressure: unsuccessful pressure kept up against a man's will would be described rather as an *attempt at coercion*, although for our present purpose that distinction is not very important. Where precisely then in actual practice coercion begins it is not easy to say: but non-co-operation and threatening both seem to involve an element of it, while the strike and the boycott are certainly coercive in character. Punishments, like threats, are also forms of coercion, though their respective opposites, rewards and promises, are hardly so, since few persons are unwilling to receive them. It is, furthermore, to be observed that, while the successful use of coercive pressure, even though it be free from violence, is apt to rouse resentment, history proves that, in many cases at least, such use has not left behind it any lasting bitterness.

The offer of a reward is a frequently-used means of bringing pressure to bear upon others. Here a distinction has to be drawn between the reward offered for a contest of skill, the reward offered for a contest of luck, and the bribe. A bribe is a gift offered to a particular person in order to induce him to do something which otherwise he would not do, because it is either dangerous or morally wrong or in some other way unwelcome to him. The disapproval naturally felt for bribery, and for prizes awarded (generally in the interests of advertisement) on a basis of pure chance, ought not to be felt for rewards competed for by the exercise of skill, seeing that emulation, though capable of abuse, is in itself a healthy instinct, and is quite capable of being usefully canalized by means of a judicious system of prize-giving.

Punishment, as has just been observed, is a distinctly coercive means of control. The essence of punishment would seem to be

that it is the infliction of an unpleasant experience on a person in such a way that he will associate it as a consequence with some deed of his own which those who punish him regard as seriously evil. The purpose of punishment is regarded by some as retributive, by some as reformative, and by some again as a deterrent to others. These three qualities are not quite co-ordinate with one another: for retribution has reference primarily to the motives of the punisher, who wishes to impress upon the offender the fact that his conduct has shocked the reasonable expectations of his fellows, whereas reform and deterrence concern chiefly the outcome, whether intended or unintended, of the punishment itself. There is no reason why these three qualities should be mutually exclusive—why, for instance, retribution should not both reform the offender and deter others from offending. The fact would seem to be that all punishment is to some degree retributive in character, but that justifiable punishment should also aim both at reforming and at deterring, and is truly successful only when these aims are achieved. It is, of course, true that punishment, being always unpleasant, frequently results in embitterment and resentment on the part of the person punished: but this is by no means necessarily or always the case. We may add that the deterrence operates only when, as usually happens, other potential offenders are involved. It is clear also that the infliction of the death-penalty may be both retributive and deterrent, but has only a small chance of being reformative.

Three main types of punishment need to be distinguished.

Firstly, there is that which is incidental to the discipline of children in the home and at school. For long centuries it was assumed that liberal bodily chastisement was an indispensable requisite for the proper training of children; and there are many nauseating episodes in history and even in living memory and many nauseating passages of literature wherein this old-time notion is reflected. It has now been almost universally abandoned; and the reaction against it has by some been carried so far that they advocate the removal of all punishment and therewith virtually all discipline from the education of children. It has, however, yet to be proved that the penal element can be entirely excluded from home and school without gravely

undesirable results. On the other hand, experience shows clearly that, if the punishment is not excessive, and if the child is sure of the general good-will of the authority concerned, punishment need not result in any long-drawn-out breach of happy fellowship.

Secondly, we have to consider the quasi-private infliction of penalty by individual persons on other persons. Murder, duelling, piracy, highway-robbery, and similar acts of violence come under this heading, though wanton acts of robbery can be regarded as punishment only by a special extension of the meaning of the term—the envy of the punisher replacing the desert of the punished. From normally civilized society this method of pressure has virtually passed away: it remains only by virtue of what is known as “the unwritten law”, which is believed by many to warrant a man in killing at sight one whom he finds in unlawful possession of his house or his wife. It is also worth mentioning that, when other and better means of restraint are not available, the overbearing offender of the type familiarly known as “the bully” can often be induced by violent resistance and personal chastisement to refrain from his bullying, though (as in many other cases of punishment) he is not thereby reformed at heart.

In the third place we have the familiar practice of publicly and legally punishing offenders, through the agency of the police-system and the courts of justice set up by society at large and acting on society’s behalf. The prime motive behind this system would seem to be the universal desire of human beings to be themselves protected, and to see those dear to them protected, from wanton injustice and maltreatment at the hands of vicious and irreverent men. This natural wish broadens out into a general sense of the value of an orderly social life, wherein—by the mutual subordination of personal appetite—all may enjoy their rights at the price of fulfilling their duties, and conditions may be set up and maintained whereby matters of public interest can be conveniently organized and righteously conducted and individuals left free to pursue their private interests in peace and safety. That the judicial system of a modern democratic state is a largely successful method of securing these inestimable privileges is obvious to all. And its

success is not limited to the coercion of crime; it extends also in some degree to the reformation of the criminal, for it is said that in England some sixty per cent of the persons imprisoned for a first offence never incur that punishment a second time.

Three further points concerning the judicial punishment of crime need to be noted.

(1). While all punishment (including therefore that inflicted by the community) is bound to be painful, the infliction of extremely severe punishment is apt only to harden and embitter the offender and even to fail as a warning and deterrent to others. Capital punishment, as I have already observed, virtually robs its victim of the chance to reform. The claim that it was only by severe flogging that hooligans have been deterred from "garrotting" and other outrages has been declared to be unjustified by the facts. The abolition of capital punishment in various countries has not been observed to inaugurate an increase in murder, thus showing that what was restraining murder was not capital punishment. The use of torture has proved itself virtually valueless as a means of extorting evidence and as a deterrent penalty.

(2). It has often been urged that the element of physical coercion is integral to this judicial system. Men come to court and go to prison only because they know that, were they to resist, they would be immeasurably and hopelessly overpowered. When we point to the willingness with which our unarmed and often solitary policemen are obeyed even by those physically stronger than they, we are reminded that this obedience is rendered because the offender knows that the policeman is the authorized representative of the whole community, and that, if need be, the power of the whole community will be put forth to enforce compliance with his orders. That plea is in large measure true. But a deeper analysis reveals the fact that this hypothetical exercise of the whole community's power consists at bottom, not of a real or even a potential mustering of physical forces, but of that general prevalence of constitutional habits and decent standards of conduct which create for the support of the policeman the constraint of a strong social sense. Another illustration of the same fundamental fact is the unmistakable and growing readi-

ness to obey the policeman and to comply with the law generally, not from fear of punishment, but from the spontaneous habit of decent respect for the public welfare.

(3) The demonstration of this last point is carried further by a study of the use of the vote. There are some idealists who object to voting because it is a form of coercion. They point out that, if a measure is passed into law simply because those who vote for it outnumber those who vote against it, the outvoted minority will be compelled to comply with it against their will and better judgment, and will be judicially punished (say by fine or imprisonment or even worse) if they decline to do so. Objecting to violent coercion, they object also to the voting which may lead to it and which will in any case lead to the threat of it. Such persons overlook the fact that, thanks to the constitutional habits bred in us by democracy, men have grown imperceptibly into a state of mind wherein, realizing that law and order in the community take priority over their personal preferences or opinions on a practical issue, they are of their own accord ready and willing to comply with the decision of the majority, even when they themselves have voted on the other side. Certainly their non-compliance would be judicially punished; but their willingness to comply is at bottom not concession to a threat, but loyalty to a wide political principle of which they themselves heartily approve. In being outvoted, therefore, they are not really being coerced, and in outvoting others they are not really coercing them—for the whole procedure rests upon a previous mutual agreement. The objection to the use of the vote on the ground that it is coercive would therefore seem to fall to the ground.

The final item in our series of methods of pressure is war. Inasmuch as our main concern is to investigate the ethical issues raised by war, it will be necessary to make a fairly close examination of war as an institution and of what it involves. Before, however, we proceed to make that investigation, some general remarks on the series as a whole may be offered.

It will have been observed that, although we began with the least violent and finish with the most violent, and have tried to arrange the intervening stages in the order of decreasing gentleness, we have not succeeded in producing a simple rectilinear

series. One division has been observed to overlap another; offshoots have had to be noted; and quite clearly, many a practical course of action might represent more than one item listed in our collection. Further, we found it so difficult as to be almost impossible to say precisely at what point in the series the methods described began to be coercive. Notwithstanding this general difficulty, however, of drawing sharp lines of demarcation, we may yet accept as a sound general principle of division the distinction between that non-coercive pressure which we can designate roughly as influence, which is not resented by him on whom it is exercised, and which, if successful, modifies his personal preferences in a certain direction—and, on the other hand, coercion proper, which is exerted in defiance of the subject's disapproval and resentment, and which, even if successful, usually alters only his practical decision, not the state of his heart. Coercive pressure, as so defined, is itself divisible into two varieties, psychological and physical (though the use of the *threat* to punish physically illustrates the difficulty of drawing a hard and fast boundary between them); and physical coercion finally can be either that which does not injuriously damage the person in mind or body (such, for example, as humane imprisonment), or that which does (such as severe or prolonged imprisonment, torture, mutilation, capital punishment, or war).

Another distinction which serves to complicate the problem is that not all the modes of treatment enumerated are the work of private individuals acting simply on their own authority and with an eye to purely personal interests. Some of them are acts done by individuals in their corporate capacity, either as members of a social group which for certain purposes takes action as a moral unit (e.g., in signing a petition, forming a procession, participating in a riot, or recording a vote), or as the duly-appointed representatives of such a group (e.g., when a policeman runs an offender in, not because he personally dislikes him, but in his capacity as the official delegate of the community at large). In attempting later to assess the ethical legitimacy or illegitimacy of these several types of pressure, we shall have to consider what bearing this corporate or representative character of certain of the types has upon the question

of their ethical propriety: it is quite conceivable that a conclusion which is valid in purely personal relationships might not be valid, or at least not equally valid, in corporate relationships. At the same time, it is clear that the distinction needs careful watching, lest it be found to lead to an untenable moral dualism: for it has been truly remarked that the corporate acts of a group are of necessity on a lower ethical level than that of its best members.

We must now turn to a closer examination of the character of war as a means of exerting pressure on others.

At the outset we may note that war is quite obviously not a variety of private or personal activity, but an activity on the part of men acting as members of a corporate whole. This does not mean that the great laws which ought to control human conduct do not apply to individuals taking part in warfare, for clearly there *are* deeds (e.g., the application of torture) which, it may well be held, no Christian ought to do, even as the impersonal representative of society. But it does mean that their actions cannot be judged as if they were simply and purely matters of private life: and a certain amount of pacifist apologetic is rendered unconvincing by the fact that it betrays no consciousness of any such distinction (see below, pp. 32, 34, 43).

War is necessarily violent and coercive to an extreme degree. The concrete forms which military activity takes vary greatly with different peoples and different epochs; and in studying it as a problem facing the civilized man of to-day, we must take care to avoid both exaggeration and understatement in the effort to depict the facts as they really are.

(a). In the first place, war to-day involves, as it has always done, the international and wholesale slaughter and maiming of combatants at the hands of one another. As an honest Congregational deacon grudgingly conceded to me during the Great War, when as a pacifist I drew his attention to the characteristic task of the soldier, "Of course, they have to kill one another". The killing and maiming is for the most part done either by discharging shells from heavy guns, or by dropping bombs from the air, or by throwing hand-grenades or bombs (processes which result not only in death, but in indiscriminate mutilation

of all degrees of severity short of death), or by shooting cartridges from machine-guns and rifles (which effect less actual mutilation, but otherwise kill or wound indiscriminately), or by stabbing with the bayonet. As between these methods of destroying life, the use of the cartridge is perhaps less horrible than the others, especially if (as, for instance, is the case with the sniper) the business can be done at a respectable distance. Ghastly as is the damage done by shells, bombs, and grenades (the victim possibly having his whole face shot away, and yet living), the prize for hideous brutality must be awarded to the bayonet. Whether, however, any *ethical* distinction accompanies this distinction in ghastliness may well be doubted; for while on the one hand it might be said that bayonet-fighting is not really worse than shooting, and seems worse only because of our sentimental queasiness, it might on the other hand be replied with equal plausibility that the horror of bayonet-fighting serves only to bring home the true nature of *all* fighting, the only difference between them—that of local proximity—being hardly sufficient to make any difference morally. Be that as it may, bayonet-fighting (in which every man in the infantry is trained) involves an encounter at close quarters and the destruction of the enemy's life as it were with one's very hands.

Here, for instance, is an extract from the fourth edition of a manual of military training printed in 1923 for use in the United States Army (and modified subsequently—about 1926—as a result of protest): "Bayonet fighting is possible only because red-blooded men naturally possess the fighting instinct. This inherent desire to fight and kill must be carefully watched for and encouraged by the instructor. It first appears in a recruit when he begins to handle his bayonet with facility, and increases as his confidence grows. With the mastering of his weapon there comes to him a sense of personal fighting superiority and a desire for physical conflict. . . . He longs to test his ability against an enemy's body; to prove that his bayonet is irresistible. He pictures an enemy at every practice thrust and drives home his bayonet with strength, precision and satisfaction. Such a man will fight as he has trained—consistently, spiritedly and effectively". A little later in the same work: "To finish an

opponent who hangs on, or attempts to pull you to the ground, always try to break his hold by driving the knee or foot to his crotch and gouging his eyes with your thumbs". Very similar instructions could be quoted from the official Manual published by the Dutch Royal Military Academy at Breda.

There lies before me as I write a printed copy of a lecture on 'The Spirit of the Bayonet', delivered by a Sergeant-Major on the 19th of July 1918 to a certain O.T.C. The Commanding Officer present thanked the lecturer, and called for three cheers for him, which were given. The lecture was printed as a pamphlet, inscribed "Not for publication"; and copies were distributed to members of the corps, but were afterwards withdrawn by authority. A single copy however escaped capture; and mine was one of a number reprinted from it. Here are a few extracts. ". . . . It was a good thing to show Tommy how to kill a 'boche' and to get that delightful feeling of putting him out with a bayonet—to feel that he had finished off one of those Germans. But there is something more to be taught We had to teach the bayonet-fighters that after killing their first man they had got to go forward and kill more, and still more. You've got to get down and hook them out with the bayonet; you will enjoy that, I can assure you. (Laughter.) You will want the bayonet to clear the trench. And it is because I know the value of the bayonet that I want you to forget sympathy . . . You will certainly know what it feels like to drive that bayonet home and get it out again; you will feel that you will like to go on killing . . . Get sympathy out of your head. We washed sympathy out of the service years ago. We go out to kill. . . . You go straight forward looking for somebody to kill with your bayonet—in the neck, in the eye, in the lungs—the whole job is to get the point in and get it out quickly. . . . That is the spirit to have—to keep on killing. . . . And I say to you: if you see a wounded German, shove him out and have no nonsense about it. . . . What is the use of a wounded German, anyway? He goes into the hospital and the next thing that happens is that you meet him again in some other part of the line. That's no good to us, is it? So when you see a German laid out, just finish him off. . . . Get hold of your men; whatever you do, see that these men are taught to kill. . . ." The shocking vio-

lence of the language here quoted is doubtless to be in part accounted for by the personal character and sentiments of the speaker: but that he did not seriously misrepresent the character and spirit of bayonet-fighting may be verified by the reference to the personal recollection of anyone who has been through it. I remember as a boy hearing an officer quote the instructor: "Twist the bayonet as you draw it out so as to render the wound mortal" ("so as to make a jagged gash" is, I believe, the more modern formula). Did space permit, further evidence that in the Great War our soldiers were encouraged to kill wounded Germans could be adduced.

I add, however, by way of confirmation, two quotations from Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson's book, 'The Choice before us', first published in 1917. "Thus, for example, in the training for bayonet charges the men are taught to kick the enemy in the genital organs at the same time that they make their thrust. They are trained to charge at sacks or dummy men on which the vital parts are marked. I have heard of men fainting with physical horror under this discipline" (p. 28). "It is only those who have lived weeks and months in the trenches, those who have taken part in a bayonet charge, those who have struggled like brutes with feet and hands and knives and clubs, who have trampled on the faces and mangled limbs of wounded men, and staggered away at last hardly knowing what they have been doing; those who have lain hour after hour between the lines at night, tortured themselves and listening to the screams of the tortured; those who have hung in agony on barbed wire till a spout of liquid fire released them: these men, with their bowels dropping out, with their lungs shot through, with their faces torn away, with their limbs blown into space, are the men who know what war is" (p. 53).

If any reader be disposed to complain, on grounds of decency and taste, of gruesome details like these being repeated here, and to urge that everyone knows that war is a horrible business and that there is no necessity to harrow a reader's feelings by such gross realism, my reply will be that we cannot expect to be able to judge a thing rightly if we disguise from ourselves the true nature of what we have to judge, and that it ill becomes those who defend the rightness of occasionally participating in

war to object to the reality of what they defend being clearly seen and fully described.

I do not, however, wish to anticipate, by a sort of snap-vote, based on an emotional appeal, the conclusion of our main enquiry. But I would at least venture to remark that proceedings of the kind just delineated stand in need of a great deal of justifying, if indeed they can be justified at all. For it must always be remembered that what has to be justified is not the brave *endurance* of these horrors, but the wilful *infliction* of them—a distinction often ignored, yet quite vital to our discussion. Certain preliminary suggestions advanced in defence of the infliction of them may conveniently be dealt with at this stage.

It has, for instance, been urged that the killing of one another by the combatants is not the object or essence of war, but that it is simply a frequent and regrettable accompaniment of it—incidental to it, that is, but not necessarily inseparable from it. Thus the late Dr. P. T. Forsyth, in his 'Christian Ethic of War' (1916), wrote: "It should be remembered that the object of war is not to kill but to bind the strong superman . . . A disabling wound would really serve the purpose as well as death, if we could inflict the one without the other, and make it last long enough for the purpose . . . the State does not order him to kill but to occupy territory by a process in which the risk to life is great" (pp. 7, 12). Schleiermacher had, about a century earlier, urged a similar argument; and attention has been called to it in more recent days. One is reminded by it of the distinctions drawn in books on formal logic between (1) the properties, (2) the inseparable accidents, and (3) the separable accidents, characterizing and so describing that which is to be defined, but forming no part of the formal definition of the term by which it is designated. "Slaughter", on these conditions, may perhaps be no part of the definition of "War": but it is certainly one of its "properties"; and for practical purposes the abstract possibility that war is conceivable and definable without it does not materially affect the situation. I remember seeing in a young officer's note-book that he had been told in a lecture that one of the objects of some military operation or other was "to inflict casualties". Men going to war are definitely trained and

are personally prepared to slaughter, and, if war is waged at all, numbers of them actually do so; and for the purpose of an ethical investigation, that is enough, be the logical definition of war what it may.

Some pacifists have made the practice of killing the enemy in battle a ground for contending that all war is necessarily immoral because it involves the committing of murder. The substance of Lowell's well-known outburst in 'The Biglow Papers',

"Ez fer war, I call it murder,
There you hev it plain an' flat",

has been repeated countless times and with passionate conviction. It ought not to be too impatiently swept aside as gratuitous caricature, for there does undoubtedly exist in the violent destruction of human life an ethical element common to murder and the slaughter of the foe. Milton was aware of it when he made Adam liken to the murderer Cain those

"who thus deal Death
Inhumanly to men, and multiply
Ten thousand fould the sin of him who slew
His Brother; for of whom such massacher
Make they but of thir Brethren, men of men?"

All the same, the distinction between them is one that ought not to be overlooked. It is significant that in Jewish ethics murder was from the earliest times regarded as a very serious crime, whereas the pacifist objection to bloodshed on the field of battle never so much as appears. And even so indifferent a moralist as Iago was fain to confess,

"Though in the trade of war I have slain men,
Yet do I hold it very stuff o' the conscience
To do no contrived murder".

Whatever conclusion we may be led to regarding the iniquity of killing in war, we ought not to forget that it is not to be ethically equated with the murder of a personal enemy, even though there may be some real similarity between them, especially for him who fights in an unjust cause.

Another attempt at a simple and quick settlement of the

ethical issue has been to appeal to the characteristic Christian maxim, "Love your enemies", and to urge that such things as a soldier has to do to the enemy cannot by any stretch of imagination or skill of argument be held to be consistent with love. I am personally disposed to regard the argument as cogent: but it is only right to take note of the ground alleged by non-pacifists for refusing to accept it. This ground is usually the fact that, in fighting one another, soldiers are acting, not in a private and personal, but in a purely representative capacity: their efforts to kill may be quite free from personal hatred, for the same reason that their bloodshed does not brand them with the mark of Cain. The distinction between personal and representative action is, it must be granted, a valid one; and the soldier wounded to death may take his treatment simply as "fortune de guerre" and have no wish to complain of any hatred felt for him by the man who has wounded him. On the other hand, it seems impossible, without grave risk of unreality, to maintain seriously that the violent infliction of wounds and death is a form of behaviour expressive of, or even consistent with, love, or that successful bayonet-fighting, for all its corporate and representative character, is not a clear manifestation of hatred. Our conclusions on this issue are surely confirmed by the fact that the military authorities during the last war took steps to check and prevent the rise of any temporary friendliness between the soldiers on opposite sides. Had the mutual killing not been inconsistent with love, there would have been no fear (as there evidently was) that fraternization would interfere with it. I have seen it stated in print that in 1918 our officers were actually given an order bidding them teach their men to hate the enemy.

(b). The extent to which and the ways in which civilians are made to suffer in war-time has in the past varied greatly with changing conditions and different peoples. There have been campaigns in which the invading army has massacred-off the civilian population as it advanced: but this procedure has for the most part been confined to specifically punitive expeditions, or to invasions conducted by uncivilized tribes. Up to a century or two ago the population of a city taken by storm was regularly given up to be butchered and plundered at will by the victorious

besiegers. This international slaughter of civilians is no longer the custom in war between civilized powers: but what has in that way been gained by some growth of humane sentiment has been largely counterbalanced by the formidable increase in the destructive efficiency of the weapons used. The employment of high-explosive shells in the bombardment of cities (whether from guns or aeroplanes), and the dropping of incendiary bombs and bombs emitting poison-gas, have placed civilian life in greater peril even than that caused by the more wilfully-savage customs of by-gone days. No longer, as in the time of King Henry V,

“the flesh’d soldier, rough and hard of heart,
In liberty of bloody hand shall range
With conscience wide as hell, mowing like grass
Your fresh-fair virgins and your flowering infants”:

but our women and children face to-day a prospect no less appalling and far more frequent, the prospect namely of being burnt to death, poisoned with noxious fumes, or having their tender bodies suddenly ripped to pieces or crushed to death by one or other of the deadly weapons which science has now placed within the flesh’d soldier’s hand. There is no need of more words to elaborate the physical and mental horrors thus overhanging us: suffice it to say that in any modern war an indefinite number of human fatalities and casualties are bound to occur, not to mention the indefinite amount of destruction visited upon the precious products of human skill and industry.

We are urged by some not to forget certain considerations on the other side of the account—for instance, that the infliction of sheer terror is likely to defeat the inflictor’s final object; that the German Government in the present war is said to have promised not to use bacteriological weapons of destruction; that gas-warfare is by common consent reserved for cases of extreme provocation; that no new gases have been invented since the Great War; that science has enlarged our powers of self-defence and of healing as well as our powers of destruction; and so on. Such pleas may well be true, but they do not greatly relieve the appalling horror of the prospect. “Vacant chaff, well meant for grain”! And what can be said of the moral quality of

the practice which involves the wilful infliction of such unspeakable suffering—what beyond the point already noticed, namely, that these things are done not from personal spite, but by men representing a nation to persons representing another nation? It has been pleaded that this killing of civilians is not deliberate, but truly incidental (like the accidental destruction of innocent lives in the quelling, say, of a violent riot), that what is aimed at is not their bodies and homes but buildings of military importance adjoining their homes, and that therefore warning is frequently given before a bombardment begins, so that non-combatants may have an opportunity of taking refuge from the peril. The plea of incidentality has in this case rather more justification than when applied to the killing of combatants: but when a man takes a course which he knows perfectly well is in practice bound to involve certain consequences, he accepts responsibility for those consequences, however “incidental” they may in strict theory be. Furthermore, the usages of modern warfare (as seen in China, Spain, Poland, and now Finland also) are such that the distinction between incidental and intentional damage shrinks to vanishing point; and for all practical purposes the destruction of countless civilian lives is as deliberate as it was aforetime in the sacking of a town, the main difference being that it is more efficiently carried out from a distance.

(c). A less spectacular though sufficiently terrible weapon in modern warfare is that of preventing the enemy-country from obtaining food-supplies. The true nature of this weapon is largely concealed by the deceptive impersonality of its use. No individual or definable group of individuals in the one country actually and personally starves any individual or definable group of individuals in the other country. It needs an effort of the imagination to enable us to realize what a food-blockade really means in practical experience. It means the necessity in countless homes of watching beloved children going daily undernourished, getting stunted in growth, falling ill, and in many cases dying; it means watching the sick becoming weaker and weaker through the impossibility of giving them the nourishment they need; it means watching aged parents dying-off prematurely through sheer debility and powerlessness against the assaults of illness and advancing age. During the last war a

million women and children in Central Europe died of starvation as a result of the British blockade: some put the number considerably higher. The flood of human anguish incidental to a successful food-blockade eludes precise measurement and easily escapes consideration. But it is there; and he who makes war makes himself a party to trying his best to let it loose.

(d). We may consider next a group of miscellaneous social results of war, varying in their degrees of immediacy and inevitability, but all very clearly exemplified in the case of the Great War, and all at least in some degree likely as a result of the present war.

There is first of all the vast multiplication of sexual misdeeds. When thousands of men are removed from all the amenities and safeguards of home-life and from the company of their women-folk, it is a virtual certainty that many of them will succumb to such temptations to illicit intercourse as come to hand, with the consequent spread of loathsome venereal diseases. When thousands of young wives are left alone by the departure of their husbands on active service, it is a virtual certainty that a percentage of them will be led into adultery, with the consequent ruin of their home-life, and with disastrous effects on their children. There can, I think, be no doubt that, in a more general way, the widespread drop in the standard of sexual purity in England during the last twenty-five years is in part due to the general moral slackness resulting from war-time conditions. A similar, if less tragic deterioration is bound to take place in the matter of drinking. Under the general stress and disturbance and excitement of war, with innumerable meetings and partings, the appetite for intoxicating liquor inevitably grows. A twenty-five per cent increase in the sale of beer is stated to have been reported as one of the outstanding features of the first week of the present war in this country. It does not require much arguing to show that, even supposing this estimate to be exaggerated, very sinister developments in the way of intemperance are to be feared. A great increase in gambling also began with the outbreak of war.

Another very marked feature of social and national life in the last war was the rise and prevalence of a sort of blatant and fanatical hatred of the enemy, which showed itself in vitriolic

abuse of them in speech and writing, in a testy intolerance of even just criticism directed against our own side and of any appreciation of good on the side of our enemies, in eager credulity towards mere rumours redounding to their discredit, and worst of all in the shameless invention and ready dissemination of falsehoods as a means of propaganda. The public atmosphere, during both the Boer-War of 1899-1902 and the Great War of 1914-1918, well illustrated Lord Morley's dictum, that "sheer blatancy, at all times a power, in war-time is supreme". Such was the bitterness engendered by the sufferings of the Allies in the latter war that at the close of it they were, as nations, found to be psychologically and morally incapable of forgiving the beaten enemy, healing their relationships with him, and establishing a lasting peace. It is certainly true that, during this present war, up to the time of writing, the British press and the state of public feeling generally have exhibited but little of that patriotic frenzy which has manifested itself so virulently on earlier occasions. Whether, if the struggle is prolonged, we shall succeed in keeping free from it remains to be seen. I have heard it confidently predicted in pacifist circles that, if Britain were to get involved in war, a Fascist form of government would certainly be sooner or later established. There is at present no sign of such a thing being destined to happen; and perhaps we may reasonably hope that it will never happen.

The effect of war-conditions on the character of the children begotten and born in the course of it is a very serious item in the general account, though one that is often ignored. The strain and anxiety experienced by their mothers during the months of pregnancy is extremely apt to lead to their being constitutionally nervy if not positively abnormal, while the terror of air-raids is responsible for a good deal of definite insanity in offspring. What this condition of things means for the on-coming generation throughout the whole population, if the war lasts for several years, is clearly very serious.

A less easily definable but still very real consequence of war is the general moral deterioration that it sets up. The alarming multiplicity of cases of murder, homicide, and personal violence in this country and in America in the years after the Great

War was undoubtedly in large measure due to the close acquaintance with bloodshed which multitudes of men had formed during their service abroad. The younger generation showed clear signs of suffering from the collapse of home-discipline, while alongside of the marked slackness in morals there occurred a very clear drop in intellectual capacity, as the experience of schools and colleges abundantly showed.

It has indeed been pleaded, in regard to this general moral deterioration and to those special forms of it mentioned above, that war, like all great experiences, tends to make the good better and the bad worse, but that it tests character rather than alters it, since sin lies in the will, and circumstances cannot of themselves make us better or worse. But clearly the sinner *is* made worse by repeatedly sinning; and to put him in any set of circumstances in which he must find it immensely harder to resist temptation is, taken by itself, to do him grievous wrong, even though in the last analysis the responsibility for yielding to it is his, and not ours.

In addition to this we may note, as a consequence both of the financial stress, and still more perhaps of the all-pervasive fear of premature bereavement, the unwillingness of married couples to produce children. That unwillingness is not, of course, wholly due to war-time conditions: a short-sighted love of personal ease has a lot to do with it. But the dread of war has immensely accentuated the sad shortage of children in our midst.

Finally, there must be mentioned, as the last item in this group of evils more or less inevitably resulting from war, the economic chaos, the unemployment, and therewith the social distress, induced by the ever-mounting financial expense of war and of the preparations for it. The Marquess of Lothian writes: "It has been estimated by Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler that the last war . . . cost 30,000,000 lives and £80,000,000,000. 'With that amount', he has said, 'we could have built a £500 house with £200 worth of furniture and placed it on five acres of land worth £20 an acre for every family in the United States, Canada, Australia, England, Wales, Ireland, Scotland, France, Belgium, Germany, and Russia. There would have been enough left over to give to every city of 20,000 inhabitants and over in all these

countries a £1,000,000 library and a £2,000,000 University. Out of the balance we could have set aside a sum at 5 per cent interest which would have paid for all time a £200 yearly salary for 125,000 teachers and 125,000 nurses. After having done all this we could still have bought up all France and Belgium and everything they possessed in 1914, every home, factory, church, railway, and street car'. That was the price paid for national sovereignty twenty years ago. What will be the price next time?" (in 'Church, Community, and State', vol. vii, pp. 16f.).

(e). It has sometimes been claimed by pacifists that war settles nothing. This declaration is apparently prompted by the realization that the outcome of war shows which of the two parties was the stronger, but not necessarily which of them was in the right as against the other, and further that a country beaten in a war will naturally look for an opportunity to resume the struggle under more promising conditions, and that many defeated countries have in point of fact done so. But whatever be the precise basis of the claim, there can be no doubt that, if cast in the blunt form of saying that war settles nothing, it cannot be admitted as warranted by the facts of experience. It was war that settled that the Persian Empire should not swamp European Greece, that the Moslems should not reign north of the Pyrenees, that Elizabethan England should remain Protestant, that Holland should be independent of Spanish control, that Napoleon should not be the despot of Europe, and that the Southern states of North America should not permanently secede from the Northern. There is, however, a real sense in which we may speak of the futility of war. To begin with, the wrong side is as likely to win as the right, and indeed has often done so: in such cases war proves not only to have served no good purpose, but to have made matters worse. Further, even when the right side wins, war may indeed succeed in preventing or stopping certain forms of wrong-doing on the part of the beaten enemy, and that (let us candidly admit) may be a very important achievement; but it almost always leaves behind in him a feeling of soreness, which contains the seeds of future trouble. He has been overpowered, but not reconciled; and muttering to himself, "Better luck next time", he watches for the opportunity of getting his own back. "It is a great truth",

wrote Mrs. Gaskell, "that you cannot extinguish violence by violence. You may put it down for a time; but while you are crowing over your imaginary success, see if it does not return with seven devils worse than its former self!"

War therefore may be in a sense effective; but its effectiveness is very straitly limited. It is most unreliable at the very point where mankind is chiefly disposed to seek its help, namely, as a guarantee of security. True, when the issue is once joined and the conflict is in progress, many will be in a position in which weapons of war are their only defence against the risk of destruction: Londoners, for instance, are at this moment dependent for safety on the protective measures devised for them by the army. (Even so, it must be pointed out that the civilian population is exposed to far greater danger in time of war under present conditions than at any previous time in history: to talk therefore, as men used to, of fighting in defence of their homes, wives, and children, has largely lost its meaning). At the same time, it is true in a broader sense that the possession of armaments is itself necessarily a cause of national insecurity. It cannot be denied that the possession of armaments obliges neighbouring nations also to possess them, that the very possession of them constitutes a temptation to use them ("for iron of itself", as Homer says, "draws a man on"), and that these facts, coupled with the natural desire of the beaten party to try again, must result—and are known by history frequently to result—in the series of bloody conflicts threatening to become interminable.

Meanwhile, the enormous and growing cost of modern war in lives and money is tending to prove that even those good results which it can achieve are not worth what has to be spent in the achieving of them. The alarming increase in the efficiency of scientific warfare as regards its powers of destruction bids fair to involve the entire civilized world in general ruin, and thus to reduce the whole idea of achieving any net gain by means of war to an absurdity. When we consider the condition of Europe to-day in the light of the idealistic hopes with which the Great War was entered upon, we begin to understand what is meant by the phrase "the futility of war". Armed violence, when used to check armed violence, tends in the long run to

aggravate the very evil it set out to assuage. The necessity and justice of each item in the never-ending series of conflicts may seem quite clear at the time; but what are we to say to its serious threat never to end?

"Believe me, prince,
I am not glad that such a sore of time
Should seek a plaster by contemn'd revolt,
And heal the inveterate canker of one wound
By making many".

(f). The last point regarding the character of war which needs discussion at this stage is the question of its similarity or dissimilarity to the police-system. Since for many the justification of war largely turns on this similarity, we must state and examine the case for it with the utmost care.

The argument, as I understand it, is roughly as follows. Within any particular modern civilized nation, the public peace is kept and the persons and property of individual citizens are defended against the wrongful attacks of others, only because the state, having secured a monopoly of physical power, has at its disposal—in the police-force and the law-courts—amply sufficient material for the discovery and seizure of the wrongdoer, for the fair and orderly investigation of his deed, and for the infliction upon him of a legal penalty which so far as possible shall undo the evil effects of his crime and prevent a recurrence of it. The success of the system is clearly dependent upon the state's possession and exercise of sufficient power to enforce its decision upon any potentially or actually rebellious offender (see above, pp. 22–24). It has been over and over again urged in argument against pacifism that, in the relations between states (as distinct from those between individuals within a single state), if intolerable wrongdoing is to be kept in check, some power analogous to the police-force must be available to coerce the offending unit. If some federal scheme (such as has worked so successfully among the United States of North America) could be established for the settlement of all international disputes, and if the federation could for this purpose be furnished with armaments of overwhelming strength to enable it to compel any two nations at strife to submit their case

to impartial arbitration and abide by the arbitrator's decision, that would be the best arrangement practicable at present. Here we have the case for the formation of an "International Police-Force", to be used under the auspices of the League of Nations. It is plausibly argued that, if such a force could be formed, resistance to its authority would be as rare as is resistance to the authority of the police among the citizens of our own country. But failing that, a nation refusing, when invited, to submit its case to arbitration, and proceeding to enforce against its neighbour demands which the latter considers unjust, must—in the absence of an overwhelmingly strong third party, to whom appeal can be made—be resisted by force of arms. If the armed forces of the state, it is pleaded, are warranted in coercing evil men within its own borders, they are equally warranted in coercing evil men who enter it from beyond its borders. This point was forcibly urged by Canon J. B. Mozley, in a famous sermon preached before the University of Oxford in 1871, long before the days of the League of Nations. With the advent of the League, and therewith the conceivability of an International Police-Force, the argument has been reiterated on all hands with more confidence and plausibility than before.

That it does possess a considerable measure, not of plausibility only, but of cogency, must, I think, be in all fairness conceded. On a number of crucial points the analogy is a sound one. Subject to the provisos indicated above on pp. 23f., its picture of the police-system corresponds to the facts. Further, nations, like individuals, must be recognized as in certain relationships and to a certain degree moral units, capable of acting nobly or ignobly, greedily or generously, haughtily or justly. Up to a point, also, they are capable of being compelled by force of arms to keep within the limits of international law. The combined attack of several nations of Europe on the France of Napoleon Bonaparte might be cited as a case in point. The submission of all the American States to the suzerainty of the Union, with its Supreme Court, is a still better instance, as it exemplifies the operation of the overwhelmingly strong third party which adjudicates impartially between the rival disputants. As for the glaring gap between police-coercion and the waging of war, that is at least in part covered by the action of

the military in quelling a riot (as in the case of the Gordon riots of 1780) and by the quasi-military operations needful in America for the suppression of gangsters.

There are, however, a number of important points in which the analogy does not hold: and these dissimilarities should warn us against assuming too hastily that anything that can be said in defence of the one system can be said with equal propriety in defence of the other. The logic-books tell us that it is a fallacy to treat an analogy as equivalent to a proof: and while this particular analogy is undoubtedly forcible, such weaknesses as it has should constrain us to look further, before we admit the plea that it really disposes of the pacifist case.

I urged above (pp. 23 f.) that the real reason why the police-system worked so smoothly was not simply because it was, in point of actual fact, possessed of irresistible physical power, but at least equally (if not more fundamentally) because it was functioning in the midst of a willingly law-abiding and decently-behaved population. The United States of America could fairly claim to resemble in this respect a community of law-abiding citizens: and even an International Police-Force, operating under the League of Nations, would have something of that kind for its support. Such a degree of resemblance is not to be despised; and I hope to consider later the view which Christian pacifists ought to take of the advocacy of such a force (see below, pp. 219-221). At the moment, I need only remark that the absence as yet among nations of any international equivalent of what we know as "the civic sense" among individuals weakens very considerably the force of the analogy under consideration. Doubtless it might be said that we ought to work for the upbuilding of such an international civic sense: but until such a sense *is* built up, the possibility of an International Police-Force analogous to the civic police-force is very remote. Still weaker is the analogy when appealed to as justifying one nation undertaking to deal with another as the policeman (and, we may add, the barrister, the jury, the judge, and the prison-warder) deals with the individual law-breaker. Such a nation may be able in some cases to count on the general approval of the other nations of the world. But that is as yet a very different thing from the strong community-sense so

essential to the proper administration of public justice among the citizens of a particular country.

Another important point of difference is the extent of damage or risk of damage involved in the two systems, in particular the damage that falls on innocent persons and on persons not in any direct way responsible for the trouble. The persons coerced by the police are those only who may reasonably be suspected of being guilty. They are normally coerced without suffering any personal injury. They suffer no punishment unless on careful enquiry they are proved to have deserved it. In war, on the contrary, the combatants who slay one another are as a rule in no way responsible for their nation's misdeed, and in no way capable of remedying it. "These sheep, what have they done?" Moreover, they slay not only one another, but (under modern conditions) multitudes of innocent civilians as well, who are not even representing, as combatants, the cause of the country they inhabit. It is easy, and indeed in a measure just, to reply that the damage in the two cases is only a question of degree, that individual law-breakers usually escape injury on arrest only because they know they have no chance of successfully resisting, that the soldiers slain suffer, not as hated wrongdoers, but as conscious, willing, and acknowledged representatives of a community, and that, as for the innocent sufferers, they are involved, not only in the case of war, but whenever the police have to take extreme measures, as in dealing with rioters or gangsters (though admittedly to a lesser degree here than in time of war). Just as it would be unreasonable to ignore these explanations, so perhaps would it be equally unreasonable to contend that they suffice to meet the objection based upon this particular difference between the two methods. I shall plead in a later chapter that questions of degree in matters of practical conduct often make all the difference between what is right and what is wrong. And, as I have already argued (pp. 25 f., 32, 34), the fact that men kill one another, not as private individuals, but as the impersonal representatives of their respective countries, does not of itself settle the question of the rightness of their actions.

Summing up, we may say that the analogy between war and police-activity is real and possibly even close, and must there-

fore be allowed for in any ethical assessment we may frame, but that it is not sufficiently close to constitute it (as many controversialists urge) a demonstration that, if one is to be ethically justified, there cannot be any fault to find with the other.

We have thus concluded the preparatory stage in the investigation of our problem. Abandoning the attempt to operate with the unanalysed concept of "force", we have realized that both war and the police-coercion to which it is so frequently likened are items at one end of a long series of various kinds of pressure, that these kinds of pressure can be at least roughly classified as non-coercive and coercive (according as they are exercised with or against the consent of the person subjected to them), and that the coercive may in their turn be broadly distinguished as non-injurious and injurious. For the purpose of framing a right judgment on the institution of war, we have given an account of its activities and effects, and have endeavoured also to assess the extent to which it is ethically similar to the exercise of coercion by the police and the law-courts. Our next step must be to consider the means at our disposal for determining which of the various types of pressure enumerated can be considered compatible with a Christian standard of conduct.

TABULAR STATEMENT ILLUSTRATING THE TENTATIVE CLASSIFICATION OF THE VARIOUS METHODS OF PRESSURE (see the footnote on p. 17 above)		
	General and Individual	Collective
Methods of Pressure	Non-coercive (influence, etc., etc.)	Passive-resistance to persecution, etc. The "martyr-nation" The collective hunger-strike Processions "Leaflets," Petitions
	Coercive	Voting Active resistance to persecution, etc. Strike. Boycott. "The War of Nerves" School-discipline Humane police-administration Mild imprisonment The Police-truncheon "Do-the-boys Hall" Prolonged imprisonment The cat Capital punishment Armed rebellion War Mediaeval persecution. Oriental penalties Gratuitous massacre

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM (*continued*)

IT is not given to mortal man here below to attain to really ultimate solutions of the great questions with which life faces him. A wide difference exists, in the matter of solubility, between the nearer and the remoter problems. Eggs and butter, clothes and books, pounds, shillings, and pence, can be handled with a fair measure of precision; in dealing with them, we may be said to know exactly what we are about. The way is similar, though less plain, when we are dealing with one another and with the visible and tangible phases of the material world. But when we strive to penetrate further, conscious that

"beyond this masquerade
Of shape and color, light and shade,
And dawn and set, and wax and wane,
Eternal verities remain",

then our difficulties begin to multiply. The questions with which we try to grapple seem to become increasingly unmanageable: and though we are constitutionally and rightly

"keen thro' wordy snares to track
Suggestion to her inmost cell",

our progress resembles, not so much the discovery of an inmost cell, as the ascent into a more and more rarified atmosphere, wherein all things gradually fade away into impenetrable mystery. Philosophy sets herself the gigantic task of systematizing experience; theology specializes in the work of interpreting man's religious interests: and though each of them has a certain sphere of particulars peculiar to itself, at the deeper levels their fields are the same. A theology like Barthianism, which professes independence of philosophy, is bound to be arbitrary and unconvincing: a philosophy, like behaviourism or logical positivism, which gives no adequate account of man's religious experience, can only be rejected for ignoring a vital section of its subject-matter and so leaving its task unfinished.

But neither the philosophical nor the theological approach enables us to reach really final answers to our basic questions. Our knowledge widens, and our understanding grows; but it seems as impossible to reach finality as it is to take in with a single coup d'œil the whole of the starry heavens with which our globe is encircled. Of a certain eminent modern theologian it was said to me by one of his co-denominationalists that "he had got the whole thing in a bottle". That is an achievement more often boasted of than actually performed.

Yet the exigences of practical living and the evident analogy and kinship between practical and theoretical problems should suffice to convince us, if we need convincing, of the necessity and the usefulness of pushing our enquiries co-operatively as far as we can, or (to change the figure) of making the foundations of our thinking as broad and solid as possible. The duty of thinking intelligently is one of the great unmistakable fundamentals: and the great mysteries by which we are compassed about constitute an invitation, rather than a prohibition, to the diligent use of such powers of comprehension as we possess.

The problems of ethics serve to illustrate what has just been said. No really satisfying answers have, I venture to think, ever yet been found to the great questions, What precisely is the nature of the ethically good? What is the real meaning of the word "Ought", and whence does the thing it stands for arise? What exactly is the relationship between goodness and happiness, between the desire to be truly and lastingly happy and the desire to be genuinely good? What are the parts played respectively by motive and by expediency in settling the problems of practical ethics? How far ought any solution of these problems to be attempted or expected? When the will is exercised in selectively manipulating the sundry instinctive impulses which stir the human bosom, on what principles ought it to proceed, and why? I am not suggesting that the discussion of these profound and inter-connected questions throughout past centuries has not been in many respects highly fruitful: I am only observing that they have not yet been answered with anything approaching the completeness and finality with which innumerable problems in, say, physical science, have been and are daily being solved.

Needless to say, I neither claim to be myself in possession of the answers, nor do I propose in this place to try my hand at finding them. If I am to say anything to the purpose in connexion with the grave ethical problem before us, I must be allowed to make certain presuppositions; and those of my readers who cannot agree with these presuppositions will, I fear, be unable to concur in the argument I build on them.

The first presupposition I have to make is that the Christian answer to the question as to whether it is ever justifiable to take part in war, whatever that answer may turn out to be, is the right and valid answer. No man intending to take up a Christian position can say less than that. If he becomes convinced that what he thought was the Christian answer is not really right and valid, the discovery will be to him (unless he decides to throw up Christianity altogether) a sure proof that it was not after all the truly Christian answer. Just as various sections of the Church are coming more and more to agree that, if a doctrine can be proved to be untrue, it cannot be a part of Christian orthodoxy, however strongly men may in the past have thought that it was, so no way of conduct, which can be proved to be, on a long view, unwise or ethically wrong, can claim to be regarded as fully Christian conduct, no matter how many good Christians may have approved of it. I realize that, if this book should fall into the hands of any non-Christian, what I have just said will probably seem to him unwarrantably pretentious. In justification of it, I would repeat what I have stated above (pp. 10 f.), namely, that I genuinely respect all sincere conscientious conviction, whether it be avowedly Christian or not: but I doubt whether a pacifist solution of the problem of war can be worked out without the help of certain affirmations which are virtually peculiar to Christianity; and I am in any case convinced that no discussion of the question would be adequate without at least a consideration of what Christian ethics are able to offer by way of an answer. Moreover, I would beg the non-Christian reader to bear in mind that this book is addressed in the first place to those who profess and call themselves Christians, and that these will naturally concur with me in enunciating this preliminary assumption. If, by means of those parts of the ensuing argument which a non-Christian

reader can recognize as valid, he comes at the end to feel that what is here claimed to be the Christian answer is, in point of fact, the valid one, so much the better; but whether that be so or not, it is worth our while to make it clear at the outset that, while Christians must hold that the Christian answer is necessarily valid, they also hold the converse to be true; and this means that no authority is arbitrarily claimed for any assertion *on the sole ground* that it is Christian, irrespective of its ability to vindicate itself to the sympathetic scrutiny of a mind docile to reality, an "*anima naturaliter Christiana*".

My second presupposition is that there is a certain general way of life recognizable as the Christian way, and that the ability to recognize this way and to investigate profitably its significance for the concrete practical problems of life does not depend on a preliminary agreement as to what theological doctrines and what institutional practices are essential to the Christian position when rightly understood and defined. There is indeed an immense amount of disagreement on these matters between various groups of believers, as there is, of course, on specific points of Christian living; but all the world, both within and without the Church, knows what is meant by "the Christian character"; concerning that, there is virtually no disagreement. Some of my friends are very fond of reminding us that Christianity is far more than "mere morality": but it is worth observing that, when the Apostle Paul was endeavouring to demonstrate the world's need of the Gospel of the grace of God, it was the moral condition of the world to which he pointed as the visible proof of man's distemper. And however important it may be to be right doctrinally and ecclesiastically, and however theologians may have to dispute and agonize as to what constitutes that rightness, we Christians know in our hearts—and the world around us knows—that conformity with a Christian standard of conduct is an even more urgent and indispensable requisite. The writer of this book happens to be a Liberal Evangelical Protestant; but he ventures to think that those of his fellow-Christians who are of a different way of thinking, those even to whom Liberal Protestantism may (alas!) be anathema, will find little or nothing in his argument with which they will be constrained to disagree on theological or ecclesias-

tical grounds. And that is why I do not feel called upon to give a formal definition of the sense in which I am throughout using the word "Christian" (see above, pp. 12f.), beyond availing myself of the universally-shared impression regarding the general quality of the way of life which is worthy of being described by that sacred name.

My third presupposition is that there exists for the Christian a Divinely-authoritative Law, which it is his bounden duty to learn, to apply to his own case, and to obey. Now the word "Law" has had a long and chequered career in the history of ethics and religion, particularly so under the Jewish and Christian dispensations: and having regard to the vehement and prolonged controversies which have raged over it, I feel it advisable to state with the utmost care what I understand by the presupposition I am here claiming the right to make.

In the New Testament and in a Christian context, the word "Law" derives its meaning from Judaism and the Old Testament. There, it means, literally and essentially, "instruction" or "direction": and the Law of God is therefore represented as the instructions or directions which God, as the supreme Sovereign, lays down for the guidance of men. Right conduct is thought of as being essentially obedience to the Divine ruler: sin or wickedness as disobedience.

It is true that both the Apostle Paul and Martin Luther are widely believed in Protestant circles to have shown conclusively that true Christianity, in contrast on the one hand to Judaism and on the other to Romanism, virtually dispenses with Law. Man, it is pointed out, is saved, not by works of the Law, but by faith in the grace of God shown in Jesus Christ. The greatest stress has been laid on this distinction, and very extreme expressions have—for the sake of emphasis—been used in order to repudiate the whole idea of reward or merit, and to fix a great gulf between salvation by faith and human effort of any kind. In the case of Paul, and still more in that of the sixteenth-century Reformers, the sense of indebtedness to Divine Grace took the form of a deterministic theory, according to which God mercifully redeems only those whom He wishes to, and "whom He wishes to He hardens" (Rom. ix. 18, cf. 10-23, iv. 4 f.), and what decides whether any given man is saved or

not saved is nothing he has done or deserves (for *all* men deserve condemnation), but simply whether God has or has not "elected" him. Most modern Protestants who are not extreme Calvinists repudiate this severe doctrine, seeing clearly that it is a virtual denial both of God's love and of man's responsibility. But many none the less contend that Paul and the Reformers were right in ruling out Law as a factor in salvation, in order to instil into their converts a due sense of indebtedness to Divine Grace.

Now behind both the Pauline and the Lutheran repudiation of Law there were two causes, an understanding of which should enable us to see clearly the truth enshrined in it.

In the first place, both leaders were fighting a life-and-death struggle, not against the Divine Law as such, but against a debased misunderstanding of what constituted Divine Law. Paul's first great onslaught on the idea of salvation by works was his Epistle to the Galatians. That Epistle was written when his spirit was wholly moved within him by the efforts of certain Judaizers to persuade his Galatian converts to accept circumcision and the ceremonial requirements of the Pentateuch as an indispensable condition of their Christian salvation. Naturally enough, the Apostle was up in arms against the preposterous claim. The demand that men who had experienced the new birth through the grace of God in Christ, and were living in conformity therewith, should undergo circumcision and submit to the hundred-and-one minutiae of the Mosaic Code as a condition of full salvation, had to be resisted at all costs; and Paul resisted it. But the bitterness of the struggle, renewed again and again, gave him a prejudice against the whole idea of Law as such, and helped to push his mind along that course of thought which culminated later in his elaborate rejection of legalism in the Epistle to the Romans.

Somewhat similar, I cannot but think, was the case with Luther; though for him, less tension with Law was involved as the ground of revolt, because he already had the revolt of Paul before his eyes. But he too was embittered by his long and fruitless struggle to attain inward peace by labouring at the numerous and largely ceremonial observances enjoined on the Catholic monk. When at last he came, with Paul's assistance, to

see that the root of all things was a humble trust in God's prevenient grace, he reacted so violently against "works" that, being the man he was, he felt no language too extreme to be used in rejecting them as a means of salvation.

But, in the second place, both men were feeling after a great religious reality—a re-discovery through Christ of God's love. This love was indeed affirmed in Judaism; but it needed the revelation through Christ to bring it home to men, and the revolt of Paul to secure it for the Christian Church. It was affirmed by mediaeval Catholicism; but it needed the experience and struggle of Luther to prevent men losing sight of it within the entanglements of institutionalism. This stress on the personal, fatherly, and loving character of God's dealings with men, including and transcending his mechanical relations with them as Creator of the material and psychological universes, and including and transcending also his judicial relations with them as supreme Lawgiver and Judge, is of course central and integral to the Christian Gospel. It raises a number of puzzling questions concerning the nature of Divine forgiveness, the precise meaning of justification, the distinction between it and sanctification, and the relation between Law and Grace; and all these questions are fit and proper subjects for careful theological scrutiny and discussion. What it does not do is to warrant the complete removal of the legal relationship between God and ourselves from the picture. The legal and judicial relationship of God to us is indeed taken up by His Fatherhood and His love into a new context, and given a new and deeper interpretation: but it is not thereby cancelled or suppressed. The Jewish father tenderly loved his children (as the Parable of the Prodigal illustrates); but that did not mean that he was not also their lawgiver and judge, whose business it was to dispense rewards and punishments; and the same combination of the two functions is a characteristic of all normal fatherhood. The fact that husband and wife, or for that matter friend and friend, may have business-relationships of a financial kind with each other is another illustration of the co-existence of a lower relationship and a higher or more inclusive one alongside of it. Neither Luther nor Paul, for all their horror of "salvation by works", regarded "works" as unimportant. They both showed,

in some detail, and with some assumption of authority, what "works" they expected their fellow-Christians to perform. Luther, it is true, was sometimes reluctant to express himself on problems of practical Christian ethics, lest he should seem to be laying undue stress on works. But it is highly interesting in this connexion that Calvin, who, with his doctrines of the Divine Decrees, Predestination, Election, and Reprobation, went further than any other Protestant leader of the time in excluding salvation by works, was yet in his teaching a thorough-going legalist, in the sense that he treated the whole Bible as substantially a handbook of Christian Law and used it continually as a basis for the elaboration of rules of Christian conduct.

With these facts and considerations before us, we ought not to incur the charge of lapsing from true Paulinism or true Protestantism when we insist that Christians are still under obligation to learn and to obey the Law of God. I say this because, when it is proposed to settle down seriously to investigate this Law with a view to solving some problem in practical Christian ethics, the cry is often raised that such an effort assumes Christianity to consist of a "law of commandments contained in ordinances", that it will clearly result in "a new legalism", and that it is therefore essentially incongruous with real Christianity, at any rate as Paul preached it and as Protestants understand it. The objection rests, I hold, on a one-sided misinterpretation of Paul and the Reformation, and ought not to be admitted. He who asserts that there is a Law of God to be studied and obeyed does not thereby imply that man can earn his own salvation without the aid of Divine Grace, or that God's relation to him is *only* that of a Judge and not that of a Parent, or that childlike trust in Him as revealed and brought near to us in Christ is unnecessary as a basis for the performance of Christian deeds. He means only that, when the heart has been surrendered in gratitude to God in return for His gracious invitation and His offer of pardon and of fellowship, there still remains the Divine Will to be reckoned with, a Will which may at least in sufficient measure be made known to us, and obedience to which constitutes our bounden duty, and is a condition of our complete salvation. As philosophically-minded moderns

we may feel some difficulty in the contention that a thing is constituted our duty simply by the fact of God willing it: but this question need not hamper us. The Jew necessarily couched his sense of ethical obligation in terms of a personal will; and when we remember that God is the ground of all existence, the assertion that the ethical good is constituted by His Will is seen to be free from objection, and to have value as preserving for us a reminder of the personal character of the Supreme Being.

Possibly some of my friends, who might otherwise perhaps be inclined to join in the cry against being again entangled in a yoke of bondage (Galat. v. 1), may be assisted to refrain from doing so, if I now try to remove certain misconceptions regarding the nature of the Christian's Law which are often found to accompany the use of the term in controversy.

One widespread popular idea about the Law is that it is necessarily negative, whereas Christian ethics are essentially positive. The idea that the Law is negative perhaps arises from the fact that eight out of the Ten Commandments in the Decalogue are prohibitions. Naturally, in any code intended, as the early Hebrew codes were, to be enforced in practice among a primitive people, prohibitions and taboos were bound to fill a fairly large place. But it is a mistake to think even of those codes as on the whole negative. I have not, I must confess, worked through them, counting up as I went along, for purposes of comparison, the number of positive and the number of negative injunctions contained in them. But I seem to be able to recall quite a large number of positive instructions among them. And if it be permissible (as I hold it is) to regard the ethical teaching of Jesus as Law, in the same old sense of instruction or direction, or indeed if we consider simply the essential character of a moral law as an imperative addressed authoritatively to the human will, it is quite obvious that prohibition is by no means its necessary and exclusive or even its dominant characteristic.

Another very frequent misunderstanding of the matter is the tacit assumption that Law has to do only with the external and bodily acts of a man, and cannot concern itself with the more important and fundamental questions of the state of his heart and the quality of his motives. This assumption arises

from the fact that Law, in the political sense of the word, is limited in just that way. As a social institution, it deals with the murderer, the adulterer, the thief, the man who has actually committed some recognizable offence; but it takes no cognizance of his motives, thoughts, or temptations, if no such offence has been committed. The so-called Law of Moses, having to do duty both as a civil code and as a moral authority, was obliged to deal largely with overt action. But why should we assume that what is true of a civil code must also be true of God's moral Law? There is no reason whatever why an imperative addressed by God (through whatever medium) to the will of man—and that is what we mean by "Law" in this connexion—should concern itself with the external doings of his hands rather than with the inner operations of his mind and heart. Contrary to the popular notion, even the Jewish Law was not wholly of that external character. Jesus is supposed, in the fifth chapter of the Gospel of Matthew, to be making a departure from Jewish legalism, in transferring attention from the evil outward act to the evil motive from which it springs. Yet in the very Decalogue, we have in the tenth commandment, which warns the Israelite against covetousness, a commandment which concerns itself exclusively with man's inward moral condition, altogether apart from his outward behaviour. There is nothing to prevent a Divine Law dealing just as much with the inward as with the outward provinces of human life.

A distinguishable though related error is to suppose that the Law is bound to consist exclusively of particular rules, whereas all that the Christian needs and all that Christ gives him is general principles. This attempted "clean cut" between legitimate general principles and illegitimate particular rules has played an immense part in Christian controversies about "the Law". It has been hastily assumed that "the Law" must consist exclusively of the latter, that the distinction between them and principles is obvious and perfectly easy to draw, that principles cast in the form of Divine imperatives addressed to the will are, for some mysterious reason, not "Law" at all, that, since no one but the Christian himself can see what precepts are applicable to his case, he is not subject to any objective legislation, and that even he needs no more concrete guidance in framing them

than a central and underlying love and gratitude to God in response to the redemption God has wrought for him. "Love God, and do as you please", is supposed to represent the ethical attitude of the Lutheran Christian, emancipated at last from the yoke of "the Law". The experience of undeserved redemption through Christ is described as a veritable "new birth": it is the pure gift of God's grace: man's part in it is the humble acceptance of it by faith. The change it works in the saved person is so radical that he has thereafter no need to be told to be good, and the word "duty" disappears in consequence from his vocabulary: good works follow spontaneously and inevitably from his new faith (cf. Rom. vi. 1-11); and, if they do not, then that is a sign that the faith was not really there. This is the Lutheran answer to the ordinary man's perplexed question as to what becomes of works under the system "*solâ fide, solâ gratiâ*". This, as I understand it, is in substance the Lutheran position, and not the Lutheran position only, but the position of all those good Protestants who cry out against the quest for concrete ethical standards as a Pelagian denial of the central doctrine of the Reformation—salvation by faith.

Now in reply to this very widely prevalent view, I would submit the following considerations.

(a). Understanding by "good works", as we ought, not only concrete acts and sayings, but every exercise of the will (including therefore such control as the will has over our motives and feelings), we gladly concede that good works cannot be done without the assistance of God's grace and without the exercise on our part of faith in that grace. Yet it must be observed that the operation of grace and the exercise of faith may occur at very different stages of consciousness, and must often be tacitly inferred from the manifested quality of the life. In his 'Ode to Duty' Wordsworth truly says:

"There are who ask not if thine eye
Be on them; who, in love and truth,
Where no misgiving is, rely
Upon the genial sense of youth:
Glad Hearts ! without reproach or blot;
Who do thy work, and know it not".

And if men can obey the voice of duty without being conscious

that they are doing so, the same surely is true of the operation of grace and the exercise of faith. The thirteenth of the Anglican Articles of Religion says that "Works done before the grace of Christ, and the Inspiration of his Spirit, are not pleasant to God, forasmuch as they spring not of faith in Jesus Christ, . . . : we doubt not but they have the nature of sin". My readers will remember how severely our Lord condemned the men who ascribed his merciful exorcisms to the prompting of the evil one. Availing ourselves of the canon of judgment he then sanctioned, we may safely say that the only works to which the thirteenth Anglican Article can apply are not really good works at all, but outwardly-seeming good acts that are wrought from definitely malicious or otherwise evil or poor motives. In other words, the existence of a really good work done without conscious *or unconscious* faith in and acceptance of the grace of God is an impossibility.

(b). Good works do not, as a matter of actual fact, flow spontaneously and inevitably from a sense of redemption by grace. In theory, no doubt, they ought to do so; in practice, no doubt, they often do: but often they do not. People do not always or automatically display gratitude for benefits conferred on them by their fellows: they often need the bidding of a law to rouse them to a sense of their responsibility in the matter. So too, if salvation is to be regarded as consisting wholly in a pure gift bestowed by Divine grace, there is nothing to ensure that it will necessarily evoke due gratitude in the recipient. Still less is there any binding necessity for the receipt of it to be automatically followed by all that is needed in the way of good works. It is easy, of course, to say that, if the works do not follow, true faith cannot be there. But if you are going to describe faith as that which must and does produce good works, what becomes of the contention that salvation is by faith only, and not by works also? If there can exist no justification without sanctification, the case for the clean cut between faith and works loses some of its reality. But the main point for which I am here contending is that, however we define faith and justification, there is nothing in the doctrine of justification by faith, rightly understood, which authorizes us to dispense with "the Law".

(c). Remembering that the Law of which we speak is a moral imperative addressed to the will of man, we must insist that the distinction so often drawn between principle and precept is unreal. Principles, if cast in the form of moral imperatives, as, e.g., in the injunctions "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God", and "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself", are just as truly "Law" as are the prohibitions of revenge and of divorce and the injunction to pray daily. It is quite true that some commandments or imperatives or injunctions are more particular and less general than others: but there is no such difference between them as to constitute one of them Law because it is particular, and another of them not Law because it is general. The generality and particularity are of every grade, and at no point do we come upon a clear distinction of the kind so often assumed. I shall argue elsewhere in this book in other connexions that differences in degree do sometimes constitute broad differences in kind: but even so, the difference in kind does not exclude the existence of a factor or factors common to all grades; and in the case before us, the character of legality is common to all grades, from the most general to the most particular. And what has been said about man's need of Law is just as true of the Law's particular "precepts" as it is of its general "principles". What misleads a good many people into feeling sure that it is not so, is that in the nature of things the Law cannot be formulated beforehand beyond a moderate degree of particularity, and that the discovery of how it bears on many special situations in practical life cannot therefore be known until these situations are actually present or imminent. But it does not follow from this condition of affairs that in such cases no legal precept is in place. The condition arises from the unceasing recurrence in practical life of the dilemma, i.e., of some situation in which more than one moral value is involved, and in which a right choice between the conflicting goods which are involved cannot be made until the situation itself is before us. Such a situation can, both in ethics and in the law of the State, be only to a limited extent anticipated by the careful study of typical classes of perplexing situations. But to say that there exists no Divine Law discoverable with regard even to these perplexing practical considerations would be equivalent to

saying that it was a matter of moral indifference how we decided to act with regard to them. If that be, as it obviously is, absurd, it is so for the reason that, whatever situation a man may be in, there will be a line which it is his duty to take, a course which conforms to the Will of God—in other words, a Law.

(d). By way of a confirmation of the conclusions thus reached, we may fitly recall what a large and important place is filled by Law in the New Testament. There, alongside of and interwoven with the comforting assurances of God's forgiving love and enabling grace, we find numerous clear and imperative directions of varying degrees of particularity, but all alike of legal character, in the sense already explained, i.e., imperatives addressed by God through a human medium to the will of man, enlightening and directing him as to how that will is to be exercised.

It must, for instance, be obvious to every unprejudiced reader of the Synoptic Gospels that Jesus himself frequently spoke the language of a Divinely-commissioned prophetic lawgiver. The fact comes out in the numerous direct imperatives included in his teaching and in his frequent allusions to the "reward" (*μισθός*) and punishment with which God visits obedience and disobedience respectively. It is quite true that he supplemented the late Jewish view of God by making His Fatherhood central and prominent; but no Jew would see the slightest incongruity between the function of a father and that of a lawgiver. Luther, like so many of his Protestant followers, thought lightly of the Synoptic Gospels: and the existence in them of this legal element sufficiently explains his coolness. But there is no escape from the fact that these Gospels give us, more than do the Fourth Gospel and the Epistles, far and away the best account of what Jesus himself actually said and meant.

But more. Even the Apostle Paul, largely responsible as he unintentionally was for the Antinomian tendencies in certain Christian circles down the ages, makes it clear, not only by the multiplied injunctions which he lays down for the guidance of his converts, but also by several explicit utterances, that for him the notion of a Divine Law remained a very important part indeed of the Christian view of life. "Bear one another's burdens, and thus fulfil the law of Christ. . . Be not deceived: God is not

(to be) sneered at! For whatever a man sows, that he will also reap. . ." (Galat. vi. 2, 7f.). "Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing; but (what matters is) the observance of God's commandments" (1 Cor. vii. 19). He describes himself as "not being outside God's Law, but subject to Christ's Law" (1 Cor. ix. 21). "For (it is) not the hearers of the Law (who) are righteous before God, but (it is) the doers of the Law (who) will be accounted righteous" (Rom. ii. 13).

I have endeavoured in the foregoing pages to demonstrate that, notwithstanding the great truths enshrined in the traditional doctrine of justification by faith, there still exists for the Christian a Law or revealed Will of God, which he needs for the regulation of his daily life, which he can learn in sufficient if partial measure, and which it is his bounden duty to obey. Our next task must be to consider the means at our disposal for ascertaining the content of that Law. How are we to tell what it is, in regard to practical conduct in general and to the problem of war in particular? For the Law is not completely and exclusively enshrined for us in any specifiable written document. It cannot be absolutely identified with the Ten Commandments, nor (as the Jews thought) with the Pentateuch, nor (as Tolstoyans assume) with the recorded words of Jesus, nor yet (as—broadly speaking—both Zwingli and Calvin held) with the whole of the Canonical Scriptures, though all of these are means through which we can learn something of it. Ideally considered, it is simply the Will of God: and as such, it does not lend itself to complete and precise formulation in any written document, long or short. It has to be learnt, and it may be learnt, partially and progressively; and the means of its being so learnt are the possession of a docile and obedient spirit and the intelligent consultation of all those embodiments of the Divine Will which come within human ken.

For the purpose of elucidating a particular practical issue of the kind we are here concerned with, I suggest that five tests are relevant, namely,

1. The general sense of the Christian community.
2. The utterance of the Christian heart.
3. The character and teaching of Jesus.

4. The Christian doctrine of the character of God.

5. The nature of the results, or the test of expediency.

We must not expect that the application of these tests will be in every case simple and easy, and will give at once an unambiguous conclusion. We must even be prepared to find, at least at first, some incongruity in the answers to which they point. But we are, I submit, justified in assuming that an honest application of them will eventually lead to some sort of unity by way of a solution.

More than that, we may so far avail ourselves of previous thought on our problem as to posit the following general principle, which provisionally summarizes the essential character of the Christian's attitude to his fellows, and bids fair to pass the five specified tests. "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself". "Whatever ye wish that men should do to you, do ye in your turn so to them". Here we have in what we call "the Golden Rule" the great broad principle which is to give us the norm for determining our attitude to our fellow-men in particular circumstances. In laying it down, we are getting as near as the human mind can get to ultimate reality in the ethical direction. The principle before us means reverence for our neighbour's personality as something which, because it is dear in the sight of God, is to have value in *our* sight. "The brother for whom Christ died" must needs command the Christian's respect: and no failure or wickedness on that brother's part, still less any human authority under which we are placed, can make contempt for or violation of his personal being a Christian way of treating him. In writing thus, I have no intention of begging the main question upon which pacifists and non-pacifists are divided. I want only to enunciate what I conceive to be the generally agreed principle which we may assume as the basis of our further discussion, seeing that it is, by any legitimate test we can apply, an unquestionable requirement of the Law of God.

In the next two chapters we must proceed to ask, first what this basic principle means for the problem of war, and then to subject our tentative answer to each of the five tests we have proposed, and so to ascertain whether it has any claim to be regarded as the true solution.

CHAPTER IV

THE PRIMÂ-FACIE CASE FOR PACIFISM

LOOKING again at our list of the various forms of pressure which men can exert upon their fellows, and recalling the classes into which these forms may be at least roughly classified (pp. 25, 45), we shall apparently be safe in inferring that no objection based on the Golden Rule could reasonably be brought against either the non-coercive methods of pressure or even the non-injurious coercive methods, on the score, that is, of their inherent character. For the Golden Rule does not mean simply treating our neighbour as our neighbour at the moment desires us to treat him, nor even (what perhaps is only another way of saying the same thing) as we should want to be treated if we were in every respect like our neighbour: it rather means treating him as we, with our present ideals, would like to have been treated if, before following those ideals, we had ever been in his present condition. For example, a grown man may look back with approval on the forcible control and moderate chastisement which once as a boy he received from his father, though at the time he had, it may be, strongly resented both. But it is impossible by any argument of this kind to bring the infliction of injurious coercion into harmony with the Golden Rule: the grown Christian man, whatever his youthful faults had been, never ought, and in point of fact rarely would, regard with approval a punishment which had left him, say, permanently maimed. Injurious coercion, from the very fact that it is injurious, would seem at first sight to be clearly excluded by any principle enjoining respect for human personality.

Now it is not possible to conceive of war as other than injurious to personality in the most extreme degree. It is, indeed, possible to point to historical occasions (the campaigns of Maurice of Nassau against the Spaniards, 1591-1607, are an instance), on which the fighting has been conducted with much regard for humane considerations. Efforts have, moreover, repeatedly been made to soften the cruel usages of war. Schleier-

macher and Fichte, for instance, tried to get sniping ruled out as un-Christian: and even Nelson apparently disapproved of it as murderous. But, broadly speaking, these efforts have met with little success: they have been checkmated by the inevitable character of war itself, and by the inevitable increase which science gives to the efficiency of lethal weapons. While therefore the sufferings inflicted by war have varied greatly at different periods of history, we really do not need—for purposes of an ethical discussion—to linger over these changes, so as to consider, for example, whether there ever has been, or whether there might ever be, a war so chivalrously conducted that no Christian could reasonably find anything in it to object to. In the light of the cautious study we made earlier (pp. 26–44) of its character, we see clearly that war necessarily involves very lavish and very far-reaching injury to human personality, and must therefore, it would seem, be regarded as forbidden by the most basic law of Christian conduct.

A further consideration is relevant at this point. Granting, as presumably we must, that of the two types of pressure in general the non-coercive is more congruous with the Law of God than the coercive, and that, as between the two sub-groups of coercive pressure, the injurious coercive is less congruous with the Law of God than the non-injurious, we may note that the successful use of the more legitimate type often depends on the complete disuse of the less. To put this point more simply—if the Christian is to succeed in changing or affecting others by means of his example, his influence, his speech, his love, and so forth, he must in most cases completely forgo any use of injurious coercion, or indeed coercion of any kind, in connexion with those others. The Salvation-Army lass can often control the violent East-End drunkard, but only so long as the culprit knows that she will not hand him over to the police to be locked up. Examples of the same general fact could doubtless be multiplied, especially from the records and experiences of Christian missionaries, whose power for good would largely disappear if they were to become identified with the military power of the countries from which they came. It cannot indeed be maintained that this mutual exclusion of pressure-types invariably holds good. There are undoubtedly cases and situa-

tions in which some combination of coercion (even injurious coercion) with loving-kindness has not destroyed the power of the latter. But there is a sufficient number of instances of their incompatibility to serve as a confirmation to some extent of the tentative pronouncement that all injurious coercion constitutes an infringement of the Golden Rule. I am not forgetting that such an affirmation raises a number of important questions (the question, for instance, concerning the duty of defending others): these will all, I hope, be adequately dealt with as we proceed. For the moment, I am concerned only to state in a tentative and provisional way what the great principle of Christian love seems at first sight to imply in regard to the problem of war.

There is one other possible cause of confusion which remains to be cleared up before we proceed to apply seriatim the five tests set forth at the close of the preceding chapter. The reader will have observed that I have refrained from contending that the Christian Law necessarily excludes all coercion. I have so refrained on the ground that it is very far from being obvious that all coercion as such involves some measure of outrage on the personality of the coerced person. Now alongside of the possibility that some coercion at least may be quite compatible with the Christian Law, let us place the undoubted fact that the line between coercive and non-coercive pressure, and even the line between injurious and non-injurious coercion, cannot be clearly and precisely drawn, but that in both cases the two groups shade off gradually into one another. The grave difficulty of finding the precise place in the scale of pressure-types where the line between the legitimate and illegitimate types has to be drawn, at once becomes apparent. This difficulty has, in fact, been widely held to discredit the ethical distinction altogether, on the ground that the difference between the one and the other was admittedly only a difference of degree, and therefore could not be a difference of kind. At the Tribunals during the last war (1916-1918), the conscientious objector was not infrequently asked what he would do if a burglar assaulted his mother or his sister; and if he replied that he would resist him and have him locked up, his conscientious objection to military service was usually treated at once as a patent inconsistency,

and sometimes as obviously insincere. But such inferences were, in point of reason, entirely groundless. In questions of practical moral conduct, the difference between right and wrong is very often a pure question of degree, sometimes indeed a question of measurable quantity. Is it not so in the indulgence of the bodily appetites of eating and drinking, in the expenditure of time and money on amusements, in the consumption of medicine, in the chastisement of children, and in numerous other familiar activities? In all such cases, moderation is legitimate, more than a moderate amount of precisely the same thing illegitimate, the difference being that the one ministers to personality, whereas the other violates it. To say exactly where the dividing line between moderation and excess is to be drawn may well be, in many such cases is, impossible, the transition from one to the other being so gradual. Yet who in his senses would argue that, because it was impossible to say precisely where the line should be drawn, the difference being only one of degree, therefore there could be no moral difference between moderation on the one hand and excess on the other? We may, therefore, legitimately contend that the difficulty or impossibility of saying with absolute precision where influence passes into coercion, and where non-injurious passes into injurious coercion, does not of itself discredit our contention that the last-named is an infringement of the Law of Love, whereas the exercise of pressure by means of influence, or even by means of non-injurious coercion may not be so.

We may then state the tentative and provisional solution to which our preliminary consideration of the problem leads us, somewhat as follows: As a responsible member of society and as one committed to a particular way of life, the Christian rightly desires to move or influence others in particular ways, both for their own sake and for the sake of yet others whom they may affect for good or ill: in exerting this pressure upon them, he naturally requires to know what methods he ought to adopt, and what he ought to avoid: being required by the greatest pertinent commandment in the Law to love his neighbour as himself, and therefore to refrain from anything which injures or damages that neighbour's personality, he will confine himself to those methods of pressure which are either wholly non-coercive or are

coercive in a strictly non-injurious way, forgoing altogether such injurious methods of coercion as torture, mutilation, or homicide: that is to say, he will refrain from war. This position I shall henceforth refer to simply as "pacifism". The supposition that it has at least a strong *prima-facie* case is confirmed by the instinctive reaction of many an unsophisticated man. A hospital-nurse of my acquaintance was addressed as follows by one of her soldier-patients in the last war: "It's all very well for you, miss: you can live the Christian life, but *we* can't—not on this job!"

Now for our five tests (pp. 60 f.). I might observe that the order in which I propose to apply these tests is *not* meant to represent the order of increasing or decreasing importance, but, if anything, perhaps the approximate order in which they would occur to many of us on coming for the first time to a problem in practical Christian ethics.

I. The general sense of the Christian Community.

(a). Why is this test relevant? Because the findings of our remoter and nearer predecessors in the same field of enquiry as our own will almost certainly have something to teach us. It is inherently likely that the particular ethical problem that bothers us has already bothered others before us. Christian minds older and, it may be, wiser than ours have almost certainly been engaged on it before: and if we know this to have been the case, our first business is to ask, What conclusion did they reach? We do not, of course, assume that the conclusion which they reached will necessarily be the right one for us to adopt: but we can at least say that we must consider it, and that we ought not to reject it except on very clear and convincing grounds. After all, the very powers of judgment we possess were themselves developed in us in the atmosphere and under the direct influence of the Christian community into which most of us were born and in which we were bred: and while the verdicts of that community may conceivably need to be from time to time revised, they are at least entitled first to our respectful and sympathetic study.

(b). What then are the facts as regards the sense of the

Christian community? The general sense of the Christian community on the subject of war is unfortunately ambiguous, seeing that it has rarely been and certainly is not to-day constant and uniform. The reader will not expect me in this place to describe the successive stages through which Christian feeling on the question has passed from the days of the Apostles until now. The history of those stages is indeed pertinent to our theme; and I shall be obliged to argue in the light of it. But to narrate it would involve too wide a digression from the path of our argument; and furthermore, is it not already written in a number of other accessible books? Only the baldest allusion to a few general facts can be made here.

The Old Testament, which, as a substantial part of the Christian Scriptures, contributes the broad basis of Christian ethics, does not furnish much direct support for pacifism, for, although the Hebrew Law sternly forbade murder, it did not forbid therewith the slaying of the tribal or national enemy in war. Notwithstanding exceptional passages like Proverbs xxv. 21f., Isaiah liii. 4-9, etc., and other noble utterances in the later, non-canonical writings, pacifism in our sense of the word plays virtually no part at any period in Jewish ethics. The reason for this is probably to be sought in the failure of the Hebrew legislators to enjoin upon the Israelite love for man *quâ* man, as the standing ethical implicate of "righteousness". They never rose above requiring love for the *fellow-Israelite* (such is the real meaning of Levit. xix. 18) and the alien resident in their midst (ib. 34); and even these demands were not a part of the Decalogue. When therefore Jesus introduced the great concept of love for enemies, Samaritans, and Gentiles, a different judgment on war was bound to suggest itself.

The question was not an urgent concrete issue for Christians of the first century, as there was no pressure put on them to join the legions: they were furthermore deeply absorbed in other things. Moreover, their minds were to some extent affected by the war-narratives of the Old Testament, as well as by the fact that the Emperor (whom they were taught to obey and to pray for) clearly seemed to need an army. Hence some believers remained in the army after conversion, while others even joined it when already converted. Meantime, thoughtful

Christians were coming more and more to feel that military service was incompatible with their faith. About 177-180 A.D., Christians generally were criticized for refusing to serve in the army (though we know that, in point of fact, several were then serving); and about seventy years later Origen defends them for their refusal as if they were still maintaining it (see below, pp. 230 ff.). It is not possible to account for this attitude by attributing it wholly to a horror of idolatrous contamination; it was clearly in large part due to a Christian objection to bloodshed. Nor can we set it aside as represented only by eccentric Christian writers; the evidence is far too extensive for that. We may say, if we will, that it belongs to an epoch during which the Church was not responsible for law and order, and that, when later she appreciated better the necessity of social stability, she revised her judgment. Be that as it may, Christian pacifism gradually faded after 313 A.D., and was, for the layman, completely ruled out by mediaeval Catholicism, being reserved as the special practice of the clergy and the monastic orders. In the sixteenth century, with the fresh knowledge of Scripture which it brought, the question of the right Christian attitude to war was re-opened. Erasmus denounced war: but Luther and Calvin both made terms with it, and it was only certain Anabaptist groups who held it to be wholly impermissible for Christians. So great a danger to society was this last view felt to be, that the sectarians were fiercely persecuted for adhering to it. From the sixteenth to the twentieth century, it remained the peculiar concern of comparatively small and often eccentric bodies (Doukhobors, Mennonites, Quakers, etc.), and here and there an isolated individual. The outbreak of the Great War in 1914 brought the issue with fresh urgency before the whole Christian community; and the line which the controversy has since then followed has been very roughly sketched in the opening pages of this book. At the present time, pacifism is defended and practised by only a minute minority of persons in this country. They are probably even smaller in numbers and influence than they have been at various times since 1920: but they are drawn from all sections of the Christian Church, and they command the puzzled respect of vast numbers of Christian people who cannot agree with them and yet can-

not with full completeness and confidence condemn them.

(c). To what conclusion then does the test point? In answering this question it will not do to hearken simply to the voice of the post-Constantinian majority and say, "The Church has clearly accepted war", and leave it at that. Quite conceivably, *that* acceptance was a corruption of Christian ethical purity. Few Christians to-day, with the history of mediaeval and modern Europe and its innumerable unnecessary wars before their eyes, can feel wholly satisfied with the post-Constantinian Church's record. Moreover, if the non-pacifist answer to the question were really sound and satisfactory, how are we to account, I will not say for the wide-spread pacifism of the Church of earlier and ethically purer days, but for the repeated revival of the discussion, first, at the great re-awakening in the sixteenth century, then off and on among progressive groups, and now again with renewed vigour in our own generation? As I urged above (pp. 3f.), notwithstanding its acceptance of the present struggle, the conscience of Christendom has been more profoundly stirred regarding the legitimacy of war in our day than at any previous period in its history since Constantine. It is not likely to have landed in such a state of unrest over a mere fad: and if pacifism is not a mere fad, its recrudescence and persistence at least suggest that here perhaps we have one of the issues (like persecution, torture, slavery, etc.), on which, after long centuries, the broad feeling of the Christian community, notwithstanding its soundness on many other ethical issues, stands in need of correction.

II. *The utterance of the Christian heart.*

(a). In speaking of the Christian heart, I do not wish to be understood to have in mind the conscience or the moral sense as a whole. What conscience bids, or what rather it ought to bid, is the problem with which this whole book is attempting to deal. For the biddings of conscience are often the products of very complex processes, in which other factors than the heart participate. Hence the wide differences between the dictates of one man's conscience and another's. It would therefore be merely a useless begging of the question to assume that conscience of itself can give an immediate or constant answer. It is just as

unwarranted for pacifists to take it for granted that theirs is the only view which "conscience" can approve, as it is for non-pacifists, by describing military service as "duty" (sans phrase), to take it for granted that he who will not serve is ipso facto in the wrong. The problems of conscience and duty are far too complex for any such cavalier simplifications. But we are not for the moment concerned with these complexities. The utterance of the Christian heart does not here mean the intellectual arguments a man may have to go through before making up his mind as to what course he ought to take: nor have I in mind, in using the words, what is normally understood by motive. For the purposes of our argument, we must be willing to assume that the fighter's motives are pure. By "the Christian heart" I here mean the instinctive feelings, sentiments, or emotions, which have a way of asserting themselves within the bosom of a Christian, and by which he habitually allows himself, as a Christian, to be governed.

Now it is certainly true that, while on the one hand all the instinctive emotions have in the abstract a right to be consulted and somehow satisfied (by way either of indulgence or of sublimation), none of them can justifiably be indulged without regard to some ideal standard or canon, which has the right to adjudicate between them whensoever they come into conflict with one another. The supreme obligation of love for others (p. 61) puts in our hand a measuring-rod, with the help of which it is easy for us to distinguish broadly between those feelings which may safely be indulged and those which, if in conflict with these, must either stand aside or find an outlet in some indirect way. We cannot indeed in practical life escape encountering situations in which conflict arises between two sentiments so nearly equal in dignity that it is very hard to decide which one of them has the prior claim, and very painful—by so deciding—to deny the other. This situation arises, not necessarily (as is so often hastily assumed and averred) because the world is sinful, but because life in it is necessarily complex. Hence we must be prepared to find that it is sometimes right for us to do what it is also right for us to shrink from doing. We need, however, to remember that the necessity and the painfulness of such choices must not be confused with, or used as a

justification of, the making of a wrong choice. That, of course, is very easily done. If a strong Christian emotion occasionally needs to be sacrificed, it can be rightly sacrificed only out of deference to some other strong Christian emotion with a distinctly superior claim. For the Christian heart, while it is not, as I have admitted, co-extensive with the Christian conscience, does furnish the conscience with material of the utmost value and importance; and if such rights as it has are over-ridden, the possibility of forming a sound moral judgment is destroyed.

(b). The particular utterance of the Christian heart, which we here need to assess, is that instinct of compassion, or of reverence for the life of another, which causes us normally to recoil with horror from the very idea of inflicting death or even pain upon another man. That such an instinct exists, and is in the average Christian very powerful, cannot be doubted. It is, of course, quite possible for mere queasiness over the physical horror of bloodshed, or mere cowardice over the physical danger of combat, to disguise itself, even subconsciously, under an ostensibly moral objection based on the Christian revulsion from the wilful destruction of life. In fact, the element of mere queasiness is probably in all cases an operating factor: hence, however strong a Christian's objection to shooting men may be, his objection to using the bayonet on them will probably be emotionally even stronger. All the same, the strong pressure of the instinct of compassion certainly enters very largely into the situation as a powerful deterrent against the act of fighting. So much will probably be conceded by all, as also the truly Christian character of the instinct. What is not so plain is the answer to the question whether it ought to take precedence over any other impulse which may come for the time being into conflict with it.

It will help us a little towards finding the true answer to this question if we take note of the part played in the moral development of humanity by the steadily increasing stress laid by the moral judgment, when acting deliberately, upon the instinct of benevolence or compassion. The moral judgments of which we feel most confident, and the possible reversal of which would appear to revolutionize, nay, to overthrow, our moral universe in the most shattering manner, are those wherein we approve of

some rise or other in the attention paid to the claims of human sympathy. Readers of Lecky's 'History of European Morals' may remember how, in the course of the first chapter of that book, he points out that, despite the endless variations in the ideas of different men at different periods as to what practices are morally noble, and what the reverse, such advance as has been made has always meant either an increase in sexual chastity, or an increase in truthfulness, or an increase in benevolence. Not even the stoutest of Roman Catholic apologists, and certainly no non-Romanist, can to-day look with moral satisfaction on the mediaeval custom of torturing the so-called heretics and burning them alive. The judicial use of torture in any form, whether as a punishment or as a means of obtaining evidence, has almost completely passed away, and certainly is nowhere regarded by Christians with approval. The change is almost wholly due to the revolt of the Christian heart against cruelty. It is true that a sense of its futility as a means of securing evidence has had something to do with its abolition: but that would not affect its use as a means of punishing specially-detestable crimes; and the horror with which it is now regarded far surpasses what would be evoked by a mere sense of its uselessness. During the Indian Mutiny, General John Nicholson, whom Lord Roberts described as "the beau idéal of a soldier and a gentleman", persistently urged that legal permission should be given for the Indians guilty of the atrocities in Delhi to be burned, impaled, or flayed alive. Could any Christian be found to-day who, whatever his righteous indignation at the atrocities in question, or whatever his admiration for General Nicholson, would regard that proposal with anything but the utmost horror? And his horror would arise wholly from a realization of the supreme authority of the instinct of mercy, and the iniquity of so gross a violation of it as would be involved in flaying a man alive.

General Nicholson's case is no doubt an exceptional one, as was the occasion that gave rise to it. But it does serve to illustrate the oft-noticed tendency of injurious coercion to coarsen and demoralize those who use it. One does indeed sometimes hear it urged that, even in the most justifiable infliction of pain (as in surgery, or in the non-injurious punishment of children or

criminals), the character is at least to some slight degree worsened. That in such cases the immediate sentiment of pity has to yield before the claims of a more far-sighted good-will is of course true; and we ought for that very reason to be on our guard lest human sympathy should thereby suffer permanent or excessive loss. But where the honest application of the Golden Rule would show that the temporary pain was really a ministry, and not a damage, to the personality of the sufferer, not only does no difficult conflict of duties arise, but no worsening of the inflictor's character need ensue. These are the situations in which it is right to do what it is also right to shrink from doing. He who so acts feels regret, but he does not necessarily suffer demoralization. Far harder is it for him who, fighting even with a noble object in view, dyes his wrists and fingers in the blood of his kinsmen, to avoid the insidious peril of having his moral sensitiveness gravely blunted. There is, indeed, no inevitable necessity that it should be so with any particular individual, nor does even the risk of it settle the question as to whether he is right or wrong. But the undoubted existence of the risk, and the direct connexion of it with the violent suppression of the humane instincts, clearly show on which side the vote of the Christian heart would be cast.

There is one typical situation in which the sentiment of pity would normally raise little or no protest against the infliction of injury. It is the situation in which a straight fight occurs between this sentiment and the instinctive impulse to defend a weak and innocent person against cruel or foul treatment. If it were clear that the cruel or foul deed could be effectively prevented by striking the offender—even if nothing but a death-blow would suffice—the average Christian heart would say, "Strike, and spare not". The cases in which A can prevent B from injuring C only by himself injuring B constitute, from the point of view of Christian sentiment, the most serious obstacle to the enthronement of compassion as always the *supreme* arbiter, and the greatest stumbling-block in the path of those who would declare injurious coercion *always* un-Christian. The difficulty is one which the pacifist will do well not to endeavour to evade. We shall need to discuss it later when we come to consider the test of expediency (see below, pp. 117–123); for the

question of the *right* method of defending others is clearly bound up closely with the question of the *efficacy* of this or that method. At the moment our business is to take note of the existence of this instinctive desire to defend others from injury, and of its exercise of a pressure on the Christian heart usually stronger with most of us than that exercised by the sentiment of pity, whenever there occurs a head-on collision between them. The only other observation that needs to be made here is that it is becoming less and less possible to represent war as involving a straight issue of this kind. Apart from the fact that the *corporate* defence of others frequently introduces conditions which complicate the issue and so render less obvious the right of the one sentiment to override the other, the conditions of modern warfare are such that, by agreeing to use them, the Christian, so far from protecting his dear ones from danger, rather exposes them to it (see above, pp. 33 f., 39).

(c). When, therefore, we try to sum up the net contribution made to the problem by applying to our tentative solution of it the test of the utterance of the Christian heart, we must acknowledge that the instinct which bids us defend others is responsible for introducing a very grave complication. For it is not as if the exercise of non-injurious coercion could be relied on as always effective for purposes of defence. There are undoubtedly cases in which successful defence does involve the infliction of serious injury on the aggressor. The Christian, therefore, whatever his final answer, must be prepared to find himself faced with the need of choosing between alternatives, both of which seem at first sight to be equally repugnant and insufferable.

Apart from that difficulty, which we must take up later, there can be little doubt as to the direction in which the Christian heart leads us. Particularly when we reflect on the part played by the instinct of compassion in the moral development of the race, and the way in which one long-prevalent cruelty after another has been abolished by the growing power of that instinct, we cannot but realize that, while the application of it as a test does not suffice to settle our present problem finally, it does lend a good deal of strength to the tentative hypothesis that the Christian Law, rightly understood, forbids participa-

tion in war, because it forbids the infliction of damage on the personalities of others. Its advancing claims have not previously misled us, as the history of morals shows. Is it likely to be misleading us here?

III. *The Character and Teaching of Jesus.*

(a). Probably all Christians would agree that the personal character and teaching of Jesus Christ do, at least in a general way, embody for his professed followers the norm by which they ought themselves to be guided, the Divine Law with which they ought to comply. The notion of "the Christ-like character" has established itself in the mind and heart of Christendom; and probably no Christian, whatever qualifications he might desire to add, would like to see that way of designating the Christian's moral standard fall into disuse. Equal unanimity would almost certainly be found for the conviction that no "imitatio Christi" can—or ought to try to—be quite complete, but that certain legitimate limitations are set to it by various considerations, in particular by the differences between our circumstances and his. Much disagreement would however undoubtedly emerge as to the nature and extent of these legitimate limitations. This problem of the application of his standard to our changed circumstances and calling will be discussed below (see pp. 84–87); but it is needful at this point to touch on three matters connected with the authority of Jesus regarding which I believe that the judgment of some modern Christians is apt to go astray.

i. Present-day writers are never weary of urging that Jesus was not and did not mean to be a legislator. Now it is not difficult to imagine meanings which might be given to the word "legislator", but which could not reasonably be applied to him. He did not, that is to say, formulate a code of regulations like the Deuteronomic or the Priestly Code incorporated in the Pentateuch—codes which were meant to be coercively enforced by the civil rulers of the Jewish community. But if by "legislator" we mean one who, in the Name of God, addresses religious and moral imperatives to the wills of those who see in him a Divinely-commissioned Master, then the term fits him perfectly well. The root-notion of "Law", in a religious and ethical

context, is, as we have seen, that of direction and instruction. It is not only negative, but positive as well. It does not deal only with the regulation of man's external conduct: it addresses itself also to the inner self-determinings of his will. It claims to control, that is, the head and the heart as well as the hands, the feet, and the voice. It is not only general, but also particular. So understood (and that, I submit, is the right understanding), "Law" is the correct term to apply to Jesus' numerous ethical imperatives. It is, indeed, quite right to urge that this legislation was promulgated in a particular set of historical circumstances, a set of circumstances differing in many respects from our own: but it is not right, because Paul said "By the works of the Law shall no flesh be justified", or because Jesus himself habitually used the idiomatic hyperbole customary to the Oriental prophet, to infer—with our Barthian friends—that his injunctions did not embody a Divine Law which we ought to and can and are expected to obey, but were intended only to reduce us to a becoming sense of our own sinfulness and moral impotence. I have argued above (see pp. 50–60), not only that a Divine Law exists which the Christian has to learn and with which he has to comply, but that both Jesus himself and the Apostle Paul clearly so taught (see especially pp. 59–f.). That Jesus in particular meant his hearers to take his teaching very seriously, and to conform to it in their own lives, is put beyond dispute by the unmistakable parable of the houses built respectively on rock and sand, with which the Sermon on the Mount closes (Mt. vii. 24–27; Lk. vi. 47–49). That parable, the reader will remember, was intended to apply to the man who "listens to these words of mine, and does them", in contrast to him who "listens, and does them not".

ii. It has been urged that Jesus' teaching was dominated by his confident expectation that human history, in any normal sense of that expression, was in the very near future to be brought to an end by the Divine and cataclysmic introduction of the Kingdom of Heaven. There is no need to discuss his eschatological teaching in detail here, important as that teaching is. Only a few comments are necessary for the fulfilment of our present purpose. It must, I think, be admitted that Jesus did not look forward to so long a continuance of the world-

situation as has actually ensued (though that miscalculation, if we may call it so, affected the outer form, rather than the substance, of the Divine triumph which he anticipated), and further that his thoughts on the subject of money and possessions generally were in part affected by his eschatological expectations. But it is a mistake to suppose that the whole substance of his ethical teaching was dependent upon them, and is for this reason inapplicable to us who cannot now share them. Large sections of that teaching (I instance the words about marriage and divorce, and the Parables of the Good Samaritan and of the Prodigal Son) have no direct relation whatever to eschatology. Moreover, when Jesus does state explicitly the ground for an ethical injunction, his words usually contain no hint of the approaching end of the world, but consist of an appeal to the abiding nature and will of God (see, e.g., Mt. v. 44f., 48 = Lk. vi. 27f., 35f.; Mt. xviii. 10, 12-14; Mk. x. 5-9 = Mt. xix. 4-8). And in any case his allusions to the time when he expected the great climax to arrive (Mk. ix. 1 = Lk. ix. 27 = Mt. xvi. 28; Mk. xiii. 30 = Lk. xxi. 32 = Mt. xxiv. 34) make it clear that, in his belief, so long a time as almost a generation (twenty or thirty years?) might elapse before it occurred—an interval, that is, which excludes the contemplation of so early a break-up of society as would make considerations of social stability irrelevant and negligible.

iii. The two topics on which the ethical teaching of Jesus is most concrete and explicit are (1) the loving treatment of men in general and wrongdoers in particular, and (2) marriage. It is, I suggest, legitimate to appeal to human experience down the ages as furnishing proof that, appearances and expectations to the contrary notwithstanding, the ways enjoined by him are more conducive to human welfare than any rejection of them can be. In advancing this argument, I do not wish to beg the question as to his attitude to war—for that we have yet to examine: but it will not be questioned that the unmeasured and growing calamities which have befallen various countries of the world during the last twenty years or so are very unmistakably connected with a general rejection within their borders of the authority of Jesus' teaching. In regard to divorce, though I believe his prohibition of it (as a step permitting re-marriage)

was absolute, I am prepared to waive for the moment the question as to his *precise* meaning. Taking only his general view about it as agreed, we have there a moral demand which, at first sight, frequently and painfully contradicts the strongest inclinations of many married persons. Concluding from the painfulness that the demand ought not to be complied with, multitudes of people have in their own practice coolly set it at nought. I hazard the judgment that this attempt to be wiser than Jesus on the subject of the deep sanctity of marriage and the consequent illegitimacy of divorce has resulted, not in increasing the sum of human happiness and welfare, but in vastly reducing it. On two great practical issues, therefore, regarding which his ethical teaching has so often seemed to be unquestionably wrong, history and experience unite to vindicate its far-sighted wisdom. And if men are unwilling to find the right thing to do by following his teaching, there is nothing left for it but for them to find it by tasting the bitter fruits of their disobedience. Incidentally, one would like to ask those who are always insisting that Jesus was no legislator, how they would like to see his injunctions concerning sex-conduct freely disregarded in practice by Christian folk on the ground that the only Christian Law is "Love God, and do as you please".

(b). The contents of the Gospels, in so far as they bear upon the problem of war, are so well known, and have so often been controversially discussed, that we are under no necessity of repeating in extenso the relevant passages. It is admittedly impossible to ascribe to Jesus a considered, objective disapproval of all coercive government, in the manner of Tolstoy and the anarchists: the need for some measure of coercion in the community seems so obvious that we can well imagine Jesus assuming its general legitimacy and arguing from that, in the same way that he assumed and argued from the normal beneficence of parents to their children. On the other hand, while his so-called non-resistance-teaching was given with reference to a particular historical juncture (the Herodian and Roman rule in Palestine), yet there is no mistaking the emphasis and clarity with which it was given, the direct derivation of it from no lower a source than the benevolence of God himself, and the complete harmony of it with the rest of his teaching (in par-

ticular, with the enunciation of the Golden Rule and the Greatest Commandment) and with his own personal ideal as exhibited in the declaration that he had come, not to destroy men's lives, but to save them, and in his own personal conduct up to and including his death on the Cross.

It is indeed very often asserted, in fact not uncommonly taken for granted by the best-informed people, that Jesus never framed and delivered any ruling on the subject of war. It is true that the Gospels contain no verse explicitly recording such a ruling. But such facts as we have make it sufficiently clear that he did reach a very definite decision on the matter, and that his decision was a rejection of war as incompatible with the Will of God. I have tried elsewhere to state fully the grounds for this conclusion; and I must here confine myself to a very brief statement of them.

As Messiah Jesus undertook a task which, whatever its supra-national and universal implications might be, had reference primarily to Israel as a nation. His choice of *twelve* disciples, his confinement of his personal activity and theirs to the Jews of Palestine, his designation of his hearers as "brethren" (a term normally signifying "fellow-Jews"), and the contrasts he drew between them and "the Gentiles", and finally his avowal to Pilate that he was "the King of the Jews", entirely confirm what the word "Messiah" itself strongly suggests, namely, that Jesus thought of his mission as primarily and directly concerned with the Israel of his own day. His words of bitter disappointment, spoken at the close of his ministry, over the unresponsiveness of the Jews to his appeal (Mt. xxiii. 37-39 = Lk. xiii. 34f.; Lk. xix. 41-44) clearly imply that, while he may have foreseen their rejection of him for some considerable time, he had at the outset of his ministry not expected it, but had looked forward rather to being accepted and followed by the nation as a whole. Moreover, the coming of the Kingdom of God, to which he looked forward, was to take place *on earth* (Mt. vi. 10). Now one who was going to deal as Messiah, and that successfully, with Israel on earth, could not possibly have ignored the great political issue which was weighing heavily on the mind of the whole nation, namely, the subjection of Israel to the rule of the Herods and of the Roman Emperor; nor could

he have simply ignored the widespread Jewish belief that one of the prime tasks of the Messiah was to subdue the Gentile nations and to break their yoke from off the neck of his people.

That then is the background against which—or rather the context within which—we must read Jesus' refusal at his Temptation to seize the kingdoms of the world by bowing the knee to Satan, his injunction in the Sermon on the Mount of love for enemies, his repeated warnings to the people as a whole against imminent catastrophe (e.g., Lk. xii. 54–xiii. 9), his counsel that tribute should be paid to Caesar, and his prophecies of the fall and destruction of Jerusalem (Lk. xix. 41–44; Mk. xiii. 1f. and its parallels; Lk. xxiii. 27–31). This body of evidence, studied in the light of the historical context just described, points clearly to a very definite rejection of war as a means of bringing in God's Kingdom, nay, may even be said to be totally inexplicable without the hypothesis of such a rejection.

It is often said that Jesus rejected the idea of leading an armed revolt against Rome, because he did not wish to establish a "worldly" or "political" kingdom. That statement is accurate only if, by "worldly" or "political", we mean "military". For it must be remembered that the sharp separation which we to-day sometimes make between politics and religion would have been largely unintelligible to the ancient mind. With the Old Testament before him, the Jew habitually regarded politics as a department of his religious interests; and while the Messianic Kingdom was before all else a religious state of things, it was also political in so far as it was concerned with the acts and relationships of men in their national as well as in their individual capacity.

Nor is it quite satisfactory to ascribe Jesus' policy of peace and reconciliation to his certainty that armed revolt would be crushed by the Roman legions. It is not even certain that he would in fact have been so overpowered: it is still less certain that he himself felt sure that he would be. Why might he not expect to do at least as much as Judas Maccabaeus had done?

We must, moreover, guard ourselves against being misled by an exaggerated tendency on the part of some modern New-Testament scholars to read Jesus' references to *God* bringing or

giving the Kingdom as if they implied that he himself and his followers were *not* charged with the task of bringing it. The devout Jew frequently spoke of right activity generally as God's doing (see, e.g., Psalm cxxvii. 1): but he did not thereby mean that he himself was to take no initiative or devote no positive effort to it. If Jesus refrained from calling the Jews to arms, we may be sure it was for some *other* reason than that he thought of the giving or bringing of the Kingdom as the act of God Himself.

We are thus driven back to his own ethical teaching concerning love for enemies, peace, forgiveness of wrongs, etc., as at least the main reason why, when making up his mind regarding the right way for the Messiah of Israel to take, he repudiated the use of the sword. We know that he did repudiate the sword: we know that he did give teaching clearly inconsistent with any use of the sword. Do we need to look further than the teaching when seeking for the ground of the repudiation?

We need not infer from his rejection of the idea of a Messianic war that his attitude to the Gentile-problem was purely negative. If we put together his sayings about the Gentiles and study them in the light of the universalistic prophecies in the Old Testament, we can see fairly clearly what his hope and plan were. Knowing as we do his familiarity with the writings of the Old-Testament prophets, and in particular his interest in the Servant-Poems embedded in Deutero-Isaiah, we may with some confidence infer that the ideal aspiration therein reflected, namely, that Israel should fulfil the Divine purpose by becoming a light to the Gentile peoples of the earth (Isaiah xlii. 1, 4, xlix. 6), was taken up into his own world-view. If we consider his relations with Gentile individuals and his words about the Gentiles generally, we seem justified in concluding that, while for practical reasons he limited his personal work for the time-being to Israel, his ulterior project was to move his people to undertake in a spirit of love and service this enlightening mission to the Gentile world. Such a mission, by converting them to the true faith and reconciling them to the Jewish people, would solve the Gentile-problem in a better way than any conquest by force of arms could do.

Further confirmation of our reading of his attitude, if any is

needed, is forthcoming from the story of the Passion. Can we explain his sudden loss of popularity at the trial better than by attributing it to the fury of the people against a claimant to national leadership who now at last clearly showed that he had no intention and, as it seemed, no power to save himself from scourging and crucifixion? Further, the actual occurrence of his death (unless we take the unlikely view that, for certain non-ethical reasons, such as the fulfilment of prophecy, etc., he determined to bring it about at all costs) was rendered inevitable by his refusal to use in his own defence those very weapons of which he also refused to sanction the use on behalf of Israel as a nation.

Let us reflect a little further on this great theme of Jesus' death. It has indeed long been customary in Christian circles to take the use, with reference to it, of certain sacrificial terms and phrases in the New Testament in a strictly doctrinal sense, and to view the death of Jesus accordingly as a mysterious sacrificial transaction of a propitiatory, expiatory, or atoning kind, such as alone could make it possible for God to forgive sinners. Such a view is hard to reconcile with Jesus' own clear representation of the Divine pardon as a gracious personal act on the part of the Heavenly Father, an act the only human condition of which was the sinner's penitence and his willingness to forgive his fellow-sinners. The view labours, moreover, under the drawback of representing so supreme and central a thing as the reconciliation of God with man under transactional categories which are non-ethical and sub-personal. We can avoid these drawbacks only if we insist on seeking for the Divine significance of the dying of Jesus in and through its sublime moral character as a human act, and locating its redemptive virtue in its power to drive home to men the sense of sin and to move them, as the author of Isaiah liii was moved by the Servant's sufferings, to repentance. Whatever else we may come to see in the Cross (as reflecting the sorrow brought to God Himself by man's sin), we shall surely misinterpret it if we do not in the first place see in it a supremely loving and courageous act of self-sacrifice. If that be granted, then the ethic which led Jesus so to sacrifice himself must have been as vital to his work and gospel as was the redeeming death itself. And

inasmuch as that ethic was clearly love of such a kind as to exclude the practice of injurious coercion, the only conclusion we can draw is that the practice of injurious coercion (and therefore of war) is quite radically and essentially incongruous with the character and teaching of Jesus. It is patently illicit to assume, as did the late Dr. P. T. Forsyth ('The Christian Ethic of War', pp. 5f., 9), that we can infer from the Cross the exact ethical opposite, namely, the rightness of war, on the general ground that judgment and bloodshed were involved in both, regardless of the fact that, whereas the soldier's service is to shed the blood of others, Jesus' service was to let others shed his own (see below, pp. 139 f.).

So viewed, the evidence takes on a self-consistency and coherence which furnishes no slight confirmation of the soundness of the interpretation here offered: and in the light of it, the few objections that can be advanced on the strength of certain details in the story are far too inconclusive to upset the main results reached. It is on this ground, and not because I wish to evade any serious argument, that I venture to devote only a little space to these objections.

The problem of the defence of others is never explicitly touched on by Jesus: presumably he regarded it as covered by what he said regarding personal conduct in general (see below, p. 122.). The implications of his references to the severe judgments of God will be considered below, when we are applying our fourth test (see below, pp. 87-90). He did not rebuke the centurion for being a centurion, probably because he came to his conviction about war by way of a study of Israel's duty to the Gentile world, not by way of ethical considerations in the abstract: moreover, the rightness of the man's daily calling was not the matter under discussion. He accepted the protection of the Roman legions, not necessarily because he was prepared to see his followers exercise the harsh practices (like scourging and crucifying) which Roman soldiers were accustomed to exercise, but surely because he recognized, perhaps unconsciously, a subordinate value in the service which they were rendering—a recognition in no way determinative, as we shall see later (pp. 86, 135-138), for his own personal course and standard. When he spoke of sending not peace, but a sword, he was simply

predicting that his claims would lead to domestic dissension, because some would accept them, and some reject them. When he drove the traders from the Temple-Courts, he inflicted no injurious coercion on anyone. When at the Last Supper, he bade any disciple who had no sword sell his cloak and buy one (Lk. xxii. 35-38), he was probably speaking either ironically (cf. verse 37, where he ironically accepts the rôle imputed to him of "transgressor"), or figuratively (referring to the new element of hostility which the disciples were henceforth to encounter). Verse 38 makes it clear that on either of these views his allusion to the swords must have been misunderstood by the disciples; but as no further explanation of that allusion is recorded, it has been urged that misunderstanding on their part is unlikely, and that the words were really meant literally, and were rightly so understood by the disciples. Jesus, it is suggested, seeing that his followers could no longer depend on the goodwill of their fellow-countrymen, exempted them from the obligation of further compliance with the Sermon on the Mount, and bade them provide adequately for their own defence, and take their part in the forcible maintenance of that law and order which Israel's rebelliousness would now threaten. But, the obscurity of the passage being admitted, this theory introduces more difficulties than it removes. Had Jesus meant anything so drastic as the rescinding of the Sermon on the Mount, he must surely have couched his intention in clearer words—to say nothing of the difficulty of explaining why, if the Sermon on the Mount was now rescinded, he should himself be under any moral necessity of submitting to death, rather than of fighting in defence of his cause.

(c). To describe accurately the policy of Jesus and the ethical reasons behind it is not however quite the same thing as to settle the question for the modern Christian. What if the pacifism of Jesus be one of the things (like celibacy, for instance), in which for certain good reasons there can be for us no exact "imitatio Christi"? Quite a number of good Christians hold that it is one of those things. They argue that as Son of God and Saviour of the World he had a mission to fulfil which is radically different from our mission. Even when they are prepared to interpret his redemptive work on the moral and personal lines

suggested above, in distinction from the transactional and quasi-mechanical or at least quasi-juridical view embalmed in so many traditional doctrines of the Atonement, they still plead that, as the Teacher of Truth, Jesus had necessarily to pursue a special line in his ethical conduct, a line which in the nature of things his ordinary followers, who are not called to be exclusively teachers of Truth, cannot and ought not to try to follow. There are also many who account for the peculiar character of his teaching in another way. His counsels of perfection in the Sermon on the Mount are, they say, rules to be followed when the Kingdom of God shall have fully come: he never meant them to apply to life in this present evil state of the world.

We can dispose of this last-mentioned theory with little difficulty: for its untenability becomes patent at once when we reflect that in a perfect world one would have no enemies, and therefore could not love them; and one would never be smitten on the right cheek, and therefore could never turn the left to the smiter. In a word, the one thing about these teachings concerning which there can be no mistake is that they have reference to life, not in a perfect, but in a very imperfect world.

The other argument, however, drawn from the special nature of Jesus' own function in the world, is not so easily dismissed: for some measure of such speciality there undoubtedly was. What seems, however, quite decisive against it is the fact that in the Synoptic Gospels (for on such a question the evidence of the sayings reported in the Fourth Gospel cannot be admitted as sufficiently trustworthy) Jesus nowhere betrays any consciousness of a *qualitative* distinction between his own function and the function of his followers, other than that involved in his Messianic position as pioneer and master. On the contrary, the exact opposite is implied (see, e.g., Mk. x. 43-45 = Mt. xx. 26-28; Lk. xxii. 24-27). Moreover, his *own* conduct throughout corresponds closely with the injunctions he gave to *them*. The pertinence of this observation is not to be ruled out on the plea that these injunctions were addressed, not to his followers as such, but only to those whom he was training to be, like himself, preaching missionaries. That limitation may be true of some of his teaching; but much of it (the sort of thing we get, for instance, in the Sermon on the Mount) was clearly intended

for devout Jews as such, whom at first he envisaged as being en bloc his prospective disciples. If we accept the moral view of the Atonement outlined above, it seems clear that the ethical standard regulative for him must also have been intended as regulative for his followers generally: and even if we prefer some one or other of the older transactional theories, the fact that he never explicitly mentions any dissimilarity in quality between his own service to the world and theirs, but rather implies their entire similarity, makes it impossible to interpret his example and teaching as so dependent on the peculiarity of his own task that it has no direct or close bearing on the task of his ordinary followers (consider in this connexion Phil. iii. 10, Coloss. i. 24, 1 Peter ii. 21, 1 John iii. 16).

From the fact that Jesus, while choosing and enjoining pacifism for himself and his disciples, does not appear to have uttered any general condemnation of coercion objectively considered, it has been inferred that he approved of and accepted the work of the Roman legions in securing a state of peace and obedience to law, within which it was possible for him and for Israel to get on with their religious teaching, and without which they could not have done so with any hope of success. There is, I think, force in the argument. But any appreciation he may have felt of the service of the Roman armies on these grounds clearly did not prevent him from both choosing for himself, and advocating for the whole Jewish community (so far as he could influence it), a radically different way of life. And if it be urged that to put things that way is to concede that his pacifist teaching was meant by him to apply only to a set of men with a special vocation, the answer may well be made that Christian men and women as such (not Christian ministers and missionaries alone) *are* persons with a special vocation, and that Jesus' pacifist teaching therefore applies to them as much as it applied to him—which, it will be seen, is precisely the pacifist contention. The question as to whether personal pacifism is honourably consistent with a recognition of value in certain non-pacifist activities is one that we shall discuss in detail later (see below, pp. 128–148). For the moment, it will suffice to observe that the appeal to the test of conformity with the teaching and example of Jesus results in a very strong

vindication of the rightness of our provisional pacifist theory, and that the special character of Jesus' own calling cannot be used to prove that this theory, while valid for him, is not necessarily valid for his followers.

IV. *The Christian Doctrine of the Character of God.*

(a). There is clearly a very real sense in which man's moral conduct ought to embody an imitation of God. "Be ye therefore imitators of God, as beloved children", says Paul (Ephes. v. 1); and Jesus also takes the same broad truth for granted in saying, "Be ye therefore perfect (or merciful), as your Father is perfect (or merciful)" (Mt. v. 48 = Lk. vi. 36: cf. Mt. v. 45 = Lk. vi. 35). Some family-likeness must needs exist between the Father and the sons: and this cannot but show itself in the sons' moral character. At the same time, the imitation is clearly subject to limits. A father's treatment of his sons may be in many respects a worthy model for the sons' treatment of one another: but the simple fact that he is father to them, while they are but brothers to one another, indicates at once that the two relationships cannot be *in all respects* similar. So it is, clearly, in human families. When to this great difference of relationship we add the further difference that the Heavenly Father is to men something which no human father ever is to his offspring, namely, the architect and creator of the universe into which they are born and in which they must live, and also the omniscient and morally-perfect judge, we see that great qualifications will need to be made to the statement, notwithstanding its truth, that we must treat one another as God treats us. Perhaps we may hazard the suggestion that it will be in His activities as the architect and Creator of Nature and as supreme Judge that we are least called upon to imitate Him, and that it is in those relationships to us which can be best conceived in personal terms that we can feel encouraged to mould our conduct on what we can see and understand of His.

(b). The outstanding characteristic of God's nature according to the teaching of Jesus is His long-suffering and mercy. Jesus describes God as lifting up His sun on evil and good men alike and sending rain on righteous and unrighteous (Mt. v. 45 = Lk. vi. 35). His teaching abounds in allusions to God's love and

patience and willingness to forgive. In the Parables of the Lost Sheep and the Lost Coin and the Prodigal Son, Jesus depicts God as more eager to forgive the sinner than the sinner is to repent, and even as undertaking considerable toil in the endeavour to be reconciled to him. In speaking of the sacrifice of his own life, Jesus does not explicitly unfold its meaning in this way: but Christians are unanimous in viewing the Cross as a revelation of the forgiving and redeeming activity of God, God Himself defraying at His own expense, as it were, the tax levied on His resources by the sins of His children.

But alongside of this stress on the mercy of God, Jesus' teaching, like that of the rest of Scripture, also depicts Him as a just and mighty Judge, Who inflicts terrible penalties on those who rebel against Him or who disobey Him. Detailed references are needless: but one supposed exemplification in history of this side of the Divine Nature deserves mention. We know that the Jews' rejection of Jesus' policy of reconciliation with Rome led, not only to his death at their hands, but also to the revolt against Rome which broke out in 66 A.D. and culminated in the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 A.D. We know also that Jesus clearly forewarned the Jews of their danger of incurring this calamity. The early Christian Fathers are at one in regarding the final event as a direct Divine punishment of the Jewish race for rejecting and crucifying Jesus. Jesus himself does not indeed explicitly so describe it: but he clearly thought of it as the *consequence* of their rejection of him (Lk. xix. 42, 44), as indeed it very obviously was. But when it is remembered that, to the devout Jew, an incident or consequence necessitated by what *we* call the Laws of Nature was normally ascribed to the ad hoc volition of God, some will perhaps feel justified in grouping Jesus' prophecies of the Fall of Jerusalem along with his other prophecies of Divine punishment as forming with them a single group. On the other hand, the fact that he refrained from explicitly speaking of it in that way may not be without real significance.

It is by no means easy for us to work out a satisfying synthesis of the God we know as the self-sacrificing and forgiving Father revealed in the teaching and death of Jesus with the awful Judge Whose punishments strike terror in the guilty

heart. But we can at least offer a tentative suggestion. In our own experience, the inflexible rigour of the physical and psychological Laws of Nature seems to correspond roughly to the severities of the Judge. The fact that the former appear to us to operate mechanically, whereas the latter are represented as personal acts, may be accounted for by the difference between the ancient and modern standpoints alluded to towards the close of the last paragraph. In the case of the Fall of Jerusalem, the calamity clearly resulted from the wrong choice of the Jews, by the operation of natural psychological laws—rebelliousness in Israel calling forth terrible vengeance in Rome. And although we cannot easily synthesize the two aspects of the Divine character here before us, it is clear (1) that the Divine severity corresponds rather to the creative agency of God as architect of the Universe than to His personal relations with us as our Father, and are therefore presumably less likely to be a proper object for our imitation than is His forgiving love; and (2) although Jesus accepts both sides as true, the only one which he expressly bids us imitate is the forgiving love. We never find him bidding his followers punish the guilty, as their Heavenly Father punishes the guilty.

The great Origen teaches that, when men sin, God lets them go on in their sin, until they get sated with it, and come to loathe it ('De Principiis', III. i. 17: cf. Psalm lxxxii. 12, Job viii. 4, Isaiah lxiv. 7 [R.V. marg.]). That is one way of saying that men may learn by bitter experience the folly of sin and the wisdom of righteousness. If indeed they do, both ancient and modern thinkers would agree in regarding the process as forming at least one stage in the Divine discipline of man. But whereas the modern man would go on to interpret it as the operation of one of God's natural laws, the ancient would depict it rather as the infliction of his direct and deliberate chastisement. If the modern interpretation is admissible, the punishment belongs rather to the function of God as Creator and Judge than to His personal dealings with us as Father.

(c). The result, therefore, of our effort to apply to our tentative theory the test of conformity with what we know of the character of God would seem to vindicate it. Not that we are to refuse, like Marcion, to admit any element of punitive severity

in God; but that His gentleness and forgiving love, which is so striking a feature in Jesus' picture of Him, stands out prominently as the main feature of His *personal* treatment of men, in contrast to the severe punitive judgments which Jesus indeed (in keeping with the Scriptural world-view) represents as His personal acts, but which are seen to belong rather to that side of His being in which we can least resemble Him, namely, His sovereign Creatorship and omniscient Judgeship. If therefore, as pacifists, we claim to conform to one phase of the Divine character rather than the other, the choice is not an arbitrary one, but has the sanction, as I have shown, of Jesus himself.

We have now applied to our tentative theory four out of the five suggested tests. And I do not think it is too much to claim that it has passed them all successfully. The one unresolved difficulty, the defence of others, we proposed to treat as an item in connexion with the fifth test. The fifth test is in fact the hardest of them all. It may, I believe, be safely said that, were it not for difficulties raised by the fifth test, there would be little disagreement among Christians about the rightness of pacifism. But many people, feeling that it does not satisfactorily pass the fifth test, and recognizing that the other four are yet legitimate tests, often try to show that it does not satisfactorily pass them either. Since, then, the most serious challenge is presented by the fifth test—the question as to the nature of the results—I must now address myself to the task of meeting that challenge.

CHAPTER V

THE TEST OF EXPEDIENCY

BEFORE proceeding to apply this fifth test of ours to the policy of pacifism which we have tentatively advanced as the right one, and which seems to answer the other four tests tolerably well, we must consider the view of those who would demur at the outset to the application of such a test as that of expediency, when once the rightful claims of the authorities we have just been studying have been satisfactorily met. Such persons would plead, in substance, that as Christians we have no business to bother ourselves about results: having in conscience and the New Testament the means of clearly seeing the great principles of right conduct, we ought to go ahead and follow them, let the consequences be what they may. Our business is to do God's Will, and leave the results in His hands. To do otherwise is to reduce the Christian ethic to a kind of pragmatic utilitarianism. In any case, we cannot foresee the results of our actions with sufficient clarity to enable us to direct our course by a knowledge of these results. Hence the wisdom of leaving all such nice calculations alone, and walking in simple loyalty to the great ethical principles of life.

“Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,
These three alone lead life to sovereign power.
Yet not for power (power of herself
Would come uncall'd for) but to live by law,
Acting the law we live by without fear,
And, because right is right, to follow right,
Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence”.

The same conviction is reflected in the oft-quoted maxim which denies that the end ever justifies the means—a maxim which presupposes that we can always know the moral quality of the means we use as easily and clearly as we can know that of the ends we aim at, and which maintains that a bad means ought never to be employed in order to effect a good end, however desirable this latter may be. A good example of this attitude is

the contention that it is never right to tell a lie. We may not know, it is admitted, what precisely may be the result of our telling the truth: it may, indeed, lead to apparently most untoward results, either for ourselves or for others or for both. But we do know that to tell the truth is a great law of duty, while to tell a lie is inherently wrong. Nothing else matters. A man of honour in a tight place does not start arguing and bargaining with his principles. He does what he believes is right, and lets the results take care of themselves.

There is, I believe, a large measure of truth in this view of the matter; and we can all probably call to mind clear and appealing exemplifications of its truth. At the same time, we feel perhaps equally certain that there must be a catch in it somewhere, since we are confident that we neither do, nor indeed ought to, leave the foreknown consequences of our actions completely out of account in deciding what actions to commit. The theory that considerations of expediency ought to be ignored out of deference to an *a priori* or intuitive sense of principle stands in need of drastic qualification for the following reasons.

(1). Our natural sense of concern over the effects of what we do, our desire to produce good results by our actions, and our unwillingness to produce evil results, arise from an instinct as authoritative and as worthy of regard as our deference to the great moral principles in the abstract. In point of fact, we all do take account of our experience of results as pertinent to our judgment of the moral quality of our own actions and those of others: and we know instinctively that we must do so, and ought to do so—that is to say, our concern over the results is a *moral* concern; and if it ought not to be trusted, why should we trust our concern over moral principles in the abstract? It must be borne in mind that we are not here engaged in investigating inner motives or in distributing praise or blame. If our own motives are unworthy, we are right to blame ourselves: and since we are normally ill-informed as to our neighbour's motives and temptations, we are bidden not to judge him. But in any case, our business here is to judge, not men, nor even their inner motives, but the moral quality of their actions; and in order to do that, the results at which they aim and to which they lead have to be considered.

(2). The great moral principles themselves surely stand in some relation of dependence to the consequences which they may be calculated to produce. Could we not truly say that the reason why theft, lying, murder, greed, pride, uncleanness, and the like, are morally wrong, is, at least to a great degree, because the practice of them brings with it calamity to mankind? Or, if this statement be objected to as savouring of tautology (because, having first made up our minds on a priori grounds that these things are bad, we naturally regard anything that follows from the prevalence of them as bad also), may we not venture to be more concrete, and say that one reason at least why we regard these actions as wrong is because, man being what he is, they make impossible his most lasting and highest happiness? I do not wish to digress here into a discussion of the precise relation between happiness and goodness, or to get entangled in an investigation of whatever element of truth may lie enshrined in one or other of the various hedonistic theories of morals; but I invite the reader to agree that there exists an integral connexion between each one of the great ethical principles of conduct and the human happiness which compliance with those principles subserves. The fact that man's immediate and (if we may use the adjective) sectional happiness needs frequently to be sacrificed for the sake of his most lasting and most inclusive happiness does not materially affect the issue. The point for us to observe at the moment is this: that, if the character of the consequences has something fundamental to do with the great general principles of morals, it will surely have something fundamental to do with the application of these principles to practical life also.

(3). When we undertake the important task of settling definitely what our moral principles involve in the matter of our personal and concrete and practical conduct, it becomes more than ever clear that no such translation of a moral purpose into the terms of practical life would be possible unless the test of reasonably foreknowable results was available for our use. How is a physician or surgeon or nurse to know the right practical way to treat a sick person, except by foreknowing and considering the results that will follow upon this or that method of treatment? What practical use would the noble motive of

mercy for the sick or injured be, unless it were followed up by knowledge and consideration of how his body would react to the various conceivable or suggested remedies? It is morally wrong for a man to over-eat, over-drink, over-smoke. But wherewithal shall he cleanse his way from these excesses, except by discovering and taking account of the results of this or that amount of indulgence? It is morally wrong for a man so to treat his wife that either his own physical powers are debilitated or that she produces more children than is consistent with her general physical well-being. But how is the practical significance of these rubrics to be realized, except by paying heed to the dictates of practical experience? The nearer we come, in any enquiry into ethics, to the concrete and practical application of principles to life, the more attention do we have to pay to the quality of the results of the several courses of action open to us.

(4). I have referred above (pp. 58 f., 70 f.) to the frequency with which the complexities of life (especially, we may note, *political* life) present us with moral dilemmas, i.e., with situations in which two or more moral principles are involved, and at least one of them has to be sacrificed whatever course is taken. In such a situation, it is often possible to decide on one's course without hesitation, because one of the moral considerations involved clearly has the prior claim. When, for instance, a child plainly needs some correction, concern for its good habits must obviously take precedence over the other sound principle of sparing the child pain and sorrow. But other occasions will arise on which the conflicting considerations will be much more evenly balanced: and in those cases our estimate of their intrinsic worth as moral principles will need to be assisted by a comparison of the results to which they will severally lead.

It is as dilemmas that we ought to consider the cases presupposed by the popular sayings that the end justifies, or does not justify, the means. In their bald, unqualified form, both assertions are unsatisfying. For if we say, "The end does not justify the means", and with Neander describe the contradictory principle as "vile" and fruitful of destructive deeds, we can be faced at once with numerous cases in which, for the sake of achieving some good end, it is obviously right to do something, which otherwise would not have been right (e.g., correcting a

child). If, on the other hand, we say, "The end does justify the means", we are held up by the recollection of the many shameful instances in which this plea has been indefensibly used in order to justify acts of falsehood, cruelty, and bloodshed. The reason why the end sometimes does and sometimes does not justify the means is because every clash between means and end is in reality a dilemma, and because every dilemma can be wrongly as well as rightly solved. The sharp separation we make between ends and means is, in fact, not strictly accurate. For the means will produce various results of its own, besides the anticipated end, by reference to which it is judged to be effective: and a true moral estimate will involve a consideration of *all* these results. It would be better, therefore, to describe the clash as a clash between one means (with its appropriate results) and another means (with *its* appropriate results). Now it is clear that, if our dilemmas are to be rightly solved, a careful comparison of the total results of each of the two or more alternative courses open to us will be needed. Once again, therefore, we are brought to the consideration of consequences as indispensable for a satisfying solution of practical moral issues.

(5). Nor must we omit as negligible the educative value, both for ourselves and others, of the vindication (in practical experience) of the rightness of ethical principles, which had been previously accepted, in a provisional way, on the strength of some *a priori* authority, such as the injunctions of a trusted teacher. It is altogether good that in our moral education there should be this constant inter-play between authority and verification. I have already alluded to it above (pp. 77 f.), when discussing the authority of the ethical teaching of Jesus. When we remember that our task is not to usurp the functions of the Knower of all hearts, and to mete out condemnation to our fellow-men, but that it is very much our task to estimate rightly the moral character of their deeds, we realize how pertinent to our efforts is a study of results. Mark Antony was right in branding the murder of Caesar as a "foul deed", before he had enquired about the assassins' motives. The head-hunting practised by the Dyaks of Borneo and the burning of heretics and witches by mediaeval Christians are worthy of moral reprobation, even although both were carried on as religious

duties. The Jewish enthusiast was doing wrong in persecuting the Christians, notwithstanding the fact that he thought that in killing them he was offering service to God (John xvi. 2). And the blame which we often mete out (or ought to mete out) to ourselves when we find that, without malicious intent, we have brought about calamitous results, either through negligence or through erroneously regarding the anticipated results as good, sufficiently reveals our awareness of the connexion between consequence and morality. And unless we are able to give others some grounds for believing that the principles of conduct for which as Christians we stand were such as to conduce, at least on the whole and on a long view, to the welfare and happiness of mankind, we shall deprive ourselves of one very important weapon of Christian apologetic and propaganda.

But, it will be asked, if a consideration of the results of our actions must enter so unquestionably into the business of deciding their moral character, what room is left for that "scorn of consequence" to which we referred at the commencement of this chapter, and of which we said that it undoubtedly contained a large measure of truth? For true indeed it is that occasions not infrequently arise, on which a man seems obliged to bid defiance for the time-being to consequences, and to stand stubbornly by what looks like some a priori and more or less abstract principle. Then it is that the human conscience throws all calculation of immediate results to the winds, and cries out, "Let justice be done, though the heavens fall!" How can such a defiance of consequences ever be right? For two reasons: (a) not only is absolute certainty about the immediate concrete results of our actions never within our reach, but very often even approximate knowledge concerning them is impossible; (b) there are dilemmas in which the more righteous alternative is the acceptance of death. In such cases, any adequate study and balancing of probable results is virtually ruled out: a man therefore avails himself of a scale of the comparative values of moral principles in the abstract, which scale embodies the gathered experience of mankind in general, and of himself in particular, touching the probable consequences of obedience to those several principles. This gathered experience leads to the enthronement of certain great duties, like kindness, chastity, truthfulness, and

justice, as absolutely trustworthy guides, even when the *immediate* results of faithful adherence to them are either obscure or menacing. Then it is that a man may assure himself that, whatever may supervene, the results cannot be *ultimately* disastrous: and, even if it means martyrdom for him personally, he can say with confidence, "Let justice be done, though the heavens fall!", because he knows that the heavens are on his side, and will not fall. Such temporary disregard of the immediate sequel does not mean that the consideration of consequences has not played a very important part in the fashioning of those ideals which at the moment he may be called upon to follow more or less blindly.

In conclusion, then, we may say that the probable or certain results of any course of practical conduct *are* relevant material for a true judgment as to its ethical value. We must, however, remember that this test is not going to be an easy one to apply, largely because the future is proverbially uncertain and results can never be completely foreseen. That does not mean that we are entitled to evade or decline the test of practical expediency: but it does mean that we must not expect it to give us an infallible verdict or to take us more than a certain way towards determining what it is right for us to do.

Having thus disposed of—by answering in the affirmative—the question as to whether it is legitimate to introduce the test of expediency when we are discussing a problem in ethics, we must now proceed to ascertain what happens to our tentative theory when it is subjected to this test.

Broadly speaking, almost the whole human race believes that it is occasionally right and necessary to inflict injurious coercion on human beings, in order to prevent the perpetration by them of some intolerable evil—in other words, that the refusal ever to inflict any injurious coercion on anyone, whatever else might be said in defence of such a refusal, would conspicuously fail to pass the test of expediency, because it would lead to results clearly worse than the injurious coercion itself. That conviction has been taken for granted through long centuries by virtually all groups, civilized and uncivilized, within the family of mankind. If we set aside the various bodies of Christians who

base their ethics on a certain interpretation of the teaching of Jesus, the conscientious objector to war has usually been as lonely and powerless as a lodge in a garden of cucumbers. Voices, of course, have from time to time been raised in complaint against the evils of war; and here and there a teacher has laid stress on the positive value of gentleness and forgiveness. China and India have had their pacifist or quasi-pacifist philosophers. Even the Hebrew warrior Abner feared lest the sword should devour for ever, and so bring "bitterness at the latter end" (2 Samuel ii. 26). The Hebrews generally used the same word for "peace" as for "welfare". Euripides, it is clear, felt profound disgust at the iniquities practised in war: and Horace was aware that it was "detested by mothers". But it never seems to have crossed the Jewish or the Greek or the Roman mind to doubt the reality of the just war or the righteousness of fighting in it.

It would not be accurate to make the same sweeping affirmation regarding the legitimacy of purely aggressive war, though it is well to remember that belief in its legitimacy has been accepted for long periods of history and by vast numbers of people, and perhaps can hardly be said to have completely disappeared even yet. Francis Bacon (see above, p. 3) reflects the tension, in the mind of the professed Christian of his time, between the usefulness of war for its own sake and the sin of needlessly plunging into it. "Incident to this point", he says, "is, for a state to have those laws or customs which may reach forth unto them just occasions (as may be pretended) of war. For there is that justice imprinted in the nature of men, that they enter not upon wars (whereof so many calamities do ensue) but upon some, at the least specious, grounds and quarrels. . . . First therefore, let nations that pretend to greatness have this; that they be sensible of wrongs, either upon borderers, merchants, or politic ministers; and that they sit not too long upon a provocation. . . ." As late as 1912 the Prussian general Bernhardi wrote in support of the view that peace was demoralizing, and that even aggressive war was good in that it contributes to a nation's true greatness. In declaring that he wanted to make Italy not simply a military, but a militaristic nation, and in his treatment of Abyssinia, Signor Mussolini came very near to

endorsing Bernhardi's view. With that view, however, we are not concerned, nor with its natural concomitant, the belief that it is actually undesirable that war should ever be finally abolished. That such beliefs are patently and unquestionably incompatible with Christianity needs no arguing. And if they do still survive in a few bellicose bosoms, their obsolescence is evinced by the care that aggressive powers almost invariably take to-day to avail themselves to the full of the noted difficulty of exactly defining a war of aggression, and to endeavour to represent even the starkest aggression as really necessary in the interests of defence and therefore as justifiable.

It is, however, only fair to recognize the vast ethical difference between the attempt to justify really aggressive war and the conviction that the use of military methods in order either to enforce the observance of law and order within the community, or to resist aggression on the part of other communities, is justifiable. To condemn both views indiscriminately on the broad ground that both are attempts to justify war is to evade realities and to commit a grave injustice. For it is unreasonable to disregard the ethical difference between wanton malice or blood-lust on the one hand and retribution (or even personal vengeance) on the other, though we must go on to recognize again the difference between private and public retribution, and again that between retribution and reconciliation. The view that life must under certain conditions be violently taken has been conscientiously held by many who have objected very strongly to the taking of it under other conditions. The curious co-existence in the heart of Xenophon, for instance, of a willingness to kill freely those who could technically be reckoned (however wantonly) as enemies, alongside of a real nobility and humaneness of conduct in other relationships, constitutes for a modern reader one of the strangest and most remarkable features of his 'Expedition of Cyrus'. Heartless scourging, crucifixion, and even burning-alive were legal Roman punishments: but when Porcius Festus told the members of the Jewish Sanhedrin "that it was not the custom of the Romans to make a present of any man (to his accusers), before the accused had had the accusers face to face and had been given an opportunity of defence concerning the charge (made

against him) " (Acts xxv. 16), he was giving expression to a distinctly noble moral principle. Not only so, but in our reading it is hard not to welcome the penalties Shakespeare deals out to Iago and Don Pedro and Claudius of Denmark and Edmund of Gloucester, just as it is hard not to recognize a certain ethical justice in the assassination of monsters of cruelty like Caligula and Domitian. The glory of tyrannicide was one of the outstanding features of Greek ethics; the Book of Judith shows what the Jews thought of it; and more than one respectable Christian voice could be quoted in its defence. The point I want to make is that there is such a thing as a conscientious willingness to destroy life and otherwise inflict injurious coercion, under certain pressing conditions, which is of quite a different and of a far higher ethical quality than normal private murder or angry homicide or wanton massacre, which does not involve abominations like torture, and which is often free from such reproach as could be levelled at capital punishment. In the same way it is only fair to make a real distinction between persons who have by means of war defended some ideal or some genuine human value, and those on the other hand who by the same means have simply sought to aggrandize their own power and glory. And if the pacifist is to make good his case, he must be able and willing to recognize these ethical differences to the full.

The believer in the rightness of occasionally resorting to some form of injurious coercion can point to a whole series of situations which begins with the most innocent use of coercion and by gradual steps leads up to his full position. He can commence with one or two universally-accepted positions. Even the most affectionate parents and school-teachers have to remember, in dealing with children, the responsibilities of discipline as well as the promptings of sympathy and the willingness to forgive. It is clearly expedient that children should sometimes be coerced and corrected; otherwise not their breeding only, but their very safety would be seriously imperilled. Providence might seem to have arranged for their due control by making them physically weaker than their loving elders. But surely it is equally needful and justifiable to overpower and control the violent drunkard and the dangerous lunatic; and this function

calls for a more strenuous exertion of force than does the management of children. The typical bully, be he boy, youth, or man, will usually yield to no endeavour to keep his unkindness within tolerable bounds, until he has been overcome in fair fight and given a sound thrashing. The individual criminal has to be controlled. Even if it be agreed that the best treatment of him is forgiveness and help, still he has first to be compelled to submit to investigation and judgment: and such compulsion means that sufficient force must be used on him to secure his submission, lest "liberty pluck justice by the nose". Normally it is possible for our police-force, operating with the whole power of the community behind it, to arrest and confine an individual evil-doer without injuring him. But it is not always so. Occasionally, violent and organized resistance is set up; and conflict, involving risks to life and limb, is necessary before the officers of the law are able to proceed with their proper business. It certainly seems in every way expedient that such conflict should be successfully waged, that is, that the forces of the Government should be sufficiently well-armed to command victory. The American gangsters have elaborated a system of resistance to law, which occasionally can be overcome only by ruthless shooting on the part of the police. Sometimes the public peace is broken, not by an individual criminal running amok, but by a large crowd breaking out into frenzied disorder: and nothing then avails but to call out the military and authorize them to shoot, with the result that some possibly innocent individuals are wounded or slain. If it were a matter (as it sometimes is) of dealing with piracy, it would be needful to sink the pirate's boats; and not even the provision of life-saving parties and apparatus on the Government's vessels could ensure that no pirates would be drowned. All these are cases in which, not only is coercion expedient, but the coercion, in order to be effective, has to risk being, and often has actually to be, injurious. Nor can it be denied that, through this compulsory enforcement of peace and order and of compliance with other laws made for the common good (like regulations concerned with hygiene and industry), untold benefits have accrued to the human race.

Now from fully approving of such instances of injurious

coercion as those I have just named to fully approving of defensive warfare seems indeed a very short step. If a state is to function at all, it must presumably be strong enough, not only to control its own citizens, but to protect them against foreign assault and to maintain its own independence against the ambition of an alien aggressor. And when a people is entitled, by its national distinctness, to form an independent state, and is eagerly desirous of doing so, but is prevented by the tyrannical suzerainty of another state over it, it would seem to be justified in asserting its liberty by force of arms, if there is any chance that it can succeed in such an effort, and if there is no other means of succeeding.

History, indeed, provides us with a number of instances in which, so far as we are able to judge, the cause of human progress, freedom, enlightenment, and culture has been promoted, or at least protected against a very damaging set-back, by a successful appeal to arms. One might mention in this connexion the resistance offered by Greece to Persian expansion early in the fifth century B.C., the Maccabæan revolt against the Seleucid empire of Syria in the second, Pompeius the Great's suppression of the Mediterranean pirates in the first, the long drawn-out conflict waged for many centuries by the Roman Empire against the nomadic peoples from the north and east, the tense struggle between Christian Europe and Islam—a struggle which lasted for nearly a millennium, the wars of King Alfred against the Danes, the armed protection given by the Protestant princes of Germany to the Lutheran movement, the opposition offered by the Netherlands under William the Silent and his son and by England under Elizabeth to the bigoted tyranny of Philip the Second of Spain, the Puritan revolt against Charles the First, Cromwell's threat to the persecutor of the Vaudois, the Scottish Covenanters' resistance to Claverhouse and the Stuarts, the combination of Europe against the insufferable pride and greed of Napoleon, the campaigns of Cavour and Garibaldi for the emancipation of Italy, the Civil War in America—which preserved the union of North and South and abolished negro-slavery, the British Government's protection of north-western India against the murderous tribesmen beyond the frontier; and

—many would add—the Allies' vindication of the violated neutrality of Belgium in 1914, and of the outraged decencies of international conduct in 1939.

The foregoing survey of the various forms in which, and the various occasions on which, injurious coercion has apparently had to be employed for the protection of real human values, and has therefore been justifiable, constitutes a very damaging criticism of our tentative ethical theory. One can indeed hardly be surprised that for many serious-minded persons this body of evidence furnishes an unquestionable and absolutely final refutation of the view that all coercion involving injury to others is an infringement of the Christian standard of conduct. I do not wish to deny or undervalue the formidable strength of such an objection to Christian pacifism. It is, in fact, this close interrelation between coercion and social security which makes pacifism the most controversial of all Christian ethical ideals. For you can abolish institutions like slavery, torture, private wealth, and capital punishment, you can even advocate celibacy and voluntary poverty, without seeming to imperil the normal peace and well-being of society. But you cannot wholly abstain, and persuade others to abstain, from all exercise of injurious coercion, without apparently opening the door to "red ruin and the breaking-up of laws". Before, however, we conclude that the test of expediency tells quite decisively against the theory we are subjecting to it, account has to be taken of several other considerations. Some of these, if studied in isolation, might seem inconclusive; but cumulatively they are not without great weight. For the sake of completeness, and at the risk of creating prejudice against my case, I propose to include them all—the less strong along with the more strong—in the following enumeration.

(1). The superficially plausible assumption that a state cannot function properly unless it is strong enough successfully to resist foreign aggression by main force is a curious instance of the liability of the obviously true to turn out on inspection to be quite false. Let us cast our eyes down the list of the independent states of the world, and ask, how many of them are strong enough to resist successful and determined attack from one of the handful of states which we usually designate as "the

Great Powers". Why, the world is full of states which have virtually no power to withstand aggression from a strong neighbour, but are none the less safe because they do not invite aggression. The fact is so palpable that there is no need to specify examples. If it be said that they need only to be able to resist such neighbours as are *likely* to attack them, the case under criticism is not mended: for there is no means of measuring this likelihood; and whether aggression be likely or not, clearly many states succeed in functioning notwithstanding the risks they run. If, on the other hand, it be said that states *ought* to be prepared to resist any likely aggression, I reply that that is a different question—the very question, in fact, which we are investigating. Whatever be the right answer to it, the fact remains that a State's capacity and willingness to resist a foreign aggressor stand on quite a different footing, so far as concerns the necessity of its successful functioning, from capacity and willingness to restrain law-breakers within its own borders.

(2). In many, though we may not say in all, of the instances we have noted of apparently righteous wars, the aggression that had to be repelled was not entirely unprovoked. Even the nomadic invasions to which the Roman Empire was subject need to be studied in the light of the ruthless barbarity with which Rome had treated, first the Gauls and then the Germans, and the bad faith with which she later treated the Goths. Erasmus thought that the Turks kept up their attacks on Christendom because they believed that Christendom was aiming at dominion over them. There have been extremely few wars in which the faults have been wholly on one side, and the issue at stake has been one between pure white and pure black. Even in those cases in which our sympathy and our sense of justice are very definitely enlisted on one side as against another, we can usually see that the side in the wrong was yet contending for some positive principle of value. This was ably pointed out by Mr. G. F. Bridge in 'The Hibbert Journal' for October 1917 (pp. 50–52): among his instances is Italy's war against Austria in 1859 (in which an international court of law, had one existed, could hardly, he thinks, have done otherwise than give a verdict in Austria's favour). I do not want to lay much stress on this

point, since there clearly have existed cases of purely unprovoked aggression (a pathetic example is narrated in Judges xviii. 7-10, 27-29); and it is not inconceivable that such might occur again. I have nevertheless felt it worth mentioning, as a useful check to exaggeration on the other side. Moreover, caution is in any case necessary in linking too closely the beneficial effects of certain wars on civilization generally with the ethical justifiability of those wars. It might, for instance, be pleaded that Joshua's conquest of Canaan, Alexander's conquest of Persia, and Rome's destruction of Carthage, proved ultimately to have benefited humanity, though ethically unjustifiable. One is tempted to digress at this point into a discussion of the right and the good: but it is not necessary; for no Christian to-day would advocate or defend an ethically unjustifiable war on the ground that it might ultimately prove beneficial to civilization.

(3). The apparent continuity of the series of situations which might be claimed as unquestionably justifying the use of coercion (pp. 100-103), and the difficulty of designating any point in it at which a new ethical principle is palpably introduced, do not of themselves prove that the way of coercion is equally justified at both ends of the scale. I have already given reasons (pp. 64 f.) for insisting that, in practical ethics, a difference of principle, on which the judgment as to what is right and what is wrong may turn, is not infrequently a difference of degree, despite the fact that we do not possess the means of determining the precise point at which moderation becomes excess, just as the existence of pools and moisture make it impossible for us to draw a sharp line between land and water, palpably different as these are.

(4). I move to yet stronger ground in proceeding to meet the objection that no other means than war (or some other form of injurious coercion) exists whereby certain intolerable evils can be adequately met. It is very often tacitly assumed that, if the way of injurious coercion be abjured, nothing is left but purely negative passivity, a futile *laissez-faire*-policy which allows the evil thing to run its course unchecked. Now the refusal to use injurious coercion *may* in certain circumstances deserve to be so regarded. When a man or nation refuses to strike because of

cowardice or parsimony or unconcern, the choice of peace is worthy of reproach as negligent, inactive, and therefore disastrous. But what if the refusal to strike arise from some quite different motive? What if it rest on the conviction that there is, in love and gentleness, showing itself in forgiveness and service, an alternative method of grappling with the evil thing? No Christian, having before his eyes the Apostolic injunction to "conquer evil with what is good" (Rom. xii. 21), can afford to deny that such an alternative exists, and has a claim on our attention. Doubtless there are difficulties and complications to be cleared up, before the reader can be expected to admit that in the existence of this alternative policy of love and gentleness we have a sufficient warrant for discarding all injuriously coercive methods; and these difficulties and complications we shall face and discuss all in good time. At the moment let us keep to this single point: does there, or does there not, exist—in the Christian ethic as we know it from the New Testament—a clear and effective method of meeting and overcoming evil? I submit that the only possible answer is in the affirmative. There is certainly no doubt as to the character of that method; nor is there any doubt regarding the faith of the New Testament teachers and writers in its general effectiveness. There is furthermore ample proof from history and human experience that this faith was justified (see above, pp. 17f., and below, pp. 107–112). It is important that this general affirmation of the positive efficacy of Christian love should be accepted as it deserves, and should not be hastily set aside as irrelevant because of some objection or other which we have not yet examined, and to which it is often prematurely supposed that there is no answer.

(5). Probably the foremost difficulty which will occur to a Christian non-pacifist, who feels obliged to concede *in the abstract* our plea that gentleness and love have positive value, will be the serious risk in many cases that this particular policy of gentleness and love may fail, and that the victory will then remain with evil. But if pacifism may fail, so too may war. Most of the arguments used for the purpose of justifying war on behalf of a righteous cause tacitly presuppose as certain the success of such war, *and are valid only if its success can be counted*

on as certain. Yet nothing is more uncertain than the outcome of an armed struggle between two powers which are at all evenly matched. If the test of expediency can be used to discredit pacifism, on the ground that pacifism may fail, it can be still more cogently used to discredit war, on the ground that war may fail, as it quite obviously and frequently does. Incidentally, it is also worth observing at this point that the military victory of the wrong side is not always the unrelieved calamity it seems to be, and does not therefore always stand in such urgent need of being forcibly prevented as its opponents feel: the historian Fyffe, for instance, doubted whether mankind's permanent interests might not have been better served by Napoleon's success in 1812 than by his defeat. Be that as it may, I would again plead here with the reader not to repudiate this argument by prematurely summoning *other* difficulties to his aid. There are admittedly several points to be met, and I shall endeavour to meet them all honestly: but clearly they can be dealt with only one by one; and the answer to this one is that, since there is a risk of failure in all human policies including war, risk of failure in particular cases does not constitute a valid refutation of pacifism.

(6). One of the commonest means used to show that pacifism completely fails to answer the test of expediency is to frame an hypothesis positing the universal adoption of it and then to picture the terrible social and political chaos that would result. "If we all did as you" (so the non-resister is frequently told), "what would become of the security of life and property in the community?", or "If we all did as you, we should have the Germans landing here, massacring the population, and annexing our country to their Reich". To this hypothesis-criticism there is more than one answer to be made, and we shall need to recur to it later (see below, pp. 132-134). But let me at this stage point out its inherently self-contradictory character, when couched in this simple form. What is the value of an hypothesis which first posits that *all* the members of a society are so good that they will not return evil for evil, and then (in order to have a real grievance to put forward) arbitrarily withdraws some of the "all" to play the part of wrongdoers?

A similar, but less vulnerable criticism of the pacifist argu-

ment might be framed on the ground that, while in individual cases the efficacy of returning good for evil had been proved, we have no sufficient exemplifications of it on a large communal scale to show its feasibility as a national policy: and it is, of course, as a national measure that war has to be considered.

But if the historical examples of the practical success of pacifism are less numerous and impressive than we should like, consider whether the reason may not be the fewness of pacifists rather than the ineffectiveness of pacifism. Seeing that only a small fraction of the population has at any time attempted to practise it, we cannot reasonably demand instances of its success when taken up on a nation-wide scale. We are not, however, without a number of examples of its success when followed by individuals or groups of individuals in their dealings with communities of considerable size: and these instances leave us in no doubt but that the same success as attends this method when followed by individuals would also attend it if it were followed by a whole community.

The pre-Constantinian Christian Church offered no violent resistance to the often brutal ill-will of the pagan populace and the ruthless repression often attempted by the Imperial government. Yet it lived down the hostility and, by meeting cruelty and hatred with patience and kindness, it eventually became so large and influential that Constantine found the toleration and protection of it the only practicable policy. It is sometimes said—and I think with truth—that the Roman Empire never did its best to crush the Church, and that, had it done so, it could easily have succeeded. That, however, does not alter the fact that the hostility both of government and populace was severe and long-drawn-out, and that it was overcome by the Christian method of turning the other cheek. The pacifying influence of the Christian clergy in the post-Constantinian days is acknowledged to have considerably mitigated the calamities resulting from the barbarian invasions.

The power of patient endurance to wear down persecution has often been illustrated since Constantine's days. The English Puritans (after the Restoration) and the Scottish Covenanters are cases in point. The Quaker-colony in Pennsylvania (1682–1755), unlike all the other European colonies in America, made

no arrangements to defend itself, with its women and children, against the wild tribes of Red Indians with whom everywhere else the colonists were at war. The Quakers made a point of dealing with the Indians in just and generous ways; and as long as they refrained from injustice and armed conflict, they were immune from molestation. To suggest that this policy succeeded only because defencelessness was an impressive novelty to the Indians is surely a mistake: if it had done so, why did it not promptly fail as soon as the novelty of it wore off?

In the latter part of last century, the United States Government spent a huge sum and lost numerous lives in an endeavour to subdue the Modoc Indians. At length the difficulty was solved by the conversion of the whole tribe to Christianity through the efforts of a Quaker woman-missionary.

Theodore Pennell travelled alone for several years among the warlike Afghan tribes on the north-west frontier of India, armed with nothing but his medicine-chest, and engaged in healing the sick. The value of his work as a power for peace, in a quarter where military operations for the defence of civilization are usually held to be specially necessary, may be judged from the opinion of a British General in India, who declared that Theodore Pennell was worth to the British Government more than two regiments of soldiers. Another instance is the opinion of one who knew the facts that, had Mary Slessor the missionary been settled in the Aro country in Calabar, the Government would not have needed to send a punitive expedition thither in 1902 in order to suppress the slave-trade. It is, in fact, widely maintained by well-informed persons that practicable alternatives to punitive bombing (in the form of civilizing missions, promotion of agriculture, etc.) exist as a means of dealing with dangerous primitive tribes. The records of the various missionary-societies are full of instances of this kind, demonstrating the power of Christian love and service to check the savage instincts of imperfectly civilized peoples.

The well-known work of Mr. Gandhi, both in India to-day and earlier in Africa, exemplifies rather the power of non-co-operation than of Christian love on the part of a group: but even so, it calls for mention at this point as another manifestation of the efficacy of non-violent methods of restraint.

Incidentally, there are, of course, numerous cases on record of rival communities, even rival nations, replacing conflict and the risk of it by friendly mutual understanding.

While, therefore, for the reason stated, we cannot produce an historical instance of a *whole nation* overcoming evil with good, history furnishes us with plenty of testimonies as to the positive power of Christian love and gentleness as a counter-blast to violent wrongdoing. Such facts as we have illustrate indeed the fewness of pacifists, but vindicate rather than discredit the practical usefulness of their pacifism.

(7). But, it will be said, even supposing we admit all that has hitherto been urged, including the last plea that pacifism is a feasible policy, not only for Christian individuals, but for larger groups of people, we still have to face its liability to fail in particular cases: and if its failure is foreseen to be highly probable or even virtually certain, why not then have recourse to warfare as a method which has at least a possibility of being successful? The answer to this lies, partly in the inseparable character and inevitable consequences of war itself, the bearing of which we shall discuss in our next numbered paragraph. But it partly consists also in the specific character of Christian love and gentleness. As I argued above (pp. 63 f.), the success of this policy frequently requires, on the part of its users, a complete abandonment of the policy of violence. But more than that, whenever in a particular case Christian love and gentleness do fail (as at times they certainly do and will), there is generated a new redemptive power which has again and again shown itself capable of ultimately reversing the temporary defeat and supplanting it by a far-reaching victory. The palmary instance of this paradox is, of course, the death of Jesus Christ on the cross. It is, indeed, anticipated in the Deutero-Isaianic description of the martyred Servant of the Lord (Isaiah liii. 4-12), who, by means of his undeserved sufferings, had roused in the author a consciousness of sin (verses 4-6) and would hereafter divide the spoil with the strong, and receive a portion among the many, bearing away their sins (verses 11f.). But it was mightily and gloriously fulfilled by Jesus, who through the bitter pains of crucifixion brought repentance and redemption to as many as would be taught and led by him. In inferior measure, but by

virtue of the same paradoxical principle, do his self-sacrificing disciples "fill up that which is lacking of the afflictions of Christ" (Coloss. i. 24: see above, p. 86), so that, in the familiar terms of the proverb, the blood of the martyrs becomes the seed of the Church. The sufferings of loving and non-resisting Christians let loose in the world a power which eventuates in the conversion of evil men to God. Just because Christianity, as all its adherents recognize, centres in the Cross, this paradoxical principle of love's success through failure is one of its characteristic and inseparable features.

No misunderstanding of the true nature of the Christian religion could be more complete than that which allows the Cross to be used as a military talisman ensuring victory on the field of battle (see above, pp. 82 f.). For the Cross stands for voluntary submission to death at the hands of enemies in order that those enemies may be changed into friends: whereas the sword stands for the infliction of death on enemies in order that they may be overpowered and destroyed. Could any two symbols stand for more complete opposites? It is a less grievous, but still serious, misinterpretation of the Cross to treat it as a Divinely-ordained but enigmatic means of propitiation or atonement for sin, if in doing so we totally disregard the moral conditions under which the Cross first became a fact of history (see above, pp. 81 f.). Without attempting to advance here any final doctrine on the Work of Christ, I do submit (a) that no doctrine will satisfy which does not begin with, and embody as integral and essential to itself, the ethic of non-injurious love as the ground of Jesus' acceptance of the Cross, and (b) that, inasmuch as the Cross is integral to the Christian Gospel of Divine Redemption, the ethic that led to it must be equally integral to the Christian way of life in a world of sin. It is therefore obligatory on the Christian controversialist to take very seriously the paradoxical truth that the temporary failure of the ethic of love is often the very condition of its ulterior triumph. "Hast thou considered", asks Carlyle, "how Thought is stronger than Artillery-parks, and (were it fifty years after death and martyrdom, or were it two thousand years) writes and unwrites Acts of Parliament, removes mountains, models the World like soft clay? Also how the beginning of all Thought,

worth the name, is Love; and the wise head never yet was, without first the generous heart?" The Christian pacifist accordingly is better entitled than the reformer of any other type to avow his faith in the positive power of self-sacrifice.

"They never fail who die
In a great cause: the block may soak their gore;
Their heads may sodden in the sun; their limbs
Be stuck to city gates and castle walls—
But still their spirit walks abroad. Though years
Elapse, and others share as dark a doom,
They but augment the deep and sweeping thoughts
Which overpower all others, and conduct
The world at last to freedom".

It is, of course, inevitable that a certain tension should sometimes arise, in the minds of those concerned for the future of humanity, between the immediate and the ulterior or ultimate good. Seeing that our powers of foresight and calculation are limited, we have to be content sometimes with a general trust in the power of courses of action of a certain quality to produce on the whole good results, even though their immediate consequences may be tragic (see above, pp. 96 f.). Yet, however difficult it may be to foreknow the successive stages in the outcome of a particular action, there can be no doubt but that it is the ultimate, rather than the immediate, outcome for which we ought to be mainly concerned. This preference is bound up with the determination to make our plans for the achievement of results as radical as possible. Such an attitude must often involve an attempt to mould human characters redemptively rather than to control human actions immediately, though this latter has, of course, its own importance. To be willing to accept temporary disaster for the sake of such ultimate redemption must not be confused with the cold detachment, say, of a historian who keeps himself "above the battle" and sits loose to the turmoil of the moment. It is simple compliance with the conditions of future advance: for he who will never tolerate a momentary set-back as the necessary price of ultimate success, is, as a great authority once put it, "sitting on the safety-valve of progress".

(8). Over against this oft-ignored power of love and gentleness to wrest triumph out of temporary failure, stands the equally oft-ignored tendency of war to fail, even in apparently succeeding. That the right side very often fails immediately in a trial of armed strength is, of course, a perfectly indubitable and well-known fact: but while the risk of immediate failure is held by many to discredit the claims of pacifism, the similar risk in the case of war is, for some unexplained reason, not thought to discredit the military method. But more. Even in those cases in which the right side wins the war, as often as not the use of the war-method, it being what it is, provides no really final settlement of the question at issue. Admitting that it would be an exaggeration to say that war settles nothing (see above, pp. 38-40), we may legitimately point out (a) that it invariably brings vast evils with it, and the question has to be asked whether these are not greater than those to which victory has put a stop; and (b) that in particular it is woefully apt to lead on, sooner or later, to a fresh war. (Similar disadvantages attend the infliction of severe punishments on individual criminals [see above, p. 23]; only in this case the injury is less marked, and the evil consequences less conspicuous). Those who have felt justified in resorting to war in the interests of the State or for some other righteous cause have often been at the same time painfully aware of the unrighteousness of the means they were using, and would have agreed with Salisbury in Shakespeare's 'King John' when he sadly confessed,

"Such is the infection of the time,
That, for the health and physic of our right,
We cannot deal but with the very hand
Of stern injustice and confused wrong".

And how disappointing have often been the results! What lasting advantage did the Crusades achieve? Erasmus's plea that Christian missions should be sent to the Turks instead of armed hosts, and his belief that the most effectual way of conquering them would be to let them see the spirit and teaching of Christ expressed in the lives of Christians, doubtless sounded obviously foolish to many of his contemporaries: but clearly the repeated despatch of armies had the effect of

prolonging and embittering the struggle between Islam and Christendom. The successful Puritan revolt against Charles the First was the immediate provoking cause of the violent persecution to which Nonconformists were subjected for nearly thirty years after the accession of Charles the Second: and it was rather the patient endurance of persecution than the power of the sword which eventually brought that persecution to an end. Who of us has not been thrilled by the triumphant uprising of Italian nationalism against the Austrian yoke in the middle of last century? Yet behold the upshot thereof—Mussolini, boasting that he has “trampled upon the corpse of liberty”! We are not unnaturally prone to applaud Abraham Lincoln’s decision to prevent by force of arms the Southern States of North America from seceding in order that they might retain the institution of slavery: yet it is well-known that the defeat of the Southern States has not to this day solved the problem of the relationship between blacks and whites in America; and it is in every way probable that, had more patience been used, the same forces which had already led to the voluntary abandonment of slavery in the Northern States would in time have led to its voluntary abandonment in the Southern. The bombing of enemy-villages across the north-west frontier of India is well-known to promise no permanent settlement of the problem, and is strongly disapproved of by many who are fully acquainted with the conditions, and closely concerned with them.

But the crowning instance of war’s habit of disappointing the hopes based on it is the great struggle of 1914–1918. No war could, to all seeming, have more perfectly satisfied the non-pacifist’s idea of a righteous war. The Allies entered upon it with the highest ideals of the defence of freedom and the establishment of lasting peace: they hoped

“To reap the harvest of perpetual peace
By this one bloody trial of sharp war”.

Maintained for over four years with heroic patience and self-sacrifice, it resulted in an overwhelming victory for the right side. When it was over, the Allies had an absolutely free hand in settling the terms of peace. I well remember that, when the

Armistice came, and everyone was heaving sighs of relief, an influential Christian of Oxford (now deceased) was heard to remark that the outcome of the War had now proved that the pacifists were wrong. Yet what in actual fact *were* the results of the war? I do not here obtrude the colossal cost of the war itself in lives and money: I refer to the political consequences of the Allies' use of their victory. Such was the moral and psychological condition to which the savage struggle had reduced them, that they found it impossible to set healing measures on foot, or to refrain from showing cruel vindictiveness to the beaten foe (see below, pp. 159-162). The consequence is seen only too clearly in the present condition of Europe, and the appalling series of political developments which have intervened.

There are certain drugs known to medical science which, while momentarily effective, require after a very little use to be administered in larger and larger doses if they are to have the needed effect; and a stage is soon reached at which so large a dose would be needed that death would result. War seems indeed to partake of the same characteristic. One "justifiable war" succeeds another, until to-day the burden of armaments and the risk of destruction by the use of them are greater than at any previous epoch in the history of our race. Perhaps it is characteristic of all actions which are morally misguided—to provoke the agent to more and more doing of it, until utter loathing and finally collapse ensues. That, at least, is what Origen's theory of judicial satiety (see above, p. 89) affirms, and what the facts themselves often point to. In some piece of Mohammedan literature, the following saying is ascribed to Jesus: "Whoso craves wealth is like a man who drinks seawater; the more he drinks the more he increases his thirst, and he ceases not to drink until he perishes". A good case could be made out from history for believing that what applies to the craving for wealth applies to the use of war.

(9). The question has been raised whether, supposing the complete justifiability of a particular war for Christians could be incontrovertibly established (say, for example, the fight of Charles Martel against the Saracens in 732, or of John Sobieski against the Turks outside Vienna in 1683), the conclusion would really settle the ethical issue of pacifism for us to-day. At first

sight it would appear as if that were the case. The analogy I have just used of the dangerous drug points to the legitimacy of occasional and carefully-guarded use on special occasions, rather than to the need of complete abstention. It is at least conceivable in the abstract that a particular form of human activity might in nineteen cases out of twenty do more harm than good, and therefore lack any general certificate of expediency in support of its moral rightness, and yet on rare and isolated occasions have been the least evil of all available alternatives. Hence, some pacifists prefer to base their view on the obsolescence, rather than on the inherent wrongness, of war. It is to them, not so much a moral error, as an anachronism. They claim that the infinitely severer conditions of modern as compared with those of ancient war render it now completely illegitimate, though in the past it may not always have been equally so. It has also been urged that there are no dangerous nomad races at large to-day, to threaten civilized peoples with invasion. Worthy of mention at this point is the view of certain present-day Catholic pacifists, who, in loyalty to the teaching of Augustine, Aquinas, and others, admit the possibility of a just war, and carefully enumerate the conditions of it; but virtually deny that any war to-day would satisfy these conditions.

On the whole, I doubt whether the basis for such a view is a sound one; for the methods of war have never been other than ethically shocking, and who can be sure that the conditions under which it was occasionally right in the past may not recur in our own day or at some time in the future? A more recent form of the argument is the plea that "pacifism is unquestionably right", but untimely, i.e., that it is the ideal which we ought to be approaching, but that, if applied by the British Government at the moment, it would do more harm than good. So put, the argument can hardly be accepted: for it is not clear how a course of action can at one and the same time be "unquestionably right" and yet inapplicable. The real distinction to be drawn is, I think, not one between circumstances which once justified war and those which no longer do so, or between circumstances which now justify war but one day will not do so, but between the subjective moral differences of the persons primarily concerned with it. Pacifism is applicable only in so

far as there exist pacifists who are convinced of its wisdom. The subjective differences are of vital importance, yet are usually overlooked in arguments on the subject. I propose to go fully into that side of the question in the next chapter.

(10). Is there, finally, anything further to be said in regard to the almost universal belief of mankind that it is occasionally justifiable and indeed a palpable social necessity and a moral obligation to make use of injurious coercion in order to defend from maltreatment those who cannot defend themselves?

There can be no doubt that we have in this belief the strongest of all sentimental objections to pacifism (see above, pp. 73 f.). I use the word "sentimental" here, not in any derogatory sense, but simply as an accurate designation of the main character of the objection; for there can be no doubt that it owes its strength to the violent emotional revolt with which the human, not to say the Christian, heart reacts against the idea of neglecting any conceivable means, however violent, of preventing outrage or injury being inflicted on a defenceless woman or child. The actual situations in which such danger might be successfully averted by military resistance are, of course, very various. Consider, for example, the picture drawn by the late Dean Milman, in his 'History of Christianity' (vol. iii, pp. 217f.), of what might well have happened to a citizen of the Roman Empire in the days of the barbarian invasions. "Monachism, indeed, directly secured many in their isolation from all domestic ties, from that worst suffering inflicted by barbarous warfare, the sight of beloved females outraged, and innocent children butchered. . . . With what different feelings would (the monk) behold, in his poor, and naked, and solitary cell, the approach of the blood-thirsty barbarians, from the father of a family, in his splendid palace, or his more modest and comfortable private dwelling, with a wife in his arms, whose death he would desire to see rather than that worse than death to which she might first be doomed in his presence; with helpless children clinging round his knees: the blessings which he had enjoyed, the wealth or comfort of his house, the beauty of his wife, of his daughters, or even of his sons, being the strongest attraction to the spoiler, and irritating more violently that spoiler's merciless and unsparing passions".

i. The first observation that needs to be made on this problem is that our question is not, "Ought we to defend the weak?"—for we all know that the answer to that question is in the affirmative—but, "By what means ought we to defend them?" We have indeed to reconcile ourselves to the unwelcome fact that in this world we can never make absolutely sure that women and children, even those dearest to us, will not be maltreated. A measure of risk that they will be maltreated, even though normally it be only a small measure, is inseparable from the very fact of their being alive in a sinful world. There are, as we have seen, broadly speaking, two methods of trying to prevent wrong being committed; and neither of them is absolutely water-tight and secure for any particular case. But speaking generally, and taking a long view, we may claim that the method of gentleness, as an expression of active good-will, is at least as effective for defence as is violence—indeed, more so. That there are not more examples of it is due, not to its ineffectiveness, but to the rarity of the use made of it. Still, there are examples of it: we need mention only the Quaker women and children of Pennsylvania (see above, pp. 108 f.), who dwelt unharmed amid savage Red Indians, protected, not by fire-arms or even locked doors, but by their Christian spirit. And it is to be observed that such a method of protection often depends for its success on not being used alongside of the weapons of violence, but adopted as the sole and exclusive policy (see above, pp. 63 f., 110).

ii. It is a grave misrepresentation of the facts to suggest that the defence of the weak is at all frequently or generally the main issue at stake in a war between civilized powers. It would be an exaggeration to say that it is never a main issue in war: but it is none the less a grave perversion to depict even a defensive war of modern times as being waged in order to defend the helpless inhabitants of one against the brutal attacks of the soldiers belonging to the other. Two nations live for centuries side by side, arming themselves against each other ever more heavily: one day, on some political issue, war breaks out between them. Naturally, while the strife is actually raging, *some* women and children are defended from damage at the hands of the enemy by the soldiers of their own State. That

position of affairs is misused as a warrant for representing the defence of these persons as the main issue of the war. I remember a man in khaki during the last war being welcomed by the aged leader of a Bible-class with the enthusiastic words, "Come in, friend; come in. You're fighting for me and my 'ome!" The good-will was honest enough: but who does not see that, as an interpretation of the Great War, it was quite perverse? A pacifist engaged in reconstruction-work in France in 1917-9 was asked what he would do if he found a man killing his wife. He replied, "I'd land right on him! But nobody except the rankest militarist thinks that has anything to do with war". Granting that there may be situations in which that apologia would not be fully justified, it is valid enough for most modern wars. And when we put alongside of it the enormously greater danger to which modern warfare exposes non-combatants (see above, pp. 33, 39, 74), we must surely admit that, so far as we are dealing with a present-day problem, war is entitled to claim little justification, if any, on the score that it is needed in order to defend the weak from maltreatment.

iii. Another clear indication that the appeal to the strong instinct to defend the weak as a moral justification of waging war is in the main a controversial weapon rather than a sincere and trustworthy conviction, is the way in which it is gaily forgotten and disregarded when this particular discussion is not up. How often during the Great War of 1914-1918 were pacifists proved wrong and dishonourably wrong by stirring allusions to the undeserved sufferings of the Belgians, and to the patent duty of Englishmen to fight in their defence. Yet when, later on, innocent Chinese were suffering atrocities at the hands of Japan, and innocent Abyssinians at the hands of Italy, though many condemned and protested against what was being done, one did not hear the leaders of public and particularly religious opinion blazing away, as they did in 1914, about the baseness and cowardice of men who would not at once take up arms in defence of the sufferers. An eye-witness told me years ago how he had seen a defenceless girl being abused under a wagon by foreign soldiers who had recently swarmed into a conquered town. He had done nothing. "What could I do?", he said to me. And he was a British military officer. One can find

plenty of examples of non-pacifists, when they are not at the moment thinking of refuting pacifism as a failure to defend the weak, contemplating with frank approval the sacrifice of one's wife and children, if such a price be demanded on behalf of some great cause. Here, for instance, is Luther, defying the persecutors:

"Nehmen sie den Leib,
Gut, Ehr', Kind, und Weib;
Lass fahren dahin!
Sie haben's kein'n Gewinn;
Das Reich muss uns doch bleiben".

During the Great War, a representative English newspaper praised the patriotism of a Belgian peasant who was reported to have preferred to see his wife and children shot one by one and last of all to be shot himself, rather than report to the Prussians under threat what he knew about the position of the Belgian army. Mr. G. F. Bridge—if I may again quote his war-time article in 'The Hibbert Journal' (October 1917, p. 49)—commenting on the unheroic character of the virtues normal during peace, adds, "And then suddenly comes war, and lifts us out of and beyond ourselves, gives us a cause to work and to suffer for wholly detached from ourselves, and puts not only pleasure and interest, but *home and family, into the second place*" (italics mine). I find the same sentiment expressed in the late Canon Rashdall's book, 'Conscience and Christ' (pp. 193f.)—the work of one strongly opposed to pacifism. It is clear, therefore, that the pacifist is by no means the only person who realizes that, dear as wife and child may be, extreme conditions may arise in which their immunity from physical harm or from the risk of it can be secured only by unfaithfulness to some greater and holier cause. That is not to say that a man can make no mistake in assessing the respective claims of this cause and of his family: but the facts adduced should suffice to protect the pacifist from hasty condemnation simply on the ground that there does exist something (namely, the Kingdom of God, as involving a particular way of life), to which he may have to sacrifice the physical safety of his wife and children. For if that fact be, as is so often assumed, a sufficient ground for condemning the

pacifist, then the non-pacifist must be condemned no less emphatically along with him.

iv. The appeal to the Christian heart has, as I have urged (see above, pp. 69-71), an indefeasible part to play in the settlement of problems in practical ethics: and certainly its normal utterance is in favour of defending the endangered weak by all possible means. But it is doubtful whether an ethical question can be satisfactorily decided by consulting the Christian heart on one single isolated feature of the situation (and that, moreover, a feature often not central or essential). In this particular case, the non-finality of our emotional reaction to this one feature is sharply brought out by its direct conflict with another emotional reaction—one called forth by a still more essential feature. If I can defend others from harm only by committing unspeakable atrocities myself, I cannot just ignore the dilemma because of its painfulness or its difficulty. It is a hateful thing to leave women and children exposed to the risk of physical harm: but so it is to run cold steel into another man's throat or belly, to kick him in the testicles, to gouge out his eyes, or trample with heavy boots on his face as he lies wounded. And if these two hateful things ever are actual alternatives, I cannot rightly decide on my course simply by consulting my emotional reaction to only *one* of them.

v. While the altruistic principle necessarily enters largely into our ethical decisions, it is a question whether, on a really long view, right conduct regarding others can be allowed to involve a radically different ethical standard from that required for right conduct regarding ourselves. Clearly we owe ourselves many of the same positive services as we are called on to render to others. It is, for instance, as unmistakably our duty to feed and clothe ourselves properly and to keep well, as it is to tend the wants of others in these respects. Father Damien did well to live among the lepers; and in enduring the disease himself, he performed heroic and Christlike self-sacrifice. Yet the heroism and the Christlikeness turn on the fact that he did not wilfully infect himself with the disease, but simply exposed himself to the risk of infection as the inseparable condition of being able to serve and help the lepers. It would, indeed, be strange if the good we seek for other persons were

something totally different from the good we seek for ourselves.

It is, in any case, noteworthy that the particular duty of defending others is never mentioned in the teaching of Jesus: presumably he did not feel that it called for special instruction (see above, p. 83). An effort has been made to discover an implied injunction on the subject in the Golden Rule. If that Rule was given solely as a *means of discovering* how we ought to treat our neighbour, would not everyman's natural desire to be defended from peril at any cost prove that he owes it to his neighbour to defend him at any cost? Otherwise, if we apply the Rule *only after settling on other grounds* the question of violence, does not the Rule become a mere platitudinous assertion that what is a duty for others is also binding on us? The answer is, I suggest, that the Golden Rule is indeed a means of discovering our duty, but that in applying it we cannot rightly ignore our general ethical convictions, seeing that a man's instinctive reaction to a situation, say of personal peril, is not a sure guide even to what he himself would on reflection see to be morally right. One main purpose of the Rule is to keep awake in us a sense of our obligation to love our neighbour as ourselves. For although we may be aware that what is binding on others is binding on ourselves, and that a love for others is thus binding, we are by nature so prone to overlook the fact that it is neither unnecessary nor platitudinous to remind us of it. In the case of Jesus himself, while on a long view it is certain that he has achieved vastly more than any other in the way of defence for the weak against wrong treatment, yet he took no steps to ensure against exposure to danger those whose lives he directly affected at the time. We should need far more evidence than is actually forthcoming before we could conclude that, on the ground of the instinctively-felt duty of defending others, we had to instal and adopt an ethical policy which could not be vindicated on any other basis.

I am not disposed to claim that what I have written in regard to the defence of the weak and the expediency or in expediency of the use of injurious coercion for the purpose suffices to clear the subject of all obscurity and difficulty. I recognize that the strength of the emotions connected with the question in hand are such as to render it perhaps the most perplexing

item in the whole enquiry. Unhappily, in a discussion of this kind, it is not within our power to measure with any precision, such as might be provided by the enumeration of quantitative units, the comparative strength of this and that relevant consideration. We cannot allot and add up the marks, or, as it were, take a vote in order to judge whether the ayes or the noes have it. I do not therefore claim more than that the foregoing comments are pertinent in answer to the prevalent view that pacifism can be easily and confidently discredited on the ground that it is a Christian duty to defend the weak. If I have to admit that the discussion has not led us out into complete clarity, I hold that it must on the other hand be acknowledged that the supposed refutation of pacifism on this score is not clear either, and that the ethical obscurities with which this refutation is attended are at least as serious as those in which pacifism itself is involved.

What is true of the argument about the defence of others is in some measure true of the application of the test of expediency as a whole. The enquiry in both fields has taught us at least this, that several beliefs which have for long and by many been regarded as obviously true turn out on careful enquiry to be gravely questionable, if not positively unsound. First appearances, as is so often the case, prove on close scrutiny to be deceptive. And admittedly also the various arguments are not all of complete or of equal cogency. In the effort to examine the case as completely as possible, I have included a certain number of considerations which do not carry us very far. But, of my ten answers to the customary assumption that pacifism unquestionably founders on the test of expediency, I contend that nos. (4)–(8) (pp. 105–115), dealing with the positive power of love as a restraint upon wickedness (notwithstanding its liability to fail for the moment) and with the chronic non-finality of repeated recourse to war, constitute a strong and solid block of evidence, the force of which cannot easily be met. I contend that this evidence entitles us, not only to repudiate the claim that pacifism is palpably and unquestionably inexpedient, but even to assert that the test of expediency, when applied carefully and in its entirety, on the whole vindicates our tentative theory that

pacifism, i.e., the refusal to use injurious coercion, is the truly Christian way.

Similarly with regard to the five tests as a whole. The application of them does not lead to equally inevitable conclusions in every case. While satisfied that pacifism can justly claim the support of them all, I do not pretend that the support given by each of the five is equally positive and indubitable. The sense of the Christian community, to begin with, might not unreasonably be held to be somewhat ambiguous. The aversion of the Christian heart from slaughter is for many outweighed by its aversion from laissez-faire and from the omission of some possible means of defending the weak. The example of Jesus is felt by some not to apply to his followers generally, on account of the great difference between his calling in life and theirs. Even more strongly would many feel that, since wrath and punishment clearly have a place in God's dealings with His universe, they are entitled to a place in the ethical conduct of Christians. And undoubtedly certain impressive phenomena can be quoted in support of the view that pacifism is not always expedient.

I have not presumed to daff aside these objections as trifling. To have done so would have simply defeated the purpose of my book. But it must be remembered that, as the treatises on logic teach us, it is a fallacy to suppose that objections to a position necessarily constitute a disproof of it. I have been at pains to consider sympathetically and to answer adequately every serious difficulty raised by the application of our five great tests: and even supposing that here and there my answers seem to leave something to be desired, I make bold to say that our investigation has shown that any non-pacifist version of the ethical unity for which we are seeking would be open to attacks ten times more severe and devastating than is pacifism itself.

CHAPTER VI

THE BEARING OF ETHICAL RELATIVITY ON THE PROBLEM

WITH the close of the preceding chapter, the statement of the case for Christian pacifism might seem to have reached a natural conclusion. After dispassionately characterizing war, as a mode of human behaviour, we discussed the nature of that Christian standard by which its ethical quality as Christian or as un-Christian has to be determined. We found that the use of this standard involved the application of five tests: and, on applying these to war, it became clear that, while it was not possible to declare that in every case the verdict was equally unambiguous, the investigation on the whole resulted cumulatively in showing pacifism, when rightly understood in its positive as well as in its negative aspect, to have an overwhelmingly stronger claim to be the truly Christian way than has any plea for the use of war. If the arguments so far adduced do not suffice to convince the reader, we must simply agree to differ; whereas, if they do suffice, what need is there to add more?

Need to add more arises, not from the inherent weakness of the preceding arguments, but from the empirical fact that, because these are comparatively new, the vast majority of men, including even the intelligent and high-principled, do not accept and act on them. As a good representative sample of the religious non-pacifist attitude, we may perhaps quote the prayer which Nelson wrote in his note-book on the morning of the Battle of Trafalgar: "May the Great God, whom I worship, grant to my country, and for the benefit of Europe in general, a great and glorious victory; and may no misconduct in any one tarnish it; and may humanity after victory be the predominant feature in the British fleet! For myself individually I commit my life to Him that made me, and may His blessing alight on my endeavours for serving my country faithfully! To Him I resign myself, and the just cause which is entrusted to me to defend. Amen, Amen, Amen".

This confident adoption of a non-pacifist ethic by virtually

the whole human race until recently, and by the majority of the whole race even now, and presumably for some time yet to come, constitutes by itself a distinct challenge to the pacifist, and puts questions to him which it is his business to try to answer. Not that he is called on to explain why others do not agree with him: but the actual fact that the world has hitherto run and is still running on lines which he himself would feel it wrong to follow raises questions regarding the moral progress and education of the race, the right answers to which may well help to make his own position clearer to him, and may even avail to remove from the minds of others some of the difficulties which at present prevent them from accepting it for themselves.

What then, let us proceed to ask, is the real and full significance of this strange divergence of ethical judgment?

I urged above (p. 90) that the difference of opinion between Christian pacifists and Christian non-pacifists really turns on their disagreement with one another in regard to results. It is mainly because they think war to be the only way by which certain acknowledged evils can be abolished or averted that non-pacifists justify the occasional resort to it; and their attempts to show that it is not unambiguously condemned by the other four tests are for the most part quite secondary to this main conviction. Now I have willingly recognized (pp. 91-97) that a consideration of results must necessarily enter into any true judgment of the ethical rightness of any course of action. The realization of this necessity can be accepted as a common basis of argument between pacifists and non-pacifists, notwithstanding the fact that the ultimate nature of the good end to be brought about has not been fully thrashed out. The parties can be assumed to be already sufficiently well agreed as to what results would to a Christian mind be ultimately good and what ultimately evil. Attention must rather be concentrated on the ethical implications of the wide and confident disagreement between equally well-informed and good-hearted men, as to what courses of conduct will, and what courses of conduct will not, in the long run subserve those good ends which both desire to achieve.

The limitations of human knowledge as to the results of human action, with the elements of disagreement and error

concomitant therewith, have in recent years been studied anew by moral philosophers; and certain radical modifications regarding our ethical vocabulary (affecting chiefly the meanings we are to assign to the two great terms "the right" and "the good") have been advocated and widely accepted. It cannot, however, be entirely satisfactory to establish a permanent difference between the denotation of these and other ethical designations of similar scope and importance. The right, the good, duty, that which we ought to do—these must needs be identical; and any permanent separation between one or more of them and the rest would threaten our ethical thinking with an intolerable dualism. It is at the same time quite true that there *are* distinctions to be recognized, even if they be not rightly described as distinctions between the right and the good. For an action may be ethically right and good (or the reverse)

- (a) as regards the underlying motive from which it springs;
- (b) as regards the results to which the doer of it really believes it will lead;

and (c) as regards the results to which it actually does lead.

Ideally, these three should be identical: but in reality there are often distinctions between them; and these distinctions carry along with them certain important consequences.

For the purpose of the present enquiry, we may perhaps merge (a) and (b) into one. I provisionally distinguished them, firstly, out of regard for the situations considered above, pp. 96 f., in which no normal calculation of probable results is possible, and an almost purely intuitive judgment has to be passed, and secondly, because it is just conceivable (or say arguable) that a man might take a course which he knew well enough would produce beneficial results, and yet be moved thereto by an ignoble or unworthy motive. On further reflection, however, the two may well be merged in one: for on the one hand, in intuitive moral decisions a confident expectation that good results will be thereby secured is always at least implicit, even if it is not conscious or explicit or supported by any empirical knowledge as to ways and means (the abolition of torture is of interest in this connexion—see above, p. 72), and on the other hand, the expectant producer of good results, who is at the same time a hypocrite, knows in his heart of hearts

that his hypocrisy, being what it is, will produce bad results. At all events, we can afford to ignore such complications as the rare occurrence of an incident of this kind would raise. Motives are exceedingly mysterious things: it is often difficult enough for us to know even our own motives quite fully and accurately, while the motives of our fellow-men God alone can know and judge. Possibly the only way of harmonizing Jesus' prohibition of "judging" (Lk. vi. 37f., 41f. = Mt. vii. 1-5) with the obvious necessity of distinguishing right actions from wrong, is to confine ourselves to judging the actions, and leave the judgment of the doers of them alone. We can thus afford not to worry about underlying motives (as distinct from obvious and admitted intentions), except in so far as we can infer them from the nature of the results which the doer of a particular action may reasonably be believed to have been hoping to produce. Wherever that anticipated result is good, we may for the purposes of argument give the doer the credit for aiming at it from a good motive.

Our complications are thus reduced to the simple need of distinguishing between the rightness (or goodness) of actions as regards the results to which the doer of them sincerely thinks they will lead, and the rightness (or goodness) of them as regards the results to which, in point of fact, they actually do lead. If man's knowledge as regards the consequences were perfect, and different men's beliefs regarding them did not therefore differ from one another, this distinction would not need to be drawn: but things being as they are, it has to be fairly and squarely met.

Thus it comes about that, not pacifists only, but all men who venture to have views of their own on some ethical issue or other, are faced with the necessity of interpreting as best they can the significance and implications of the views of those who disagree with them. We may put the question this way: how ought the Christian pacifist to judge and interpret the non-pacifism of so many of his fellow-believers? This is the question the answer to which (as hinted above, p. 126) may throw light on the problem in hand, and possibly remove some barriers now in the way of the acceptance of his position.

It cannot be denied that, in deciding for himself what he

ought to do, a man cannot do better than decide sincerely to act according to his lights, and that, in so far as anticipation of results enters into his method of decision, he ought to take that course which he sincerely believes will on the whole lead to the best consequences. That being accepted, I want to invite the reader to agree to this further affirmation:—that a man so acting is not only subjectively justified, as doing what is, for him, with such light as he has, right and good, but is also instrumental—by virtue of his sincerity (coupled, of course, with an average measure of intelligence)—in producing some objectively useful result, even if he is mistaken in his calculations, and even if much evil which he did not anticipate or rightly assess follows therefore as a consequence of his action.

I admit that an unqualified assent to this affirmation could be given only on the strength of an act of faith. There are no doubt instances in which it is hard to see anything but evil resulting from certain subjectively-honest courses of action. I do not, indeed, think we need be seriously held up by the head-hunters of Papua or other primitive perpetrators of cruel and horrible usages, for these men are virtually at a pre-moral stage, and their doings must be classed rather with the predatory habits of certain sections of the brute creation than with the serious ethical efforts of civilized men. But what are we to say of the detestable cruelties inflicted on the Dutch by Philip the Second, “the greatest bigot ever born into this world” (as Motley rightly calls him), who yet declared on his death-bed that in all his life he had never consciously done wrong to anyone? Along with him we may think of that whole host of sincere persecutors who, in killing those who differed from them, thought that they offered service to God. Can it be maintained that, because of their sincerity, these men effected by their bloody deeds any good result?

Certainly such good result cannot be readily discerned by the naked eye. And we cannot here avail ourselves of the poet’s cheerful faith that

“There is some soul of goodness in things evil,
Would men observingly distil it out”,

and say that the good which cruel but sincere persecutors

achieved was to evoke heroism in their victims, and generally to show mankind how not to do things. For that would not establish any link between their sincerity and the good they achieved: the latter would have been just as great had they been totally devoid of sincerity. I think it must be admitted that we are not in every case in a position to demonstrate empirically that moral sincerity always effects some good result well worth achieving. Yet possibly we ought not on account of that difficulty to surrender our confidence that it is so. After all, we are obliged to have at least a few intuitional judgments about the universe in order to get along ethically at all. Our trust that in some integral way happiness is linked with goodness, and that, if a deed is honest, it must have some good results, and vice versa, are examples of such judgments: they are often indeed verified in practice, but they are essentially axioms resting on a deep faith regarding the structure of our God-governed universe. And the one I am now concerned to commend to the reader is virtually a special form of the latter of the two examples just named.

If then we are right in our faith that a sincere but mistaken action is not only unworthy of personal censure, but produces some good (because it was sincere) as well as some evil (because it was mistaken), certain very important consequences follow. Given a sincere desire to do what is right, all the methods of exerting pressure on our fellowmen, including war, possess varying degrees of rightness and of objective usefulness. We might, perhaps, urge that the gentler methods of pressure are more right and good than the rougher (as the teaching and example of Jesus seem certainly so show): but our chief point at the moment is that all the varying types of pressure, if sincerely applied, approximate in differing degrees to absolute right, and bring about differing amounts of good by way of results.

The pacifist, therefore, however strongly and clearly he is convinced that the way of war is really incompatible with the way of Jesus, should take full account of the fact that, inasmuch as the majority of men, even of Christian men, find themselves honestly incapable of interpreting Jesus' teaching as pacifists do, or at least of seeing their duty as pacifists see theirs, they

therefore lack the essential subjective conditions for adhering to the pacifist way and accepting its risks. Just as only the Christian can do the fully Christian thing, so only the convincingly-pacifist Christian can practice Christian pacifism. This means that the majority are at least *relatively* right in employing on occasions the method of war (the rightness being relative to the state of their convictions). The pacifist should not hesitate to acknowledge further that, in so acting according to their lights, they do achieve some objectively-useful end in employing such coercion—some result, that is, better than would be achieved by mere negative inaction.

From the recognition of the truth of this judgment a very important corollary follows. Seeing that the State can normally act according to that ethic only which is shared by the majority of the citizens, and which is therefore certain to be below the moral level of the best of them, it cannot, in the present state of Christianity in any civilized country, be itself pacifist. The right course for the State, in view of the convictions of the majority of its citizens, may therefore sometimes be war. The same, of course, applies to the League of Nations, and for the same reason, though of this we must speak again later on. Pacifists, therefore, would be well advised not to argue as if the State could be expected now in every case to turn the other cheek and to overcome the evil in neighbour-states solely with good. The demand that the State shall act fully up to the highest ethical level which the citizens *as a whole* will approve is perfectly reasonable; the belief that this level can and ought to be progressively raised with the lapse of time is also reasonable: what is not reasonable is to demand, under threat or implication of censure, that the State shall *now* act as if it could share to the full the exacting ethical ideal which is, as a matter of fact, held by only a tiny fraction of its constituents.

Some pacifist writers profess themselves gravely shocked when they hear it said or see it written that the laws of Christian conduct which are binding on individuals do not "apply" to States in their relations with one another. But in so far as such an affirmation means that States are incapable, because of the average ethical level of their members, of acting on the ethical principles professed by the most advanced of those members,

there is nothing in it at which moral offence need be taken, seeing that it is simply a statement of indubitable fact. The moral offence should be reserved for the willingness of *some* members of that minority, who infer from the State's incapacity to act according to their ideals that they may themselves rightly abandon those ideals when acting in a civic as distinct from a private capacity.

Failure to allow accurately for the relativity of ethical conduct to personal conviction is the reason why some pacifists are prone to write as if full Christian pacifism were already well within the reach of their country at large, and were therefore ethically practicable for its government, and accordingly to press for its immediate inclusion in the country's international policy. Critics of pacifism ought to realize that such pleas form no essential part of the pacifist case. Did our critics but realize this, we should hear less of the accusation that pacifists are striving to force pacifism on an unwilling and unconvinced country, and are attempting to reach the goal of universal peace by a short cut. If there do indeed exist pacifists who are making such efforts, I should consider them to be misguided in their enthusiasm, and should decline to defend them. But in abandoning them to their fate, I should not be throwing up my defence of pacifism.

I draw attention rather specially to this short-sighted demand of the idealist that his country should at once act up to his own ideal, and to the short-sighted assumption of his critics that in exposing the foolishness of the demand they have discredited the ideal itself, because the double misunderstanding has played no little part in confusing the issues which the problem of pacifism raises. Men attempt to refute pacifism by drawing imaginary pictures of how it would work, and showing thereby the chaos and impasse in which it would eventuate. Now, speaking generally, the drawing of imaginary pictures of its results is a legitimate means of testing the practicability of a suggested course of action; but the legitimacy of it depends on the pictures being drawn in conformity with the real conditions and probabilities of the situation. When these are ignored, the picture itself proves nothing but the foolishness of the draughtsman.

Thus, to imagine a pacifist dictator, and try to discredit pacifism by describing the mess he would (so it is assumed) make of everything, is a quite inconclusive process of argument; for a pacifist dictator, that is, a despot governing a nation on principles far loftier and more self-denying than those professed by the vast majority of his subjects, simply could not exist—he would indeed be so impossible as almost to make the description of him a contradiction in terms. If we strain our imagination and insist on picturing him—the hereditary despot, let us suppose, of some half-civilized principality, who happened to have imbibed pacifism, say at some British university, even so—in so far as his governmental measures involved co-operation on the part of his subjects (as in international affairs they normally do)—he would be powerless to implement a Christian pacifist policy for the simple reason that he would, though despot, be powerless to cause his subjects to possess the Christian feelings and convictions needful as a pre-requisite of that policy.

Only slightly less absurd than this "dictator-fallacy" is the attempt to settle the question by picturing a suddenly-disarmed Britain faced with an unchanged Europe, including an inflamed and hostile Germany. The picture is quite unreal, and proves nothing, because it totally ignores in the blandest and most unintelligent manner the changes which would certainly go along with any conversion of this country as a whole to pacifism: it overlooks the fact that a whole country can become pacifist on Christian grounds as the result only of a very long and gradual process, that in the course of that process the attitude of other nations would be bound to undergo extensive change, and that the present hostility of other nations is owing in no small measure to the *non*-occurrence of any such process in this. It is, indeed, easy for the critic to retort to this plea that pacifism must have a poor case indeed if one can defend it against the accusation of perilous futility only by the plea that so few at present adhere to it that it cannot become a public danger. I shall deal later with the charge that the growth of pacifism is a menace to the country's stability (see below, pp. 157, 165-168). But I claim the right here to point out that, whether my reply to that charge be judged adequate or not,

the critic is not entitled to attack pacifism by describing the disasters to which he fears it will lead in hypothetical pictures totally divorced from the realities of the situation as we know them (see above, p. 107).

The natural complement of the frank recognition of the fact that the State, because it represents a non-pacifist majority, cannot be required to act on fully pacifist lines, is the insistent claim (based on the same principle that ethical behaviour is always relative to the convictions and capacity of him who behaves) that those who *are* convinced that the Christian way of life excludes injurious coercion, and therefore forbids participation in war, are under obligation to act accordingly and to confine themselves to the use of influence and of non-injurious coercion. None but they, indeed, are called upon to follow this way; but they *are* so called upon.

Let us now turn back, and follow up a little further the implications of our proper willingness to recognize, not only the subjective blamelessness of sincere non-pacifists, but the objective fruitfulness of their military activities. The principle is really quite a simple one: those for whom the employment of injurious coercion in some form is the highest duty they can see effect, in using it as such, some measure of positive good, even though their belief that it is really compatible with their Christian calling be mistaken, and even though, as a result of their miscalculation, they also bring about much evil (see above, pp. 128-130). I can see nothing in the recognition of this principle (which I will henceforth refer to as the "relative justification" of injurious coercion under certain conditions), which is either inconsistent with a strenuous adherence to and advocacy of pacifism, or is in any way dishonourable to pacifists. The full and frank acceptance of it helps very materially to clarify the pacifist's interpretation of history and his attitude to the society around him: and of that help he should avail himself, however satisfied he may himself happen to feel that his case is sufficiently secure without it.

Thus, without forgetting or withdrawing what we urged above (pp. 105-112) regarding the positive power of love and gentleness to check crime, we should be willing to acknowledge

that those who, because they have no trust at all or an insufficient trust in that power, were subjectively incapable of exerting it, did yet render a positive service to mankind in restraining crime by rougher methods. Such an acknowledgement by no means implies (as is sometimes supposed) a moral obligation on the part of him who makes it to use those rougher methods himself in dealing with crime, for he has a more effective method of his own—a method which *looks* ineffective only because there are so few people about who will use it (see above, pp. 107–110). At the same time, the acknowledgement in question has a very wide application indeed, and puts into our hands a key that resolves numerous otherwise perplexing antinomies in the argument.

It will, for instance, be remembered that the Apostle Paul wrote to the Christians at Rome: "Let every person be submissive to the supreme magistrates; for no magistrate exists except by (appointment of) God, and those that do exist have been constituted by God, so that he who opposes the magistrate withstands the ordinance of God, and they who withstand (that) will earn condemnation for themselves. For the rulers are a (cause of) fear, not to one who does good, but only to one who does evil. Dost thou wish not to (have to) fear the magistrate? (Then) do what is good, and thou shalt have praise from him, for he is God's servant for thy benefit. But if thou doest what is evil, be afraid! For (it is) not for nothing (that) he bears the sword, for he is God's servant, to inflict (God's) wrath as vengeance upon him who does evil. Wherefore it is needful to be submissive, not only because of (God) wrath, but for conscience' sake—for this is the reason that ye pay taxes, for they are God's agents, permanently officiating to this same end (i.e., the restraint of evil)" (Romans xiii. 1–6). Alongside of this passage we may set the approximately contemporary saying of the Jewish Rabbi Hanina, the Prefect of the Priests: "Pray for the peace of the ruling power, since but for fear of it men would have swallowed up each other alive" ('Pirke Aboth', iii. 2, in Danby, 'Mishnah', p. 450).

One needs but a slight knowledge of the history of the first century of our era to enable one to see what a great and essential service was then rendered by the Roman imperial

magistrates to the peoples inhabiting the lands around the Mediterranean Sea. Law and order were preserved; and the Pax Romana thus established proved, among other things, to be one of the essential conditions for the spread of Christianity. It was therefore quite natural for Paul, with his hereditary inclination as a Jew to carry back all established things to the prime agency of Divine Providence, and his appreciation of the positive values of Roman rule, to affirm that the Roman magistrates were appointed directly by God, and to see in their effective coercion of criminals the Divine wrath which he had been taught to believe was the normal retribution for sin. We to-day may find it difficult to use Paul's exact words as our own: but we need not hesitate to agree with him in recognizing in the dutiful, if severe, administration of public justice by the Roman governors (see above, pp. 99 f.) an institution provided, utilized, and (relatively to the moral condition of the administrators) approved by God, for the service and moral discipline of the race. Such a view of the matter is not infrequently echoed in the early Fathers. Thus Irenaeus (about 185 A.D.), in denying the claim made by the Devil at the Temptation of Jesus to be able to give the kingdoms of the world to whomsoever he would, quotes the words used by Paul in Romans xiii, and comments on them thus: "In order therefore that it might serve the needs of the Gentiles was earthly rule established by God, but not by the Devil, who is never quiet, nay rather, who does not wish even the (heathen) races to live in tranquillity. (Earthly rule was established, I say, by God), in order that men, fearing the rule of men, might not consume each other like fishes, but that, by the enactment of laws, (rulers) might strike down the manifold unrighteousness of the Gentiles. And accordingly they are 'the servants of God', who exact tribute from us, 'rendering service for this very purpose' " ('Refutation and Overthrow of the falsely-so-called Knowledge', V. xxiv. 2).

It has been hastily, and perhaps not unnaturally, assumed that these appreciative and approving expressions used by Paul, Irenaeus, and others, settle the question as to their view of the legitimacy of the full participation of Christian men in the magistracies and even in the military activities of the Roman government. For what does any Christian want as a

sanction for his civil or military office (the two were regarded as virtually one institution in Imperial times) than to be designated as a servant of God whom God has appointed for some useful office? And he would indeed be a bold man who should undertake to say with confidence and precision how much or how little these two writers actually intended their words to imply. It is none the less important to observe that certainly Paul, and probably Irenaeus also, actually had before his mind chiefly *non-Christian* magistrates, officials, and rulers, and that the actual words they use commit neither of them to any assertion regarding the legitimacy of *Christians* doing what pagan magistrates do. The likelihood and even the possibility that Christian disciples should ever wield the power of the sword, or (we may add) the power of the scourge and the rack, in the administration of public justice was simply not before Paul's mind. It is in this connexion not without significance that the technical terms ("wrath", "vengeance", etc.), which he employs in Romans xiii to describe the office of the magistrate, are the very ones he had just used—at the end of chapter xii—in order to describe what Christians must *not* do. "Render to no one evil for *evil* If it be possible, so far as lies in you, keep the peace with all men. *Avenge* not yourselves, beloved, but give place to the *wrath* (of God), for it has been written, '*Vengeance* is Mine, I will repay, says the Lord'. But 'if thine enemy hunger, feed him. If he thirst, give him drink. For by doing this, thou wilt heap coals of fire upon his head'. Be not conquered by what is *evil*, but conquer what is *evil* by means of what is *good*' (Romans xii. 17-21). That the early Fathers always noticed this contrast or drew the right inferences from it, I do not claim. I am urging only that to extend a genuine and hearty "relative justification" to this imperial system of pagan checks on pagan crime, and to claim for it a relative Divine sanction, is—as Paul's contrast clearly shows—by no means inconsistent with a clear sense of being called upon to confine oneself personally to a very different method of dealing with crime.

Not only does our principle of relative justification put us on the track of a correct interpretation of Paul's words in Romans, and (we may add) of Jesus' words about paying tribute to Caesar and his supposed appreciation of the *Pax Romana*

generally (see above, pp. 83, 86), but it has the additional advantage of allowing us ample room for a just appreciation of the good secured to mankind all down the ages and in our own day by the dutiful employment of coercion, even to the point of injury, for the purpose of restraining crime and confining it within the narrowest possible limits. Such use of coercion will naturally include also the dutiful employment of armed force on a national scale in those wars in which the long perspective of history makes it clear to us that the victory was won by the right side and secured some solid gain for humanity—a gain which to all seeming could not, with the moral resources then available, have been secured in any other way (see above, pp. 102 f., for examples). It allows us at the same time to do full justice to the idealism and heroism of the warrior, and removes all necessity of withholding our tribute of praise and admiration for his soldierly courage, idealism, self-sacrifice, and personal kindness, not to his comrades alone, but even to his enemies. Nor is there in the nature of things any reason why some war in the present or in the future might not be entitled to stand alongside of those great conflicts of the past which we regard as worthy of a real measure of moral approbation. How far the present war between England and France on the one side and Germany on the other satisfies the conditions of such moral approval I propose to discuss in the next chapter. We might however find a place here for an allusion to those quarters of the globe (like Palestine and India), where the safety of large numbers of people would instantly be in dire peril if the protecting hand of the British armed forces were *suddenly* withdrawn, and where consequently it is impossible to deny that good is secured by the maintenance of those forces. Nor finally need we shrink from believing that, having regard to human limitations, God bestows a measure of His own approval on the dutiful and unselfish use of armed force, notwithstanding the regrettable damage that goes along with it, and that He uses it as an instrument in His providential and paternal discipline of the race.

In order, however, that we may guard ourselves against the danger of drawing unwarranted inferences from the pacifist's recognition of the truth of what has just been stated, a few words

of caution must here be added. In the first place, our theory of the relative justification of certain wars waged consciously in the defence of some really noble cause must not be hastily identified with the theory found in the Old-Testament prophets of the great empires that afflicted Israel as the rods of God's anger. There is indeed an element common to the two theories—namely, the idea of the providential employment of warfare in the discipline of mankind. If we are prepared to make Paul's phraseology our own, there is the further notion of God's instrument of punishment expressing His "wrath" against transgressors. But the great difference between the two theories is this: that the Old-Testament view is based on the Hebrew disposition to regard all uncontrollable happenings, good and bad alike, as due to the direct and deliberate choices and decisions of God, and was therefore perfectly consistent with the recognition that the punitive agent was himself thoroughly godless and wicked, animated by the most unrighteous motives, and destined accordingly to receive condign punishment himself in the near future (Isaiah x. 5-19 is the classical passage), whereas it is integral to the theory I am here offering to believe that Divine approval and use are dependent upon the honesty and high principle of the fighters concerned. Doubtless there is a core of truth in the prophetic doctrine, namely this, that God is able so to control the sin and folly of men as to cause it to subserve some good end (see above, pp. 129 f.): but it is really a very different matter to envisage the use which God may make of those who fight, not from base or greedy or cruel motives, but with a sincere conviction that only by fighting can they secure some great and precious human value.

Another distinction which must be carefully kept in mind is that between the self-sacrifice of the soldier and the self-sacrifice represented by the crucifixion of Jesus Christ (see above, pp. 82 f.). Here again an element common to the two may indeed be recognized. In both cases there is self-sacrifice, and self-sacrifice on behalf of others. This indeed may rightly be regarded as an important point: but the difference between the two methods of self-sacrifice is so glaring that it is only by virtue of an extraordinary lapse of common intelligence that the Cross can be referred to as having a sanctifying resemblance

to the soldier's dangerous calling. For it is clearly integral to any sane understanding of the Crucifixion that it was incurred and endured just because Jesus *refused* to defend himself and his cause by force of arms, whereas the prime object of the soldier is not to die for his enemies, but to kill them. He dies, only because his strenuous efforts to put others to death have proved unsuccessful. It is only when the historical and moral realities of the Crucifixion-story are unintelligently left out of sight, and (as has so often alas been done) the Cross is reduced to a non-moral symbol of a quasi-magical or quasi-mythological transaction, that the soldier's wounds and death can be regarded as a significant parallel to it. Pictures therefore of the expiring soldier lying at the foot of the Cross, on which hangs the body of the dying Saviour of Mankind, embody a very serious confusion of ideas, however loth we may naturally feel to criticize the effort to administer comfort to those done to death on the field of battle. I remember seeing during the last War a large picture in an illustrated magazine of a French priest holding aloft a bayonet, hilt uppermost, just as the soldiers around him advanced into battle, and crying aloud to them, "The bayonet too is a cross!" A similar if less blatant perversion of the facts has been committed on many a British War-memorial, on which advantage has been taken of the accidental similarity in shape between a cross and the hilt-end of a sword to plant a representation of the latter suggestively on to the former.

Our theory manifestly carries with it the corollary that it is not everybody's business to give a wrongdoer what he nevertheless may deserve to receive. It is natural at first sight to doubt the truth of this statement. So long as we are looking at the ethics of the situation only objectively, and ignoring the differences introduced by the subjective differences between men, we are prone to imagine that, if a person clearly appears to deserve certain treatment, it obviously cannot be wrong for *any* given man to inflict it on him. That is the common assumption of the man in the street, and the contention of certain serious philosophic writers also. Closer reflection, however, shows that this exclusively objective view of the situation is untenable. Shakespeare and his collaborators were no pacifists,

but they made it clear in 'The Third Part of King Henry VI' (Act II, scene v) that the slaughter of son *by father* or of father *by son* on the field of battle was to them a moral enormity. Not even the firmest believers in the rightness of capital punishment would feel it to be right for a particular hangman to carry out the sentence, if the condemned criminal happened to be one of his near relatives. The realization that a wrongdoer may richly deserve punishment is by no means inconsistent with a strong moral feeling that some particular person would none the less be very wrong in inflicting it. So the persecuted David protests to King Saul, "May Yahweh judge between me and thee, and may Yahweh avenge me on thee! but my hand shall not be upon thee" (1 Samuel xxiv. 12). So too does Lady Anne, in Shakespeare's 'King Richard the Third', say to the guilty Duke of Gloucester,

"Though I wish thy death,
I will not be the executioner".

A neglect of this important distinction, and an attempt to judge ethical issues as if it did not exist, has often confused men's thoughts regarding those issues. Thus, the pacifist's refusal to take human life has not only been interpreted as if it implied an uncompromising condemnation of all who have, from whatever motives, ever taken human life, but—on the plea that the pacifist makes the preservation of life an objective and ultimate obligation—has been extended so as to mean that to give up one's own life is equivalent to taking the life of another (see above, p. 83). A closer consideration of the moral factors involved makes it clear that subjective conditions may make all the difference, and that no valid objection can therefore be brought against the pacifist's hearty relative approval of certain wars waged for righteous causes, on the ground that such approval is inconsistent with his own refusal to participate in any such war himself.

It may perhaps have already occurred to some that, in advancing an argument of this kind, the pacifist is guilty of taking up an insufferably superior attitude towards his fellows. He claims, it will be said, to see further into the reality of things than his fellow-Christians (and of course, his fellow-citizens

generally), to exceed them in the understanding of the mind of Christ, and to be superior to them in holiness. The unguarded expressions of certain pacifists have even evoked the exaggerated complaint that pacifists generally deny that those who do not agree with them are Christians. Pacifists would be better advised, it has been hotly urged, not to give themselves superior airs, but to think it possible (as Cromwell begged the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland to believe) that they may be mistaken, and in short not to be such intolerable prigs. The complaint, however, is easily met, if only a patient hearing can be secured for the answer to it. To begin with, no question of pacifists not recognizing non-pacifists as Christians ought ever to have been allowed to arise. It is to be regretted that now and then enthusiastic pacifists have given occasion for complaint that such was their view: it is also to be regretted that so many enthusiastic critics of pacifism have treated the view as if it were held by pacifists generally, which is most certainly not the case. It ought not to need saying that to believe one course of action rather than another to be the Christian thing to do does not imply the judgment that one who honestly takes a different view is himself no Christian. At all events, our concern in this book is to judge, not persons, but deeds (see above, p. 128). Putting aside, therefore, such needless misunderstandings, we may rightly plead that if, because pacifists differ from their fellow-believers on a point of practical Christian ethics, they are to be condemned as assuming superior airs and claiming a superior holiness, the same reproach must be levelled at every person who dares to differ on such matters from his fellows—and therefore at the critics of pacifism just as much as at the pacifists themselves. The real fact of the matter is that, except as a criticism of the controversial methods of a few misguided individuals (as which it could, of course, be made a reproach to persons on *both* sides), the charge is a pure absurdity. Keen and thoughtful Christians are bound to differ from one another on some issues; progress in the knowledge of truth depends upon their being free to do so: but when they do, why should one party be accused of assuming to be superior any more than the other? As parties that disagree with each other, their attitude is entirely reciprocal. If you insist on caricaturing the defence

of an opinion which differs from that held by others, you can, of course, represent it as a presumptuous claim to know better than others: but if you do, you are endeavouring to score a point by an appeal to mere prejudice rather than to truth—and in any case, you are really saying nothing which does not apply equally aptly (supposing their controversial manners are correct) to *both* sides. In the present case, the pacifist who is begged to believe it possible that he is mistaken might well reply, "All right. I do not think I am: but let us assume, for the sake of argument, that it is so. You will, I feel sure, agree that, until my error is brought home to me, I have no option but to abide by my convictions as they are: and in the meantime I hope that you will extend to me the same favour which I have already professed myself willing to extend to you, namely, give me credit for being an intelligent and sincere man—who (though, *ex hypothesi*, mistaken) will yet by virtue of his intelligence and sincerity effect some real good—and therefore bestow on me in your turn some measure of relative justification".

The present situation, indeed, is emphatically not one for mutual censure. It is not a time for the pacifist to withhold the fullest possible recognition of the rich element of good in the noble motives and the unselfish strivings of those who disagree with him, or to hang back from the fullest possible co-operation with them in lending help and in bearing common burdens, so far as conscience allows. Nor is it a time for those who disagree to charge pacifists with cowardice or neglect of duty or priggish assumption of superiority because they combine with their pacifism such a relative justification of war as has been described in the preceding pages. On the contrary, the one line along which a closer rapprochement may be sought for with some hope of getting nearer to an ultimate synthesis of Christian judgment, is the line of increasing mutual sympathy and understanding. Such understanding and sympathy, and the greater reciprocal toleration which it promotes, still leave us indeed very far from the harmony of minds we should like to possess: but they are at least definite steps in the direction of that harmony. I have devoted this chapter to working out the extent to which the pacifist on his side can go in the way of theoretic-

ally recognizing the possible element of righteousness and fruitfulness in a war waged for a good cause and for worthy motives: and I shall devote the next to discussing the practical ways in which he can, without sacrifice of his conscience or infidelity to his witness, give practical expression to his sympathy by rendering special service of various kinds, such as a state of war demands. I want in this place to draw attention to certain hopeful indications of a real and growing recognition of the value of the pacifist's attitude in regard to war (and the analogous attitude in regard to the treatment of crime) on the part of those who none the less cannot in the main approve of or share this attitude. Some of these indications may, taken singly, sound trivial; but cumulatively they are evidence of a real appreciation of, and an approach to, the convictions for which pacifism stands.

I would refer first to the spirit and method in which the present conflict is being waged. Instead of the sudden mass-attack of aeroplanes raining poisoned gas on London and the countryside, which recent advance-descriptions of "the next war" bade us expect, we have the avowed pledges of each of the contending parties that bombs will not be dropped on any but distinctly military objectives, and that gas-bombs will not be used unless the other side uses them first. The method of dropping millions of leaflets from aeroplanes flying over Germany was a novel employment of the weapon of persuasion in preference to that of slaughter. To those who remember the outbursts of frenzied hatred and contempt for the enemy which characterized the period of the Great War of 1914-1918 almost from its commencement, the comparatively moderate public feeling prevalent in this country during the early months of the present war must appear as a very welcome and significant contrast. Pacifists and conscientious objectors are widely treated with a tolerance and respect which was totally lacking throughout the Great War. The mildest sympathetic reference to conscientious objectors was then quite enough to ruin the peace and harmony, not only of any gathering of persons in a public place, but of many an ordinary domestic or quasi-domestic assembly. The sinister appearance of a less tolerant attitude at the moment of writing is a lamentable retrogression, and

ought to be resolutely withstood. Violent recruiting-sermons were then preached from Christian pulpits, and young men were publicly incited in the crudest terms by Christian ministers to give themselves to the work of slaughtering Germans. Of that sort of thing I have so far heard nothing during the present war, though non-pacifist preachers have, of course, frankly expressed their views on the main issue. The prayers commended for use during the present crisis by the authorities of the Christian denominations are singularly free from animosity and bitterness towards the enemy. There is a vague idea abroad that, though the pacifists are wrong, they are yet standing for something which the world can ill afford to lose. A well-known educationalist and philosopher, versed in political questions and strongly opposed to pacifism, expressed to me recently in conversation, within the limits of a single half-minute, the opinions (a) that the pacifists were responsible for the present war, and (b) that England would be seriously poorer if she contained no pacifists. The provision of some form of exemption from military service for conscientious objectors is evidence, not only of the State's desire to avoid trouble, but also of its respect for the value of moral conviction. One comes fairly frequently across the general admission that it is not a bad thing that there should exist in the community a set of persons who are standing for an extremely ideal position, even on the part of persons who do not intend to stand for it themselves, and who would regret to see the numbers of those who do stand for it greatly multiplied. Even zealous military men have been known to accord as much recognition and approval to pacifism as that. It is the man-in-the-street's equivalent for the opinion of some theologians that at least men called to the Christian ministry should refuse to bear arms, for the high ecclesiastic's interpretation of the New Testament that "the Church" as distinct from the State must always take the pacifist line, or the similar view of the Roman Catholic that literal obedience to the Sermon on the Mount, though not enjoined on (but rather forbidden to) the Christian layman, is the special responsibility of "the religious", i.e., the clergy and members of the monastic orders.

When we turn from warfare to consider the restraint and

punishment of crime undertaken by the judicial authorities in the community, the leavening of the old method of condemnation and punishment by the healing and forgiving spirit which characterizes Christianity is unmistakably marked. The large percentage of the time and energy of members of the police-force which is now devoted, not to violently restraining or punishing wrongdoers, but to assisting and serving those in difficulty (often in order that they may not become wrongdoers), exhibits a modification of the method of the pagan state by the pure spirit of Christian love. The procedure and the decisions of our courts of justice are more largely determined by the desire to restore and help (as against the desire to penalize) than at any previous period in history. In particular we may note the recent and extensive growth of the Probation-system, whereby in every large city-centre Probation-Officers (both male and female) are set to work, under the direct authority of the State, to offer personal counsel and render personal help to offenders, particularly junior offenders, who have been arraigned before the magistrates but are relegated by them, without sentence, to the care of these official State-appointed ministers of friendship. And it would not be difficult, if one were to make a sufficiently wide survey, to multiply examples of the pervasive way in which the specifically Christian method of treating the wrongdoer had affected and will doubtless continue increasingly to affect the judicial machinery which—as a system—has come down to us from paganism.

My enumeration of the signs of rapprochement may seem to consist largely of trifling items and to amount in all to a very little. If, however, my interpretation of these items be true, the significance of them as a whole is considerable. For they mean that, though we are still very far from any real union or combination of the two contrasted policies, we can discern in the defenders of each of them a real respect for the values and principles enshrined in the other. In so far as there does exist, on the part of those who are not yet convinced of the full practicability of overcoming evil with good, a genuine sense of the value of that conviction and an appreciation of the special service which can be rendered by those who hold it and are prepared to face the risks it involves, we have a most valuable

response or counterpart to that relative justification which the adherents of this conviction ought to extend to those who cannot honestly share it, and to the practical help which I hope to show they ought to render to them.

In regard to the pacifist's relative justification of coercive violence honestly used, and of military measures honestly taken, for some good end, I would venture to say that a true recognition and understanding of it is vital to any successful vindication of the pacifist position. For although it may be possible to show, by following out (as I have done in my fourth and fifth chapters) what seems to be the main and most determinative line of argument, to the effect that Christian pacifism can give a better vindication of itself than can any alternative to it, such a demonstration is bound to leave an opponent unconvinced so long as he can find, within the unified position thus put before him, no adequate place for the contribution of good which he knows for certain has been made down the ages by those of non-pacifist views. Such a place can be found, if at all, only by some theory of relative justification such as I have been advocating in this chapter. It is, needless to say, only too likely that even this theory will fail to satisfy many non-pacifist (as well perhaps as some pacifist) readers. But until it has been at least expounded clearly, the pacifist case has not been stated with the requisite comprehensiveness. It is unfortunately true that the great majority of even intelligent and completely honest pacifist statements, though excellent within their limits, fail to convince others, simply because they afford no help on certain very natural and perplexing questions to which the doctrine of relative justification is the needful and only possible pacifist answer. On the other hand, critics of pacifism far more often than not fail completely to make good their case, because they are ignoring the realities for which this doctrine stands. When once those realities are properly allowed for, our critics would perhaps realize that the case for Christian pacifism is a very much stronger one than they had supposed. Even so, no doubt, it will be long before they are all convinced that it is an impregnable case: but in the meantime, the doctrine of relative justification may possess some value in enabling

them to respect a position which they cannot hold, and to co-operate tolerantly with those who hold it, aware that otherwise they may be found to be "sitting on the safety-valve of progress" (see Acts v. 39: . . . μή ποτε καὶ θεομάχοι εὐρεθῇτε).

CHAPTER VII

THE PERSONAL SERVICE OF THE CHRISTIAN PACIFIST TO SOCIETY

IT is taken for granted by many that a person who, even on the most conscientious grounds, refuses to bear arms in the defence of his country—inasmuch as he is declining his share in a service needful for its very existence as a free political unit—has put himself right outside the pale of normal civic life and forfeited his title to all civic privileges. The best he has a right to hope for is that his tolerant fellow-citizens will treat him with the same indulgence as they treat lunatics and helpless invalids. It is not long since a certain well-known English philosopher solemnly suggested, in the pages of one of our quarterlies, that the only consistent thing for pacifists to do was to commit suicide. Another eminent authority has described them as “parasites upon the sins of others”, a term meant to convey the reproach that they are the people who leave the dirty work of society to others, and selfishly profit by the result of their labour. To persons who feel that such reproaches are well-deserved, the heading of this chapter may appear to be a piece of unseemly irony.

It would not be germane to the scope and method of this book for its author to turn aside from his main theme to protest with needful warmth against the use of so insulting a term as “parasite” to characterize those from whom one differs on a point of Christian ethics. My business rather is to reply as adequately as I can to the quite serious criticism of which this offensive term is but a discourteous expression. In one sense, the whole preceding part of my book is a reply to it—for it is an effort to show that Christian pacifists, so far from being parasites on their fellow-men, are their valuable co-operators and servants: and, at the close of the last chapter (pp. 144-147), I have drawn attention to certain indications, on the part of non-pacifists, of a real if often not very articulate appreciation of the pacifist's contribution. It remains for me in this chapter to consider a little more fully the ways of practical service open

to a Christian pacifist who is a member of a non-pacifist community, which is preparing for war and, it may be, actually engaged in it.

Repudiating then at the outset both the individualism which would ignore social responsibilities, and the philistinism which dubs the dissenter a "parasite" or "pseudo-Quaker" and bids him commit suicide, I submit, as right and reasonable principles for the determination of both the theoretical and the practical questions involved, the following simple formulae:

(1). The individual is entitled, and indeed obliged, to refuse co-operation in those communal activities which he conscientiously believes to be for him morally wrong; nor ought the majority to attempt to coerce him into co-operating in such activities. He "must obey God rather than men".

(2). The individual ought, for reasons of good-will, to co-operate heartily in all activities in which the majority desire his help and which are not in themselves morally wrong; nor ought he to make the necessity of withholding co-operation in other activities a reason for withholding it in these. "Rational co-operation in politics", as Gladstone said, "would be at an end, if no two men might act together, until they had satisfied themselves that in no possible circumstances could they be divided".

We must now see how these principles apply to the particular situation with which we are here concerned. We shall consider first the matters wherein the pacifist *necessarily* differs from his fellow-countrymen (taking both the negative implications of his difference and then the positive), and secondly, the matters wherein any difference of ethical judgment between them is problematic. That done, I shall have to discuss—in the light of what has preceded—some of the deeper and more general aspects of this problem of the relations of pacifists to the society of which they are members.

The first and most obvious implication of Christian pacifism is that the man who professes it will necessarily refuse to bear arms, either as a volunteer or as a conscript, and also to make or handle munitions.

A man living in a country in which military service is voluntary, and which is at peace, would generally be regarded as undeserving of reproach if, for conscientious or even for other reasons, he were to refrain from undergoing military training. If, however, the circumstances are otherwise, his refusal to serve as a soldier or to make munitions will naturally expose him to grave criticism, not to say severe censure, even from those who gladly acknowledge his full right to his own private opinions. The criticism will take various forms.

(1). Some feel that a man's indebtedness to his country is of such a kind that, if only the latter is actually at war—no matter whether rightly or wrongly—his business is to fight on her behalf. The defence of that view has not been confined to irresponsible and superficial persons: it was the judgment of Schleiermacher, who considered that the Government relieved the individual dissenter, when once he had made his protest, of all moral responsibility for the justice of the fight; and it is sadly repeated by certain modern theologians, who think that compliance is the only course consistent with a man's close relationship to his country, notwithstanding their frank acknowledgement that participation in war is sin. Even Tennyson seems to give it his sanction:

“Nay—tho’ that realm were in the wrong
For which her warriors bleed,
It still were right to crown with song
The warrior’s noble deed”.

It would be a hazardous thing to try to estimate the extent to which this *de facto* approval of shedding blood in an unrighteous cause, simply because the cause was that of one's own country, is really held by professing Christian people. The acceptance of it seems to me completely destructive of any serious loyalty to Christian standards of life. Even Martin Luther, who is often acclaimed as a sort of champion of the Divine Right of the secular ruler, lays it down clearly, in his treatise ‘Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande sein können’ (1526), that, provided a Christian man knows for certain that his prince is in the wrong in making war, he is to refuse to serve him as a soldier, and must be prepared for conscience' sake to

suffer the consequences. That view would, I believe, be endorsed by the vast majority of non-pacifist Christians in this country to-day. We may quote in its favour, not only the weight of *their* conviction and the authority of Martin Luther, but the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church as well. Romanist theologians have, so far as I am aware, never declared all participation in war to be illegitimate for Christian men: they have, however, taken considerable pains to elaborate the conditions under which a war can be rightly described as "just", and they clearly teach that, if a state enters upon a war which is not "just", the individual subject ought to refuse to take part in it, since otherwise he becomes guilty of shedding innocent blood. I draw attention to this very widely-held conviction on the part of those not sharing pacifist views, to the effect that the individual has the right (and even the duty) to stand aside from a war in which his country is clearly in the wrong, for it has, I believe, implications greater than those who hold it realize; and I shall have occasion to revert to it later on in the discussion (see below, pp. 154 f., 165, 167 f.).

(2). A second criticism I mention, because it has been recently advanced, though I cannot feel that it is of great weight, or that it is very widely regarded as a serious difficulty in the way of the acceptance of pacifism. It is the plea that a thorough-going repudiation of war implies a sanction of the territorial status-quo, and that as this status-quo was itself the result of earlier wars, the condemnation of war in the present may thus paradoxically imply the approval of certain wars in the past. The objection really establishes nothing, because (a) it completely ignores the relative element in the justification of war, (b) it overlooks the existence of other means besides war of modifying an existing territorial misfit, (c) it confuses the recognition of a misfit with the task of rectifying it, and (d) it gives the present generation an unfair share of responsibility for the errors of their ancestors.

(3). I come to the much more serious issue which is raised when the pacifist's conviction brings him into direct collision with the demand of the State by which he is governed. Before, however, we get to grips with the tougher aspects of the problem, let us just clear away the preliminary point, which one

often hears referred to in the conversation of simple and unsophisticated persons. The mere fact that a man who fails to comply with a government-order incurs a more or less severe punishment is felt by many to settle of itself the question as to whether or no the order should be complied with. No doubt it is a serious matter, practically, to disobey the law: on this particular issue, it may well mean even in England prolonged imprisonment. On the Continent the consequences would be graver: in the dictator-countries, and in time of war, the result would be virtually certain death. News has, as a matter of fact, come through that several hundreds of conscientious objectors to military service have already been shot in Germany during the present war. Now the prospect of punishment naturally makes a big difference to the emotional condition of one contemplating disobedience to a government-order: not only so, but there might conceivably arise situations in which a man might waive his objection on some minor point on the ground that it was not of sufficient gravity to justify him in incurring capital punishment for the sake of sticking to it. But on a major ethical issue, would anyone argue that the settlement of the question of ethical rightness could be allowed to depend on the threat of punishment? To plead therefore that pacifism is illegal, and may therefore involve the man who professes it in punishment, is to say nothing really relevant to its ethical rightness or wrongness.

(4). The real difficulty as regards the State arises from the plea that no one ought ever to disobey an unrepealed law. The State, it is held by many, is entitled to the respect and obedience of all its citizens: this does not prevent the latter from agitating for the repeal or alteration of its laws; but it ought to prevent them from directly infringing such laws as have been formally enacted and remain in force. There are in the field a number of theories regarding the origin and nature of the State; and some of these would invest the State with a quasi-divine sacro-sanctity, such as would render any wilful disobedience an act of sacrilege. Other less high-flying theories lead to a practically similar conclusion, by investing the State with an absolute authority, but describing and accounting for its authority in more sober terms. When, therefore, a country is

at war, and its government calls legally upon this or that man to fight in its service, it is morally wrong for that man, whatever his private opinions, to refuse. We reply:—

(a). That the State's authority, i.e., its *right* to demand obedience (as distinct from its power to coerce and to punish), though great, is never absolute. Without attempting to discuss thoroughly the large and difficult problem of the ultimate nature of political obligation, we may as Christians be content to recognize that the commands of the State, seeing that they represent in an official form the collective wish and judgment of those of our fellow-men with whom we are in closest contact, and who are responsible for organizing efficiently the public concerns of the community, have a great claim upon our goodwill and readiness to comply. This obligation of ours to obey promptly and cheerfully does not need as its basis any recondite theory of a social contract or of the Divine right of kings: it is for Christian men a simple implicate of the law bidding us love our fellows. If that law is rightly interpreted by Paul as involving the effort to "keep the peace with all men" (Rom. xii. 18: cf. xiii. 8), it clearly requires us to comply readily with the gravely-expressed wishes of the bulk of the community: that is to say, it invests the expression of those wishes with a high measure of authority—an authority which is, furthermore, reinforced by the obligation of gratitude for very definite services received. It must, moreover, be borne in mind that the communal life, the direction of which constitutes the main function of the State, is the field wherein the natural man learns his first lessons in morality (see above, p. 19)—a fact which enhances the State's claim on his respect and subordination. But this authority of the State, though great, is not absolute. The wishes of our fellows cannot take precedence of what is clearly felt to be the will of God. It is impossible to dispense, on any Christian view of life, with the individual's privilege of taking, when need arises, a stand of his own against the State, and pleading, "We must obey God rather than man". Otherwise, we should be reduced to the unbearable conclusion that a man must serve as a soldier, i.e., must wound and slay his fellows, even in an unjust war, if the State should command him to do so—a position the falsity of which I pleaded for a few pages back (see above, pp.

151 f.). I do not know of any Christian who condemns the members of the early Church for refusing to worship the pagan deities at the command of the State. The survival of Christianity, indeed, depended on their refusal. The refusal of the conscientious objectors rests essentially on the same principle, notwithstanding the great difference in the actual point at issue. Many who would strongly disagree with the pacifist's opinion regarding the legitimacy of fighting would readily concede in principle the right of the individual to refuse obedience to the State if what the State demanded of him seemed to him to be definitely wrong in the moral sense.

(b). This claim has indeed been sharply rebuked in a recent treatise by a political scholar of repute, as capricious, arbitrary, and anarchic. Seeing that the refusal of obedience rests upon a clear distinction between the moral worthiness of most of the requirements of the State and the moral vulnerability of one or two of such requirements, it is hard to see how it can be stigmatized as capricious and arbitrary. Is our author prepared to maintain that a State-command can never be unrighteous? What, for instance, would he advise, if, in order to improve the physical quality of the nation, the State tried to compel women to have intercourse promiscuously with certain eugenically-selected men? Would resistance to that law be arbitrary and capricious? Or, to come to a case which actually exists, if our author lived in Germany or Russia, where unrighteous persecuting laws are in force, would he stigmatize a disregard for them as arbitrary and capricious? His censure of pacifists on that score therefore clearly needs to be reconsidered. The charge of being anarchic is less absurd, for clearly an *indiscriminate* disobedience to law would lead to anarchy. As, however, indiscriminate disobedience is not in question, but the disobedience on one issue is counter-balanced by loyal obedience on countless others, no serious risk of general anarchy arises.

(c). We may go further and say that, not only does this freedom of the individual not necessarily lead to anarchy, but moral and political progress depends upon it being preserved. Perhaps the truth of this claim will stand out most convincingly, if we make an effort to imagine how we should rejoice, and what an encouraging sign of progress we should judge it to be, if we

heard of a wide-spread movement of civic disobedience on conscientious grounds to the orders of the German, Russian, or even the Italian Government. The great hindrance to progress in Europe arises, not from there being too much disobedience to law, but from there being far too little. What is it that has enabled the several dictators to carry out their monstrous cruelties and iniquities, but the simple fact that they have so hypnotized the rank and file of the population in their several countries that no one dares to disobey their laws? There you have proof positive that it is an indispensable condition of progress that the individual should possess the right of sometimes refusing compliance with his country's laws.

If a man is convinced, on ethical grounds ideally applicable to all Christians, that he must personally forgo all direct participation in war, he will by the same token be convinced that he ought to persuade others to act on the same principles. He will, that is to say, insist on propagating his views according as he can find opportunities of doing so, and building up an organization for the purpose. It is quite conceivable that such propaganda might be unsuccessful, and that the number of pacifists might remain constant, or might even shrink. In that case, the movement would at most remain as a stationary leavening element in the midst of a society which on the whole ordered its affairs on other lines. As such the pacifist group might still exert a helpful influence by moderating violent passions and policies and generally fulfilling a healing rôle. Public feeling however would not be seriously disturbed by its presence. A nation armed in the normal way has nothing to fear from the presence within it of a small group of quietists from which it can draw no recruits for the fighting forces. But what if the propaganda of this group should be successful, and its numbers should show signs of multiplying indefinitely? Then indeed would it be necessary for the community at large to sit up and take notice. Here we have the practical counterpart of what was the main crux in the theory. Just as the question of expediency is what mainly interests the critics of the pacifist theory, so the actual spread of pacifism (or at least the danger of such a spread) is the chief cause of actual apprehension to the community at

large and its governors: "they doubt of them whereunto this will grow". And it would be a great mistake on the part of pacifists to treat that apprehension with mockery or indifference. Just as they must make it their business in the theoretical controversy to meet objections based on the test of expediency, so too is the onus upon them of showing—so far as it can be shown—that the actual effects of the increase of pacifism in the midst of our present-day world will justify the claims made for it by its adherents and not result in the ruin of civilization.

They take their stand therefore on the basic fact set forth above, pp. 105–115, that active Christian love which makes no use of injurious violence is on a long view a more effective weapon for dealing with human wrongdoing than is any method involving bloodshed: it is not discredited by the risk of failure in any particular case, for that risk besets just as much the use of arms; it is likely to be just as effective when practised by groups and communities as it is when practised by individuals; the Cross of Christ, seen in the light of centuries of Christian experience, gives proof of the strange power of such love to succeed through apparent failure; and unlike the method of war, which has to be eternally repeated (since every war produces the seeds of another war to follow), it has the virtue of setting in motion a process of permanent healing. Whenever, therefore, a man is converted to Christian pacifism, the country loses indeed a potential soldier, but it gains an actual and active reconciler: and unless the claims just made for Christian love are illusory (in which case Christianity itself would be an illusion), the gain greatly outweighs the loss.

It may or may not be possible to show in concrete detail how the transition of the community at large from trust in the one method to trust in the other can safely be made. But it is really time critics of pacifism ceased treating it as if it were purely negative—a "do-nothing attitude", as an enthusiastic patriot described it in a letter to me the other day. Its adherents may be right or wrong in their belief that it will work: but to go on attacking it as pure inaction, after its adherents have repeatedly claimed that it is practical politics, is simply to waste time and strength beating the air.

But can the claim that pacifism is practical politics be made

good? I propose to advance reasons for believing that it can: but I must first of all warn the reader against those already-mentioned plausible but inconclusive arguments based on inaccurate hypotheses and imaginary pictures (pp. 132-134), and loftily oblivious of the necessary dependence of pacifist practice on personal religious conviction of a certain kind. It is not fair to detach pacifism in an abstract manner from the only subjective conditions which make it possible, and then to condemn it because, so pictured, it cannot be straight-away envisaged as applicable in some quasi-miraculous way to the present political situation. It can indeed be shown to be adequate to the present political situation, *if we may presuppose a nation convinced of its truth, but not otherwise*. It has been asserted in a responsible quarter that, had Quakerism been this country's religion, Germany would never have provoked the last war. It is no refutation of pacifism to observe that the nation does not yet believe in Quakerism: the true comment on that may well be, "So much, unfortunately, the worse for the nation". All that the pacifist can fairly be required to show is that—so far as the facts and probabilities are known to us—there is reason to believe that the spread of his cause will contribute even better to the righting of the wrongs of the world than will the military victory of the right side in a war. And when we have shown that every convert to pacifism means giving the country a more efficient worker for peace and righteousness in exchange for a less efficient one, the first step in our political apologia has been taken.

In coming to closer grips with the practical situation, I propose to say something first regarding the influence of pacifism during peace-time.

It is very widely held and very frequently asserted that the impudence and aggressiveness of the dictators—the condition of things, that is, that has brought about the present war—was the direct result of the growing strength of pacifism in Britain. The argument indeed is a highly attractive one. It runs roughly as follows: there was a good deal of pacifist propaganda in the late twenties and early thirties of the century, and it was so successful that even the Government had to take note of it, and—in deference to it—to effect reductions in the

national armaments (though it may be observed that at the end of the War the Allies had bound themselves to undertake a general reduction of armaments all round): so influential was this peace-movement that it led the two European dictators to take it for granted that no aggressive schemes on their part would induce Great Britain to go to war against them: they therefore "tried on" one scheme after another, unafraid of any practical opposition, and met with such success that they at length reached a stage at which war with them became virtually inevitable. In this way pacifism is shown to be the real cause of the war.

Now I do not wish to deny that a refusal to offer violent resistance to a bully, taken in isolation from all other factors in the case, does frequently tend to encourage him in his bullying. This is one of the things which frequently makes the process of reforming him a slow job, and is often the occasion of that temporary failure which every Christian worker well knows he may have to meet with and which he has to learn to bear patiently. And I think it is conceivable (though I do not know that there is any positive evidence for it, and I suggest that it ought not to be confidently affirmed simply on the score of its *supposed* likelihood) that pacifist activities in Great Britain may have been among the factors provoking Mussolini and Hitler to deeds of aggression. In so far as it was so, the Christian pacifist would regard it as one among the various manifestations of human wickedness, and therefore to be met and ultimately overcome in the way that has always been characteristic of the followers of Christ.

[But I do most strenuously protest against this one possible and partial item in the situation being pitched upon as the only—or even as an important—cause of our present troubles. It is abundantly clear—and every speech of Hitler confirms the judgment—that the weightiest cause of the success of Nazism was the cruel treatment meted out to Germany by Britain and still more by France after November 1918. I beg the critical reader to try honestly to picture to himself what the average decent German citizen must have felt as a result of certain undeniable historical facts. Crushing defeat in a war, for starting which they honestly, if mistakenly, did not believe

their country alone was to blame, the Germans had dismissed their Kaiser and his clique, and laid down their arms under the terms of an Armistice. One of the clauses of this Armistice was to the effect that "the Allies and the United States contemplate the provisioning of Germany to the extent that shall be deemed necessary": this constituted a virtual promise that the severe sufferings of the civilian population during a food-blockade of over four years would be effectively relieved. So inadequately, however, was this clause observed, and so terrible remained the sufferings of the German civilians, especially the women and children, that even a British General in the Army of Occupation wrote home to the Government protesting against the continued starvation of the people.

I digress here for a moment to touch upon certain recent denials of the popular idea that the Allies deliberately kept Germany without food until the peace was signed. It is indeed true that plans were seriously set on foot to relieve the distress, not only in Germany but in several other countries, and that considerable quantities of supplies were actually sent to her. It is, however, candidly admitted by those who defend the Allies against the charge of wilful cruelty to a beaten enemy (a) that the maintenance of the blockade was due to the demand of the military authorities, (b) that the supplies actually sent in were far smaller than what the German population urgently needed, (c) that financial conditions were laid down for receiving supplies which Germany simply could not meet, (d) that one great reason why she could not meet them was the Allies' desire to make sure of her ability to pay enormous reparations, and (e) that this pressure on Germany was maintained in order to compel her to sign the peace-treaty which the Allies were devising. The upshot was such as I have just described. No doubt there were serious technical difficulties: but it was not only the general disorganization that prevented the Allies from terminating the starvation of the German civilians. Prince Max von Baden wrote of them in March 1921: "They have daily killed about eight hundred human beings through the continuation of the blockade during the Armistice, although they had full information that by giving permission to import about 150,000 tons of food per month, by allowing fishing in the

Ostsee, and the importation of stores from neutral countries, the lives of hundreds of thousands of old people, sick, and children might thereby have been saved. Moreover, the Allies had bound themselves to conclude peace on a basis of the fourteen Points, not in the spirit of vengeance, but as physicians who would bring healing to a sick Europe".

The French Government, with almost incredible spitefulness, quartered black troops in the occupied towns of the Rhineland, with the result that the purity and happiness of countless German homes was needlessly ruined. The Treaty of Versailles (June 1919) was in spirit and content mainly punitive. Later (in 1923), French troops occupied the Ruhr-valley. Not only had the country been sentenced to pay an impossibly gigantic indemnity, but it was systematically refused every concession which might have enabled its Government—now earnestly striving to lead the country along peaceable and wholesome lines—to establish stable conditions, to maintain internal peace and efficiency, and to restore the normal ways of political, civic, and commercial life. The Ottawa-Agreements of 1932 had the well-foreseen if indirect effect of almost completely crippling certain branches of Germany's foreign trade.

Nor was all this the result of mere bungling. It was part of a deliberate policy to reduce the country to misery as a punishment for what was deeply felt to be its colossal guilt in having initiated the war, and in having carried it on so ruthlessly. The Germans themselves saw clearly that this was so: and that they were not mistaken is abundantly proved by the tone of the British press at the time, and by the attitude one very often heard taken up in conversation. Bad as was the attitude of Britain, that of France was of course far worse. Here is an extract from a press-report of a speech made by Lord Derby at Manchester on the 2nd of December 1920: "France was a little afraid of the attitude this country was going to take up over the reparation question. She was just a little afraid that 'Make the Hun pay' was merely an election cry and that we were not going to stand by her in extracting the uttermost penny. Every penny that Germany could pay Germany should be made to pay. . . . 'I would show no mercy whatever to Germany', Lord Derby declared. 'She must not pay the mini-

imum but the utmost maximum. What we have to decide is how much Germany can pay and still exist—I will not say live—and when that has been decided use every method in our power to see that that amount is paid' ". Even to-day there are people to be found—one hopes there are not many—who complain that the Treaty of Versailles was not severe enough, who hold that Germany richly deserved all she got, and who think it is a defence of what was done to declare that, had she won, she would have meted out greater cruelties to her beaten foes. The Allies, in fact, did what Grote says the Lacedaemonians did when, at the end of the Peloponnesian War, they had the whole Hellenic world at their feet—"they chose the critical moment of cure to infuse new poison into the system". Some few voices were raised in warning against the monstrous folly and cruelty of it all; but little attention was paid to them until the harm was already done. Whether the British Prime Minister could, if he had really used his great eloquence and influence for the purpose, have swayed public opinion in a saner direction is a matter for conjecture: the fact remains that he never tried.

However intelligible psychologically this vindictiveness of the Allies may be, there can be no question of its utter wrongness from any Christian (even non-pacifist) point of view, and of its pitiable stupidity as a political attitude. Anyone not totally blinded by lust for vengeance could foresee the inevitable outcome. If the victim of cruelty survives, the result of treating him cruelly is that he thirsts for vengeance. After honestly turning over a new leaf, and making several attempts to settle down as a sober and well-behaved member of the family of Europe, and meeting only with snubs and discouragement from the dominant members of that family, Germany naturally fell for the first leader who bade fair to deliver her from the intolerable helotism beneath which she was groaning. Here surely—and not in British pacifist agitation—we have the real psychological cause of Hitler's insatiable brutality and the willingness of the German nation to support him.

How precisely the British Government ought to have acted at any particular date, when once the ghastly mistake of our post-War temper had been realized as such, is of course a difficult question, on which wise politicians might be expected

to differ: but that British policy might well have manifested much more strongly than it did an abandonment of vindictiveness and a desire to reverse its effects by friendly measures, seems—in the light of what had happened—a very natural plea for reasonable persons to advance. I am therefore at a loss to understand why the respected political scholar from whom I was obliged to differ a few pages back (pp. 155f.)—in a book produced immediately before the outbreak of the present war—brands the plea that Germany ought to have been offered some reparation of the injuries done to her in 1919 as narrow, provincial, egocentric, wicked, unworthy, prudential, arising from “a state of mind that is a compound of fear, laziness, and a certain element of remorse”. The ground for this torrent of reproach is apparently (a) that the plea in question ignores other obligations (e.g., those owed to Armenia), which were just as binding as those owed to Germany, (b) the impossibility that a nation should repent, and (c) the opinion that Germany’s misfortunes have been “chiefly of her own making”. Admitting the truth of (a), I cannot see that the culpable neglect of one obligation renders attention to another “wicked”, etc., etc. The force of (b) would not stultify an appeal for national repentance, or its equivalent, if there were occasion for it: and the truth of (c) does not absolve Germany’s enemies from the duty of making amends for wrong done to her (our author admits that the general election of December 1918 was a “great national sin”). In any case, whatever form the amends might have taken, there is no doubt whatever about the fatuous and vindictive cruelty of the treatment meted out by the Allies to Germany for several years after her surrender in November 1918.

That then is the main answer to the charge that the pacifists caused the present war: and I submit that it is a valid one. I wish only to add to it two observations of a relevant but, by comparison, subsidiary character.

Christian pacifism naturally incurs a certain amount of the reproach which strictly speaking relates only to other forms of pacifism. I am, for instance, holding no brief in this book for such condemnation of war as arises solely from a disapproval of the capitalistic system: not would I undertake to defend a Christian pacifism which was purely quietistic and negative. If

the British peace-movement was responsible at all for encouraging the dictators in their aggression, part of the blame at least would fall upon certain peace-views which I am not concerned to defend in their entirety.

Neither must Christian pacifism be held responsible or blameworthy for calamities brought about by the failure of non-pacifists to act up to their consciences. Christian pacifism does not consist simply in "not fighting": it consists in "not fighting because you are committed to the reconciling work of a Christian". If, therefore, those who repudiate Christian pacifism fail to use the weapons of war when their consciences bid them, and refrain—not because they doubt the legitimacy of war—but because they are too cowardly, or too stingy, or (what is more likely) too much under the influence of great financial interests, and if, as a result of their refraining, a worse situation is created, it is absurd to construe that worse situation as the fruit of Christian pacifism.

Not only, then, was Christian pacifism not the cause of the present war, but it was a strong influence on behalf of the preservation of peace. Not, unhappily, strong enough—for the evil heritage of Versailles weighted the scales against it. Yet it was by no means negligible. A good way of judging its value is to ask oneself how gratefully should we in England have welcomed the continuance and increase of similar peace-movements in Germany, France, and Italy. Prior to the rise of Hitler, the International Fellowship of Reconciliation and the War Resisters' International had been carrying on successful propaganda-work in all those and other countries. Naturally the work was not of a spectacular kind; but who can doubt that, according to the measure of its success, it was a real force for peace? And this claim is not discredited by the fact that there were other forces at work in the field which for the time being defeated it. One of the most interesting phases of the work was that known as the "Embassies of Reconciliation"—a plan under which Mr. George Lansbury paid personal visits to Hitler, Mussolini, and other leading European statesmen, in the endeavour to influence them in favour of pacific policies.

There, then, is our apologia for the propagation of Christian

pacifism in time of peace. But how are the rights and wrongs of the matter affected by the occurrence of war?

I do not propose to discuss the problem as to the pacifist's duty when his country has entered upon a war which he has good reason to believe is unjust, not (of course) for the simple reason that it *is* war, but either because it is purely aggressive, or because reasonable opportunities of settling the difference by arbitration have been refused. I pass this situation by, not because it could not occur, nor because, if it did, the pacifist's policy with regard to it would be easy or unimportant, but because his course would not differ widely from that of the non-pacifist Christian who, we may presume, would likewise disapprove of the war and refuse to support it (see above, pp. 151f.). There is, in fact, a very considerable group of Christian non-pacifists in this country who have pledged themselves, or are prepared to do so, and who invite others to join them in doing so, to the effect that they will not fight in any war which either has not the approval of the League of Nations or with regard to which the Government has refused to arbitrate. Such a pledge involves, of course, a willingness to see their country defeated by a foreign foe—an exceedingly grave attitude, the significance of which must not be forgotten (see below, pp. 167 f.).

But the problem as to Christian action in an unrighteous war is not a distinctively pacifist problem: and I pass on therefore to consider the line which pacifists ought to take (as regards their disapproval of all war) when their country has entered upon a war for some righteous cause, and with at least predominantly sincere motives.

As regards any possible influence on the enemy, they will in the nature of things be sentenced to temporary inaction, which they cannot do other than accept. As regards their propagandist influence among their own fellow-countrymen, they will, of course, remain loyal to their convictions, both in private conversation and in public utterance on the platform or in the pulpit or in the press. But they will need to bear in mind with more than usual care that the pacifism they are called on to propagate is one of conviction, not of obstruction: their objective is to help others to see for themselves the truth of a certain interpretation of Christianity, not to prevail on them by hook or

crook to stand out of the war, still less to try to prevent them, despite any convictions they may have, from fighting in it. If the pacifist, therefore, as preacher or friend, is invited by one or more of his fellow-men to help to clarify their own thoughts or to give them his opinion, he is well within his rights in propounding to them his pacifist faith: and he will, of course, take the risk of incurring the displeasure of the Government or of other people, if he makes any converts. He will also be at full liberty to write on the subject for the benefit of any who care to read, and even to preach and speak about it to such audiences as are willing to listen to him and (if met for public worship) are likely to be edified by doing so. But he has no right as preacher or public speaker to make direct efforts to dissuade all and sundry from entering the national forces. Apart altogether from any risk he may run thereby of incurring public punishment (that really being an irrelevant point), such success as he may reach by these means is likely to be, not the spread of the earnest Christian conviction which supplements the negative refusal to fight with a positive zeal for Christian service and reconciliation, but the creation of a purely negative attitude, resting largely on unexamined and perhaps even unworthy motives.

It is not inconsistent with his own principles for the pacifist to bear in mind that his belligerent fellow-countrymen, if satisfied that their cause is just, have a claim on his respect and sympathy as duty-loving and self-sacrificing men. He is not obliged to agree with them, or to do exactly what they are doing (even though they may strongly disapprove of his refusal to co-operate): he is not obliged to hide his light under a bushel, or to refrain from giving a reason for the faith that is in him. But he is, in my judgment, obliged to avoid obstructing them in their work, or raising opposition simply in order to prevent others helping them and to bring their operations somehow to a speedy standstill. The pacifist is not disloyal to the cause of truth and peace if he remembers that the declaration of war—always supposing it is in a righteous cause—introduces a condition of special difficulty and stress for the bulk of his fellow-citizens, and particularly for his Government. At such a juncture it is little use for him to withhold every form of assistance

on the ground that, if the Government had acted more wisely in the past, the present painful juncture would never have arisen. Such an observation may well be true; but it is not sufficient as a contribution to the existing situation, just as it is not a sufficient contribution, when a fire is raging, to exclaim that it ought not to have been allowed to start, and that in any case better fire-fighting apparatus ought to have been previously provided. It is never possible for a government or a country to start absolutely *de novo*, least of all when it has a wolf by the ears; and human affairs are of such a kind that, under certain circumstances, they may have to get worse before they can get better. A time of war is a time of new perplexity for all; and men of all views must live out their conscientious convictions, whatever they may happen to be, in a spirit, not of mutual censoriousness and alienation, but of respect, sympathy, and brotherly love. If the pacifist can stop the war by really convincing the nation as a whole that a morally better equivalent is open to it, well and good; but he accomplishes nothing to the purpose by trying obstructively to compel the Government to stop the war against the considered judgment of the majority of the population.

Before we finally leave these problems of pacifist propaganda in war-time, a word must be said in regard to one remaining difficulty. What has the pacifist to say to the criticism that his propaganda, if successful, may mean the actual defeat of his country in a righteous war, and may thus result in a very serious set-back to civilization generally? As an abstract possibility the risk of this happening has of course to be faced. It is, however, not irrelevant to point to the extreme unlikelihood of it; for the Government of a country in which Christian pacifism was so strong as to change victory into defeat would be very unlikely to involve itself in war at all, knowing that it lacked the country's whole-hearted support. Furthermore, the weakness due to the wide vogue of Christian pacifism would be more than compensated for by the corresponding strength of the healing and reconciling power of those who should refuse to fight, however impossible it may be to forecast the ways in which that power would work. Provided that the refusers were fully prepared to exert their positive influence on the country's affairs,

even at cost of suffering to themselves, they would go far towards robbing military defeat of its sting, and would wring a blessing out of the curse of it. As a matter of fact, English pacifism during the last war evoked a great deal of pacifism in Germany after it, until the country's despair at the treatment to which she was subjected by the Allies raised a militaristic dictator to supreme power. But in any case why should the pacifist alone be held up to obloquy for exposing his country to the risk of defeat in war? Does not even the Government that declares war do the same? Nay more, does not the non-pacifist Christian who refuses to support an unjust war (see above, pp. 151 f., 165) do the same? If these, for the sake of moral principles dear to them, do not deserve condemnation for laying their fatherland open to the risk of military defeat, why does the pacifist, who does it for the sake of a moral principle dear to him, deserve it? You may disagree, of course, with this moral principle of his: but to raise that point is to shift the argument on to another issue, and to abandon the complaint about exposing the country to the risk of defeat.

I have thus far been considering the practical relations of the Christian pacifist with society, in regard to certain important matters wherein his convictions differ pointedly from those of his fellow-countrymen. I turn now to a discussion of those activities in which the difference of ethical judgment between them is either non-existent or problematic (see above, p. 150).

Before, during, and after the period of hostilities, there are being carried on a host of activities of a public kind, which are more or less connected with the conduct of the war, and in regard to which the pacifist is called upon to define his attitude, one way or another.

First among these, and of so special a kind as to require to be dealt with by itself, is the payment of taxes. It is special in that, unlike the others, it does not concern a man's personal conduct, but the disposal of his property. It is this important distinction which puts us on the right track for an answer to the question whether consistency does not require the pacifist to refuse to pay that proportion of his income-tax which may reasonably be estimated to be required for war-expenses. The answer is that

the very concept of property (unlike the concept of responsible personal conduct) is of something dependent for its existence on the approval of the community at large: one "possesses" only what the general will, embodied in customary usage and in legal regulations, agree to concede to one as an individual. This is not to say that every legal decision affecting a man's property is right and just: but it does mean that the responsibility for such a decision lies with the public at large, not with the individual affected (except in so far as he has been in his civic capacity a party to the enactment). It is not in any case within his power to withhold it: certain moneys a man is due to receive have had the tax deducted from them before ever the payment is made to him, and no question of his refusing to pay it can therefore arise. The situation is for all ethical purposes the same when he has himself to make out the cheque for the Collector of Taxes. It is not within his power to prevent the Government getting the money, as it *is* within his power to prevent it making a fighting man of him. If he refuses to make out the cheque, the only result is—apart from the punishment he incurs (which I agree is not ethically relevant)—that he offers a certain amount of temporary obstruction to the Government's operations. I would not deny that there may be circumstances in which such an obstructive gesture might have propaganda-value, particularly in the case of a palpably unjust war; but even in that case, its justification would lie in its value as propaganda, not in its being an obligation of conscience as implicating the tax-payer in military measures of which he disapproved. I have already given reasons why I regard obstruction as a normally illicit method of propaganda (pp. 165-167). This view of the matter seems to me not only to be inherently reasonable, but to have been at least strongly suggested (if not explicitly taught) by Jesus himself when he told the Jews to pay the Roman imperial taxes on the ground that it was right to give to Caesar what belonged to Caesar. In calling it "Caesar's", he seems to have had in mind the distinction drawn above between a man's own conduct and his material possessions. He clearly did not admit that he who paid the money must accept personal responsibility for what was done with it; for, although he doubtless extended a certain relative justification to the Roman administration as a

whole (see above, pp. 83, 86, 136-138), he certainly did not intend to accept responsibility for, or to bestow approval upon, anything and everything that Tiberius and his agents might do with the money they collected from the subjects of the Empire.

The other activities I have in mind can be discussed *en masse*. I exclude from the list, I may say, the individual's participation, by voting, etc., in the politics of his country, as I am reserving that whole topic for my last chapter. Setting aside politics, then, the payment of taxes, combatant service, and the manufacture and handling of munitions (as, e.g., in the Army Service Corps), we have left an amorphous group of activities such as service in the Royal Army Medical Corps, various non-combatant duties with the Army such as the present Government is (through the Tribunals) offering to Conscientious Objectors (Army Pay Corps, drainage, provision of recreation-grounds, agriculture for Army-purposes, etc.), service as Army-Chaplains, voluntary work on behalf of the wounded in the "Friends' Ambulance Unit", similarly organized volunteer-work for the relief of civilian War-victims, mine-sweeping, work on behalf of soldiers in the recreation-rooms, canteens, and religious services organized by the Young Men's Christian Association and by individual churches, voluntary participation in such needful public services as the Post Office, food-rationing, and Air-Raid Precautions, and finally, agriculture or other "work of national importance" as a special substitute for military service. Ideally, perhaps, we ought to be able (as we tried to do with the various forms of pressure in Chapter II) to arrange all these in a single rectilinear series, and then to draw a clear line across it at a certain point, giving reasons why anything on one side of it would be permissible, and anything on the other side impermissible, for a consistent Christian pacifist. The reader, however, whatever his views, will readily see that the data are not simple enough for any such rule-of-thumb proceeding. All that can be offered here is the enumeration of a few points, which arise out of the general position advocated in these pages, and which are worthy of consideration as having a bearing on the settlement of the problem immediately before us.

(1). If a man is left free by the Government to choose his own course, he will need first to consider whether or not he is

called on, by the special circumstances of the time, to take up any work other than that on which he is normally engaged. The various alternatives before a man in this connexion are clearly so numerous, and the pros and cons involved in making a decision so complex, that it would be futile to advance any specific advice for dealing with it.

(2). Supposing he is free to make a change, either entirely on his own choice, or by choosing between a limited number of alternatives left open to him by the State, it will be well for him to undertake work which involves some element of personal hardship and danger; and this for two reasons. There will be plenty of need for such work apart altogether from the actual fighting; and there is nothing in pacifism which should check a healthy man's spontaneous instinct to hurry to the post of danger. But there is the further point that a conscientious objector to combatant service inevitably and naturally lays himself open to the suspicion that he is really motivated, not by a moral sensitiveness regarding bloodshed, but by a timid unwillingness to expose himself to bodily peril. Such a suspicion may in point of fact be undeserved; but—in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary—it is neither unnatural nor necessarily unjust (in view of the proneness of us all to take good care of "number one"). The objector, therefore, may be said to owe it to his fellows, especially since he desires to convert them to his own view, to do what in him lies to remove, not only from himself, but from his group and from the cause they stand for, every suspicion of being actuated by cowardly motives. There is no better way of removing those suspicions than the voluntary acceptance of specially inconvenient, hard, and dangerous work.

(3). In deciding on his course, whether he is acting under Government-pressure or not, a pacifist should bear in mind the soundness of the general principles advocated above, p. 150, namely, that, while he should refuse, even under threats, to do what seems to him in itself a clearly un-Christian act, he should not refuse to co-operate heartily with those from whom he differs, so long as the co-operation is concerned with good objects which he values in common with them. The fact that he cannot co-operate with his fellows in killing the enemy is not, in

my judgment, a sound reason for his refusing to co-operate with them in tending wounded soldiers. Nor can I see that any difference of principle is introduced when these "fellows" are the Government of a country engaged in war. Naturally he will be affected by the urgency of the call for his help, studied in comparison with the urgency of other calls upon him; but that apart, he should be willing to co-operate, in any humane and useful work, with those who need his help, notwithstanding the fact that there are other things wherein he cannot co-operate with them.

(4). When faced with a definite official demand from the Government, he will of course not forget that the Government's authority over the individual is never absolute (see above, pp. 154-156). But he should also remember that, except under a clear prohibition from conscience based on the inherent wrongfulness of the thing commanded, he ought from motives of good-will to do what is required of him (p. 154). For he is, after all, indebted to his fellows generally for a good deal; and if he decides to disobey their official representatives, the onus is upon him of being able to justify so grave and exceptional a step. This general law of compliance in matters not inherently wrong seems to me to receive strong confirmation from Jesus' own words, recorded in Matth. v. 41: "And whoever 'conscripts' thee (and compels thee to go) one mile, go two with him". The reference here is to the Roman or Herodian official's customary exaction of forced labour from the civilian Jew (cf. Mark xv. 21 in the Greek). I am not forgetting that there are differences between the Jew so treated and the modern Englishman. The latter in particular possesses the privilege and ability to take a hand in appointing the government under which he serves. But that seems to me only to strengthen the applicability of the text. If the Jew was, in matters not inherently immoral, to render cheerfully and with good-will obedience to a foreign and (as he would view it) largely unjustified government, how much more should the modern Christian render obedience to a government which, however he may disapprove of certain important sides of its policy, is neither foreign nor usurping, but constitutional and humane.

(5). The pacifist ought to exercise great care in allowing

himself to be swayed by such metaphorical phrases as "becoming a part of the military machine". For the sense in which the British Army can rightly be referred to as a machine is a strictly metaphorical one; and metaphors are apt to misrepresent reality, as well as to express it. The Army is a company of men organized on certain lines for the purpose of defeating the enemy. While the pacifist stands aside from the direct work of defeating the enemy, there is no necessity for him to decline to minister to the human needs of the human beings composing the army, simply because the Army-organization as a whole includes within its own province the organization needed for this ministry (see No. (3) above). The whole population also is a vast company of persons organized by the Government for war-purposes: it is thus a "machine" in much the same metaphorical sense as is the Army itself. But is it a reason why the pacifist should refuse to serve and help his fellows generally, that the service and the help (say in rationing or in Air-Raid Precautions) are organized by the Government which is waging the war, and, if successfully rendered, will assist at least indirectly in the prosecution of the war? The right question for the pacifist to ask when considering what special work he may legitimately and consistently do in war-time is not, "Is it organized by the Government?", or "Is it part of the Army?" or "Will it make me a cog in the military machine?", or "Is the Government's motive in arranging it, to help on the war?", but "Does it minister to the needs of suffering humanity?". If it does, it is such work as a conscientious objector may fitly do.

(6). In somewhat the same way, the pacifist in my judgment makes a mistake if he declines to do a specific piece of good and useful work on the ground that his doing it will release another man for direct combatant service. For the pacifist's true objective is not, by any and every means, to keep as many men as possible out of the Army, but to commend and propagate the Christian faith on which rests his own refusal to fight. The man who, as a result of my action, is released for military service is himself an independent and responsible person, with a conscience and judgment of his own. He must stand on his own feet, and make up his own mind (as I have had to make up

mine) regarding what he is prepared to do. I cannot make up his mind for him, and I have no right to try to do so. If he asks me for advice or explanations, that is another matter: I must then give him the truth as I see it. But to keep him out of the Army by any *other* means than enabling him to reach a conviction under which he will himself refuse to enter it is to accomplish nothing to the purpose.

(7). I mention under this next heading a few practical considerations which will necessarily weigh differently with different persons.

(a). Persons voluntarily entering the Army, even if only for such non-combatant service as that given by the Royal Army Medical Corps, are required to take a strongly-worded oath of complete obedience to all military orders. Members of the Society of Friends and various other Christians object conscientiously to taking an oath of any kind, on the ground that it is forbidden by Jesus in the words recorded in Matth. v. 34-37 (cf. Ep. of Jas. v. 12). This particular difficulty has however been met by an Army-regulation that persons so objecting shall be allowed to give the needful assurance of obedience in the form of a solemn affirmation (not involving an oath), as is already allowed in the law-courts.

(b). Persons called up for military service under the National Service (Armed Forces) Act, to be employed in non-combatant service only (Royal Army Medical Corps, Pay Corps, etc.) are not required either to swear an oath or to make the alternative solemn promise of obedience to orders. They are, however, naturally subject to Military Law, and liable to punishment in the event of disobedience.

(c). A man joining the Royal Army Medical Corps as a voluntary recruit, however, would be required either to swear the oath or to make the solemn affirmation. For such men the question arises as to whether a Christian is ever right in giving an unqualified promise (either by oath, or otherwise) to do whatever his superior military officer may bid him. It might perhaps be argued that such an understanding would in any case (i.e., whether it were explicitly so stated, or not) refer exclusively to such commands as concerned simply the effective pursuit of the medical or other activities in which the individual was engaged,

and that he would not be breaking his oath if he should refuse to obey a command, should one be given, which was alien to the real province of his corps and to which he conscientiously objected. So understood, the affirmation would commit the man no more seriously than the promise of a student to submit himself to the discipline of a College to which he was applying to be admitted, all parties recognizing that exceptional circumstances might arise in which non-compliance could not fairly be branded as a breach of one's pledged word. It is, however, doubtful whether this view of the matter really deserves to be generally accepted as satisfactory; and it is not to be wondered at that the difficulty seems to many so serious that they feel compelled to stand aside from both oath and affirmation.

(d). Under normal Army-regulations, a man serving in one corps can, if necessary, be authoritatively transferred to another; in particular, a man in some non-combatant corps can in an emergency be ordered to take rifle and bayonet and fill a place in the fighting line. Cases of this kind occurred during the Great War; and in some of them the R.A.M.C.-man affected refused on conscientious grounds to comply with the order. In the present war, the conscientious objector who is called up by the Army for non-combatant service is officially guaranteed against being switched over into the firing-line.

(e). It is a very great pity that the Tribunals charged with the task of adjudicating the claims of conscientious objectors, unless they leave a man (conditionally or unconditionally) totally outside the Army by keeping his name on the register of conscientious objectors, are unable to guarantee that he will be employed in any specific type of non-combatant work. They cannot, for instance, promise him admission to the Army Medical Corps: the military authorities have complete freedom to employ him in any work for the Army they wish, short of fighting and handling munitions. Doubtless this arrangement was adopted as the only practicable one from the Army's point-of-view: but it is very little use to many conscientious objectors, who will see a world of difference between tending wounded soldiers and organizing the payment of unwounded ones; and it will therefore inevitably multiply cases of friction between these non-combatants and the military, and probably

cause many of the former to prefer prison to obeying the calling-up notice.

(8). Whether a pacifist minister can rightly become an Army-Chaplain is a question I do not feel called upon here to discuss at length, as it does not lie on the central line of my theme. I mention it merely for the sake of completeness. On the whole, I should be disposed to answer it in the negative, but not dogmatically so, for I am aware that the differences in the degrees of clarity with which pacifists understand their pacifism, and understand the principle of relative justification, are very great; and there may well be cases in which a man of pacifist views may honestly feel that he can minister as Chaplain to men in the Army without either disloyalty to his conscience or disturbance of their discipline.

(9). A last word regarding the acceptance of trade-profits due to war-conditions. Is a pacifist business-man entitled to accept unusual profits which may fall to him because the goods (say, food or clothing) which he supplies are, owing to war-conditions, in exceptional demand? It is easy to see how a man in such circumstances would lay himself open to the bitter accusation of enriching himself hypocritically on what he professed to condemn; and such a charge would be so plausible and damaging that, if widely felt to be deserved, it would gravely (if unjustly) discredit the reputation of pacifism in the minds of many neutral persons. At the same time, it is difficult to admit the fairness of the complaint, so long as the business in question can be viewed as the honest provision made to meet some real human need, and so long as the extent and nature of the profits are not open to condemnation on moral grounds. Possibly in these difficult circumstances the business-man concerned would do well to devote all over a fair margin of his trade-profits to some charitable object, and/or to find some other way of convincing his fellow-men that he was not inconsistently fattening on that with which he ought to have had nothing to do. But the dilemma is a severe one, and the risk of misjudgment so serious that it would almost seem preferable to steer clear of the misconstruction altogether.

I have tried to show, in the immediately preceding pages,

that Christian individuals who feel compelled by conscience to refrain from active participation in warfare are yet able, without violation of that conscience, to co-operate with their fellow-countrymen, during a time of war, in a large number of inherently good activities, and that it is their duty, for reasons of gratitude and good-will, and for the sake of commending their faith to others, to do so. But, although the theory of the matter may be clear, the question of deciding exactly which activities are inherently good, and which are so directly concerned with actual military operations that a pacifist ought to refrain from them, is by no means an easy one: and we can hardly wonder that pacifists differ widely among themselves as to where the line ought to be drawn, and why. This inextricable entanglement of the activities of war with those of peace, and the difficulty of distinguishing in practice between the latter as legitimate and the former as beyond the pale, raise in the minds of many thoughtful Christians the question as to whether the whole effort to draw such a distinction in practice may not be after all a misguided one. They therefore take up a "non-possumus" attitude on the main problem—an attitude which combines the humble acknowledgement that all war is sinful with a sad admission that, since the individual has himself been and still is a sinner, and since his own life is inseparably bound up with the life of human society in general and with the life of his own country in particular, his immediate duty is to join his country's fighting forces and make the best of a bad job.

Since some such theory as this is very much in vogue to-day, and since it appeals to many intelligent and sincere men as right, I must do my best to consider and reply to it. In order to do so adequately, let me try first, without caricaturing it, to state it as fully, clearly, and strongly as one who adheres to it would wish.

I am a member of a national community, to which I am indebted for innumerable benefits. By the organization, through long years, of its common life—an organization into which much coercion both injurious and otherwise has from time to time entered—I am secured in the possession of certain valuable privileges:—safety of life, limb, and property, a food-supply from over-seas, and a whole mass of cultural amenities

of every kind. I could not, even if I wanted to, contract out of my membership in this national society: but I ought not to want to. I am glad to have the advantages of belonging to it; and I ought not therefore to object to paying for these advantages, not only by ready obedience to its laws, but by ready compliance with its demands for special service in time of emergency. That service may from time to time have to be of a military character. A measure of coercion, even injurious coercion, has had frequently in the past to be used, against both refractory citizens and foreign foes, in order that the privileges I enjoy might be secured; and such coercion may need to be used again. For me to decline (on the ground of a personal scruple) to make this coercion effective in a case of need is to refuse to the community the very help on which its stability rests. To remain therefore in the enjoyment of civic privileges, while one is refusing to serve the country in a war thrust upon it, is a radically inconsistent and indeed indefensible position, which naturally lands me in the insoluble task of picking and choosing between permissible and impermissible forms of equally needful national service. I might perhaps be able to make some useful contribution of a special kind if I were to separate myself from society and join a small group of special ascetics, who, by practising an "absolute ethic", help to keep other-worldly ideals before their fellows. But in that case I ought to remain unwedded and poor, to take no interest on investments, and to forgo the securities and privileges of normal civilized life. For the same absolutist Gospel-teaching that enjoins non-resistance also says, "Give to him that asketh thee", and "Sell what thou hast, and give to the poor". If I see that I cannot possibly do these latter, and that I cannot disengage my life from that of the community, I ought to accept frankly the compromise thrust upon me, even though I may realize that it is the outcome of human sin; and I ought accordingly to take my share, however reluctantly, in any coercive or military operations which the normal functioning of the Government of my country involves. In doing so, I must try to keep my motives pure and my spirit clean, and co-operate with others in helping the community to work its way in course of time towards a more righteous life.

That, as I understand it, is the way in which many of my non-pacifist friends would wish me to address myself: and knowing the seriousness and sincerity with which the view is held, I make my reply to it with caution and respect.

(1). I gladly acknowledge the debt of gratitude and loyalty which I owe to my country, and I believe I ought to serve her to the best of my ability as long as I live.

(2). A man can never serve his fellows better than by living in their midst as truly *Christian* a life as is possible for him. The Christian way of life includes ready obedience to the laws, and much besides. Show me, therefore, the truly Christian thing to do; and I shall know the best service I am capable of rendering to my country. The oft-mentioned clash between loyalty to Christ and loyalty to one's country cannot therefore arise.

(3). On the particular point in regard to which I am reproached, namely, that I decline to participate in the injurious restraint of wrong, when such restraint seems absolutely necessary for the country's stability and welfare, my answer is that, if I am duly following what I understand to be the Christian way of life, I am as an individual contributing more effectively to the restraint of wrong than if I fought against the wrongdoer with lethal weapons (see above, pp. 105-115, for proof of this). The fact that my contribution *looks* socially insignificant is owing solely to there being so few of us: but that proves nothing against the *quality* of the contribution. It has been pointed out that a corporate act done by a community is bound to be on a moral level below that of its best citizens, and therefore to be morally distasteful to them. That, indeed, is true: but if the individual is working effectively for the same end along a line of his own, he is doing all the community can rightly ask of him. On the possibility that his refusal to join in the corporate effort *may* result in its failure, see above, pp. 106 f., 110-112, 152, 165, 167 f.

(4). In any time of war, I am willing to undertake hard, uncongenial, and dangerous work in the service of my fellow-countrymen, provided only that it be urgently needed and be consistent with the Christian way of life as I understand it.

(5). It is quite true that my life is closely bound up with that of the community (hence my great indebtedness to the com-

munity); but it is not wholly merged in it, and the community would not be any better off if it were. My life and views as an independent individual count for something, and entitle me to freedom for at least some slight divergence in the forms my civic duties may take from the forms taken by the civic duties of others in general.

(6). While holding that what I have said under (2), (3), and (4) above constitutes a sufficient reply to the charge of shirking the debt I owe society for all the privileges I receive from it, I would like to offer one or two additional observations on the charge.

(a). The plea that I ought not to avail myself of a food-supply guaranteed by the British Navy, unless I am at least willing to fight in that Navy, proves too much. If I were captured by pirates, or wrongfully imprisoned, and were dependent for my food on my captors and warders, my acceptance of that food would not involve me in the duty of approving and cooperating with them in their villainy, even though I were dependent on them for sustenance. How much more, when a man is able and willing to render a full share of communal service, is he entitled to his rations without the necessity of personally approving of and participating in every process by which others have put it within his reach. I am not responsible for the conditions which make the protection of the British Navy necessary. God has provided food enough for all; and a man is entitled to his share of it if he deserves to live at all. Nor must it be forgotten, though I do not wish to labour the point, that to some not-inconsiderable degree the Navy which protects my food-supply is the very thing which, by representing the British share in the rivalry of nations, also endangers the food-supply, and so renders the protection necessary.

(b). On the more general question of my profiting by the amenities of civilization and yet refusing to fight for them, again the argument proves too much. We all of us have the conditions of life largely settled for us by other people, who have in the past acted, and in the present do act, without considering or consulting any particular individual (except by giving him the infinitesimal privilege of the vote); and these conditions constitute the inevitable setting of our personal conduct. If we are

expected to take the rough with the smooth, why should we not take the smooth with the rough? Does the acceptance of favourable as well as unfavourable conditions, brought about by the actions of other men for whom we are in no real way responsible, logically implicate us in an approval of all that they have done, and bind us to act in the same way ourselves? Surely not. I know the attempt is often made to prove that it is so by quoting the tag, "*Qui facit per alium, facit per se*". But an assertion is not necessarily true because it can be quoted in the form of a Latin tag: its truth will depend on what precisely we mean by it. If we mean that a man who hires a ruffian to commit a murder for him is as guilty as the ruffian himself, well and good. But if we mean that a man may not avail himself of any advantageous feature in a position which others have fashioned for him, without accepting responsibility for all that was done in fashioning it, we are wrong. The tag ought not even to be used to show that a man must not approve of a thing being done without being willing to do it himself (see above, pp. 140 f.). Many non-pacifists reap advantages from various events of the past without accepting any moral responsibility for those events—e.g., the Anglo-Saxon, Danish, and Norman invasions of England, the Dissolution of the Monasteries, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, or the Boer War. Clearly, if a man is honestly making his own contribution of service, and is required to put up patiently with such inconveniences and molestations as civilization imposes on him, he is robbing or wronging no one in enjoying immunity from such inconveniences and molestations as civilization does not impose upon him.

(7). The criticism that the pacifist is claiming the right to follow an "absolute ethic" often covers, I fear, some confusion of thought, for it does not make clear what is meant by an "absolute ethic" or why one should not follow it. I imagine that an ethical principle might be called "absolute" in one or other of two slightly different senses: (a) as formulated without regard to any other ethical principle or principles which might in practice intervene to modify the extent of its application; or (b) as facing man with a resultant moral requirement which comes to him with supreme authority. (a) The ethical teachings of Jesus are usually cast in unqualified terms: but we have not arrived at our

pacifist position by simply taking a particular injunction from the Gospel-record, and enthroning it right away, without regard to other teachings or to possible objections, as a universally binding precept. The result of our full examination of pros and cons has indeed led us to an absolute refusal of participation in bloodshed: but that is because the full examination seems to make this particular ethical question clear to us. Such clarity is not yet within our reach in regard to the bearing of the Christian ethic on money. Jesus' remarks about money were much more special and occasional, and probably more dependent on his eschatological outlook, than were his words about loving enemies (see above, pp. 76 f.). His demand that the Rich Ruler should sell his goods and give the proceeds to the poor was obviously one that he did not address to all his followers. The same is clear in the matter of celibacy. He was himself a celibate, and recognized the state of celibacy as the right thing for particular persons (Matth. xix. 12): but his description of the married couple as "that which God has joined together" (Mark x. 9) shows incontrovertibly that he did not regard celibacy as a necessary requirement of the fully righteous life. It would seem therefore that those who group celibacy, poverty, and pacifism as together constituting an "absolute ethic", which cannot without inconsistency be followed in part only, are labouring under a misapprehension as regards both the meaning of Jesus and the philosophy of pacifism. (b) If, however, by an absolute ethic one means the binding character of an ethical obligation, when once the nature and content of it are clear, then *all* our ethical conclusions are necessarily absolute: and this, so far from being a reason for not following them, is precisely what constitutes their authority.

(8). A good deal of misunderstanding has also, I cannot help thinking, arisen around the conceptions of dilemma and sin. I have touched above on the phenomenon known as the moral dilemma (pp. 58 f., 70 f., 94 f.), and pointed out that it arises, not necessarily from the sinfulness of mankind, but from the tangled complexity of human situations. The nature of this complexity is no doubt in many cases affected, perhaps deeply, by human sin, our own or another's: but even where no discernible sin is involved, dilemmas may and do frequently arise. Now it is the

nature of a serious dilemma that it necessitates a moral sacrifice, because it necessitates the abandonment of the good for the sake of the better; and there are cases where the pain and cost of such moral sacrifice are acute. But it is a misuse of terms to call the making of that moral sacrifice "sin". It is indeed rightly called a "compromise": but we must remember that there are necessary and noble compromises, as well as mistaken and unworthy ones. Whether any particular compromise is the one or the other will depend on its particular character: but the mere fact that it *is* a compromise does not brand it as wrong. And it is clearly absurd to speak of sin, when in an unforeseeable emergency a man omits an important service to his fellows because he is engaged in one still more important, and there is not time for both. It is also absurd to characterize as sinful the taking of the best possible course in a dilemma occasioned by the sin or failure of others: when Jesus brought profound grief on his mother (as he must have done) by leaving home (see Mark iii. 21, 31-35), was this infliction of pain (occasioned by his mother's shortsightedness) sinful on his part? And even when the dilemma arises from some wrongdoing on one's own part, not even then is the choice of the best possible course bound to be sinful, though it may be acutely painful.

(9). No man in his senses denies the reality and terrible potency of human sin. And it is perhaps only natural that, in an age of disillusionment and perplexity like our own, theologians should incline to lay special stress on sin, and should call for a fresh realization of its pervasive and destructive power. And there is this much justification for introducing the idea into such an argument as that which now engages us, that war, being an apparently needful means of dealing with wrongdoing, is in a very real sense the product of human sin. It does not however follow that the right method of dealing with the sin of others is itself sinful, even although we ourselves may have made the situation harder for ourselves and others by our own shortcomings of the past. The man who, after thought and prayer, reluctantly concludes that it is his duty to join his fellow-countrymen in fighting for a righteous cause is needlessly misrepresenting both himself and them in calling the fight sinful. If it seems to him on full consideration to be the right

thing to do, he does but confuse the issue in calling it "sinful", even though he may come afterwards to feel that it was honestly mistaken. If on the other hand one is serious in calling it "sinful", one unquestionably condemns oneself for participating in it. For what saith the Scripture? "... neither be thou partaker of other men's sins. Keep thyself pure" (1 Tim. v. 22). And to call pacifists "parasites on other people's sins", simply because they cannot help being affected by what these other people do, adds to the confusion; for it is an unfair attempt, by means of an unpleasant and question-begging term (see above, pp. 149 f.), to give to what really ought to be a generous recognition the appearance of a withering rebuke. Were this book a theological treatise, I suppose I should enter here upon a discussion of the precise meaning of the word "sin". That I do not propose to do, for it would carry me too far afield: but I must record my protest against the lavish use of the term by various present-day writers, who avail themselves of the bewildered state of men's minds to use the term with excessive and morbid frequency, but without adequate explanation of its meaning (often apparently assuming that the word is another name for finitude or for temptation). Such writers assume a fictitious authority for their words by repeatedly levelling at their readers charges of sinfulness, which these latter cannot rebut without exposing themselves to the plausible accusation of self-righteousness. Particularly regrettable is it when the universal presence of sin is made a reason for a negative or acquiescent attitude on the question of the Christian's responsibility regarding war.

(10). There are those who hold that the causes of all wars are, at least in part, economic, and who infer from this supposed fact that it is futile to try to deal with war, by personal abstention or otherwise, until the problem of the equitable acquisition and distribution of wealth and the equitable access of all peoples to its sources is adequately solved. Not being an economist, I feel uncertain as to how far the theory that all wars are economic in their origin is true. From such knowledge of history as I possess, I should doubt whether it is an adequate statement of the case. I suspect that national and racial self-regard has also played a great part in the provocation of war. It is, however, undoubtedly true that economic factors do enter very widely

into international relations; and it follows from this state of affairs that the progressive solution of the economic problem is a matter of great urgency. But I do not agree that the close connexion between the problem of war and the economic problem compels us to suspend our attack on the former until we have finished off the other (see above, pp. 11 f.). Nor can I agree that it is culpably inconsistent or demonstrably unreasonable for one, who believes he has found the right attitude to war in a conscientious refusal to participate in it, to engage in commerce or make other use of the money-system, provided (a) he conforms personally to the best standards of honesty, justice, and charity known to him, and (b) uses his influence as a thinker and a citizen to get a better commercial and financial régime installed.

The mediaeval Catholic Church resolved the tension between the Gospel-counsels of non-resistance, celibacy, and poverty on the one hand, and the apparent needs of ordinary human society on the other, by ear-marking the former as the exclusive business of "the religious" par excellence, i.e., the clergy, the monks, and the friars. Upon them these three stringent obligations were at least theoretically binding, but upon them only. The Christian layman was not only not required to take this yoke upon him; he was in a certain measure forbidden to do so. Men who in view of the Sermon on the Mount insisted that the Christian must not wield the sword either as soldier or as magistrate were regularly adjudged heretical and were sharply persecuted for their pains. When the Reformation brought to the rank and file of Church-members fresh and first-hand acquaintance with the New Testament, the problem cropped up again: but, although the Catholic solution of it was felt to be unsatisfactory, neither the Lutheran nor the Calvinist group managed to do any better than to bar out the non-resistance teaching from the Christian's practical life and to confine it strictly to his inner personal temper and disposition. Only the Anabaptists insisted on applying it practically, regardless of the social and political difficulties which such an application might raise; and they accordingly incurred the disapproval of Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist alike.

The stress of our present-day problem of Christianity and war has led some to wonder whether the right place for pacifism may not be as the business of a special "order" of Christians conscious of a special vocation, similar in some ways to the monastic or mendicant orders of the Middle Ages. I am disposed to think that there is some promise of fruitfulness in the idea. In both cases there would be the frank recognition that "all men cannot receive this saying, but they to whom it is given". There would be the frank extension on the part of those in the order to those not in it of a relative justification, and a recognition of the positive service rendered by them and accepted and used by God for the discipline and progress of the race. There would be the frank acknowledgement of those not in the order that those in it were fulfilling a useful and necessary function in the communal life as a whole (see above, Chapter VI).

The main differences, as I see them, would be two, (a) Members of the pacifist order would not be by their pacifism cut off, as the monks and friars were cut off, from the commercial and political business of the community at large. I have endeavoured earlier in this chapter to vindicate their right to participate in this business-activity, and to show that it is a mistake to group celibacy and poverty along with the refusal to bear arms as, like the latter, an obligation intended for the acceptance of all Christians as such. (b) They would not think of themselves as following out a way of life which was not equally valid (at least objectively and potentially) for their fellow-Christians as it was for themselves: the speciality of their call would reside simply in the fact that they were convinced of the rightness and practicability of the pacifist interpretation of the Christian standard. While recognizing therefore the value in all conscientious adherence to other interpretations, they would claim and exercise the right to propagate their convictions among their fellow-disciples, of course candidly facing the risk that by the friendly interchange of views their own convictions might need to undergo modification. If faced with the objection that they were endeavouring to press upon all what they themselves admitted to be the duty only of persons with a special vocation, they would reply that *Christians as such*, like their Lord, are neces-

sarily charged with a special vocation in society (see above, p. 86 f.). Is it possible that, in the positive and creative ministry which such an order of men could render to human society, there might be found that healthy outlet for youthful energy which Nazism and Fascism have unhappily succeeded in winning into wrong channels?

It is time this long chapter was drawing to a close. But I cannot leave it without adding a few words on the subject of the function of the Christian Church at large in the matter. In that connexion I have only four brief comments to offer.

(1). Ideally, the Christian Church ought to be pacifist. That has been in a way recognized by the traditional feeling that at least the clergy ought not to shed blood (see above, p. 145). But inasmuch as membership and office in the Church do not depend on the possession of perfect insight into difficult controversial problems in Christian ethics, it is inevitable that the Church cannot yet speak with one voice on the question of the legitimacy of the occasional participation of the Christian layman in war. That is, perhaps, no reason for desisting from the endeavour to persuade Church-assemblies of the different denominations to express themselves in an increasingly pacifist sense. But neither is it a reason for branding the Church generally as disloyal to her Master, for abandoning her fellowship, and for talking about secession. If felt imperfection in the lives of one's fellow-Christians were a sufficient reason for leaving the Church, not only would the resignation of membership be a condemnation of oneself as well as of others (for there is no Church-member that sinneth not), but it would immediately dissolve the Church into a host of disconnected units.

(2). It is particularly out-of-place for persons who are themselves conscientious non-pacifists to hold up the Christian Church to condemnation and contempt for not being pacifist. By the very fact that they are themselves sincere and conscientious in their repudiation of pacifism, they show that they (perhaps regretfully) regard non-pacifism as on the whole the morally nobler course. Then why should they censure the Church because many of her members and leaders agree with them in this? Before they can legitimately criticize her for her

non-pacifism, on the ground that it is a betrayal of the standard of Christ, they should show themselves loyal to that standard. To blame Christians for not being pacifists, when one is not a pacifist oneself, is a piece of hypocrisy. If a man really thinks the pacifist standard of Christ is the highest, the obligation rests upon him of following it. It is the purest cowardice for him to decline Christian obligations for himself, by freely choosing not to enter Church-membership—notwithstanding the fact that he acknowledges these obligations to represent a higher and nobler standard of living than his own—and then presume to blame those who do accept them because they interpret their moral obligations in precisely the same way that he interprets his. A certain prominent socialist could never find sufficiently bitter words in which to condemn the Church for sanctioning war: yet when the Labour-Government came into power, he took office himself in the organization of one of the fighting services!

(3). Some writers have seen a close connexion between the problem of war and the problem of Christian Reunion. I do not feel disposed to say much under this heading, since I am not convinced that its relevance to our subject is very close. I do not share the view of some that the distribution of the Christian forces into several denominations ought to be called “the sin of disunion” or is really the cause of serious scandal to the non-Christian world. A severe judgment on those counts would be more in place if passed on the refusal of certain Christian bodies to grant to their fellow-Christians, who differ from them on certain points, recognition as essentially *fellow-Churchmen*, and to allow them as such to preach in their pulpits or share with them in the Sacrament of the Lord’s Table. But even there, the word “sin” should not be used of what is at least conscientious, though it be shortsighted. On a question of practical ethics like conduct in war-time, the Christian attitude is already sufficiently well-known to the world. The contribution which the Church can in this connexion make to the world’s need does not depend on the achievement of Reunion, but it is magnified in power and value by every Christian advance in clarity of judgment on the problem, and in the mutual recognition and practical co-operation of the various Christian bodies.

(4). Perhaps the least contentious and at the moment most pressing service called for from the Church is to lead a general movement of repentance and a new quest for God. The recurrence of war is a fresh proof of the break-down of all hitherto-known political means of averting the scourge of war. Improved political machinery may well be needed: but unless it is backed up by a new resort to the supernatural resources of God, it is unlikely ever to prove sufficient for our need. For it is a question, not simply or chiefly, of making a political decision, but of changing the characters of men.

“Put down the passions that make the earth Hell!
Down with ambition, avarice, pride,
Jealousy, down! cut off from the mind
The bitter springs of anger and fear”.

The general débâcle of world-politics is not unconnected with that widespread abandonment of loyalty to Christian standards which characterizes the modern world. It may be that the deep disgust and despair engendered by the chaos and agony into which the nations have fallen may move them at last to abandon their godlessness and learn after all the true wisdom of the way of Christ. For such a change it is needful, not only that the special problem of Christianity and war should be clarified, but that the hearts of men everywhere should be turned again in penitence to the Father in Heaven. What is there to prevent the Christian Church in all lands from working unitedly for such a turning?

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE CHRISTIAN PACIFIST TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

IN dealing with the subject indicated in the heading of this my last chapter, I must take for granted the position argued for and illustrated in the preceding pages of the book, namely, that the refusal of the pacifist to associate himself in a close personal way with a certain coercive activity judged by a majority of his fellows to be necessary for the common welfare need not either in theory or practice debar him from taking a real share in the political and other public activities of the community. I am quite aware that there are many who will regard this position as patently inconsistent; but having already given in full my reasons for believing them to be mistaken (principally through their frequent failure to take any account of the factor I have referred to as "relative justification"), I do not think there is any occasion to argue the case again here. I need refer the reader only generally to the contents of the two preceding chapters, and also to the argument on p. 24 in regard to the supposedly-coercive element in the use of the vote. On the ground of what is said in those sections of the book, I hold that the pacifist is entitled to take the full part of a normal citizen in the political affairs of the country, to form his opinion on the measures of the Government, and to exercise pressure, by means both of his vote and of public and private utterance, in support of such measures as he believes to be best. Members of the Society of Friends, the peace-testimony of which has usually been regarded with more sympathy and approval than the peace-testimony of others, have as a rule shown a full willingness to take part in political activities. Those small pacifist sects, whose members agree with their critics that the pacifist ought in consistency to take no part in politics, are often found to combine with their pacifism various beliefs of an eccentric, obscurantist, or reactionary character.

The pacifist needs to remember that great numbers of his

non-pacifist and even of his non-Christian fellow-citizens are desperately eager to see war and the risk of it abolished, and are feverishly active in the cause of its abolition or prevention, notwithstanding the fact that they are not prepared in all circumstances to refuse to participate in it. On the principle that we ought to co-operate with others over the whole area of the interests and activities which we agree with them in approving, pacifists should make it their business, not only to be personally loyal to their own individual convictions, but to assist all who are working for peace, so far as their method of working does not involve disloyalty to those convictions. The normal operations of political activity by means of speaking, writing, conferring, organizing, voting, etc., etc., clearly need not involve any such personal disloyalty, and they are therefore a legitimate field for the pacifist's co-operation. The result of his refusing to co-operate (on the strength of the supposed requirements of consistency) both needlessly discredits the cause for which he stands, and hinders the work for peace by withdrawing from it a certain amount of political support and leaving it, to some extent at least, in the hands of the less progressive agitators.

One of the first political duties of the pacifist, as of every responsible citizen, when war either is imminent or has already broken out, is to form as accurate a judgment as possible of the real *casus belli* and the justice or otherwise of the grounds of the conflict. It is a mistake for him to say, "War is sinful, whatever its real or alleged grounds; and therefore I will have nothing to do with it", and to leave it at that. I have urged that he is within his rights in personally refraining from bloodshed and all that is closely and directly contributory thereto, provided that he is genuinely convinced that overcoming evil with good and paying the price of so doing is the only truly Christian way, and provided also that he is loyal to the positive, as well as the negative, practical implications of that conviction. I have also urged that he is entitled to defend and recommend his view to others under certain conditions. But I do not think he is entitled to shun the task of learning the true causes of the war, of estimating their justice or injustice, and openly expressing his verdict (however relatively), be it one of approval or one

of disapproval. A veteran Quaker, on being asked shortly after the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 what he thought about things, stated as the first instalment of his reply that his principles as a Quaker did not require him to approve of the Kaiser!

It must be candidly acknowledged and constantly borne in mind that, in this work of learning and judging, the individual is conditioned and restricted in three ways.

(1). He is at a disadvantage in having access to only a portion of the relevant facts. All modern Governments exercise some kind of censorship on public news ; and although the British censorship is probably on the whole the lightest and most generous, its operations, coupled with the secrecy of much of the correspondence and conversation of diplomatists, still limits the ordinary member of the public to something less than a complete knowledge of the facts. This limitation is aggravated by two further conditions: (a) that the Press is itself responsible for a certain amount of distortion, or (shall we say?) special colouring, being given to such news as it is able to publish; and (b) that a really full knowledge of the international situation is a matter for prolonged and technical study, for which only a comparatively few persons have the requisite time and opportunity. The result of all these limitations is that persons expressing views on questions of foreign politics (or politics generally, for that matter) run the risk of being wrong in their judgments, not through lack of intelligence, but through insufficiency of information; and if these wholly or partially mistaken judgments are expressed in public and made matters of agitation or propaganda, a widespread misdirection of people's opinions may ensue. Hence the impatience of specially well-informed persons with political idealists, whose understanding of the real factors in the situation is materially incomplete: the eminent scholar, for instance, from whose opinions I have already twice taken the liberty to differ, has some very sharp raps to bestow on the knuckles of those who plead for political ideals with an insufficient knowledge of the facts.

Real and grievous as is the risk of uninformed propaganda, I do not believe that the only right reaction to it is for all but the expert to remain silent. Though much is hidden from the

ordinary man, much also is known to him: and freedom of public discussion—despite the dangers by which it may be attended—is one very useful means of increasing the dissemination of the facts. As for the wisdom and advisability of a man voicing an opinion or agitating for a cause, when he is aware that he does not know everything, that must necessarily be left to his own general intelligence, and will of course depend on what he realizes regarding the sufficiency or insufficiency of his knowledge. It is far better, surely, that conscientious and intelligent men, even idealists, should be trusted to speak and to propagate their views, even although now and then their version of the facts may need correction, and even although the same privilege has also to be extended to those less conscientious and intelligent and well-informed, than that, in order to prevent any wrong notions getting about, no one should be allowed to speak, or should allow himself to speak, until he has satisfied some Public Examiner that his knowledge is sufficient to entitle him to do so.

(2). A second hindrance to certainty arises from the troublesome question as to how accurately the public utterances of our political leaders represent their real views or the real grounds of their decisions. To suggest that the accuracy is rarely complete or perfect is not necessarily to call in question the personal integrity of politicians as a class or of any individual leader in particular. All human beings are prone to conceal, unconsciously or subconsciously, a portion of their reasons or motives, when in debate with other persons: and the conditions of political life and activity are such as to enhance this tendency to unconscious concealment on the part of leading politicians. Not only so, but these same conditions inevitably foster also in them the habit of deliberately disguising to some extent their total view of a situation, in order not to raise unnecessary criticism or opposition. Such partial disguise or concealment would readily recommend itself even to normally honest men as a necessary method in the political game.

Condescending a little more to particulars, we must face the question as to how powerfully class-prejudice against socialism in all its forms may be operating in the formation of our Government's political decisions. It would be absurd to sup-

pose that, even in these days of wars and rumours of wars, we have got past the century-long conflict between capital and labour. The habit of mind which stood aghast at the formation of the first Labour-Government under the Premiership of the late Mr. Ramsay Macdonald may have been considerably softened by the experience we have since then had of the Labour-Party in office; but it has by no means completely disappeared. On the other hand, the general antipathy to socialism has undoubtedly, and in a measure understandably, been increased by the bloody atrocities with which the establishment of the Communist régime in Russia was attended, and the complete extinction of political liberty, the suppression of religion, and the merciless police-methods which have accompanied its continuance in power. The ruthlessness and success of the Russian Marxists have spread terror over the rest of Europe. The disorders occasioned by communist and socialist agitators in Germany and Italy after the Great War helped in no small measure to pave the way for the dictators in both those countries. No doubt it is possible to argue that the dread of Communism really arises from the capitalists' fear for their possessions, and that they are glad to have, in the Russian atrocities and abuses, so handy a means of discrediting Communism: but it is equally plausible, equally fair, and equally sensible, to view the methods used in Russia, which are the approved methods of Marxian Communism, as finally discrediting its political creed, whatever be the precise character or extent of the social changes so bloodily introduced and maintained with such godless and inhuman tyranny.

Here then we have at least a psychological, and not altogether ethically indefensible, explanation of the cautious attitude of our Government to Russia, its long patience with Hitler and the numerous endeavours to "appease" him (as the one feasible alternative to Communist rule in Germany), its unwillingness to over-embarrass Mussolini by pressing oil-sanctions against Italy at the time of her monstrous attack on Abyssinia, and the scantily-veiled support it gave to General Franco in Spain by refusing, under the guise of "non-intervention", to sell munitions to the duly elected, but partly socialist, Government of the country.

Two other considerations add likelihood to the surmise that this anti-socialist prejudice has been a real factor in British foreign-policy. (a) The British Government is a Conservative Government, the Tory party having most adroitly taken advantage of the financial crisis of 1931 to entrench itself in the constituencies. As such, the party is led for the most part by men from the wealthier classes, who take it for granted that it is these classes which alone possess the ability and the right to carry on the government of the country. The claim is not an entirely hollow one, for it is undoubtedly among the men drawn from this stratum in society that administrative experience and ability is mostly to be found: and this qualification is powerfully supplemented by a traditional ideal of largely unselfish public service which has always characterized the British aristocracy. To have the national affairs conducted by men of this type is in many ways an advantage: but the advantage is grievously off-set by their inevitable bias in favour of any and every régime which will keep socialists and advanced Labourmen out of office. (b) The power of high finance and its influence on politics on behalf of vested interests is always a great factor in the situation, and is for obvious reasons likely to make more difference when a Conservative Government is in power, than when either a Liberal or a Labour Government is in power. There is reason to fear that not a few of the false moves made by Britain in recent years were due to this sinister cause. It is natural to think of those financially interested in the manufacture and sale of armaments as being the main (though by no means the sole) hindrance to a real international settlement. Was not scandalous proof actually forthcoming of the deliberate attempt of certain armament firms to torpedo the Disarmament Conference in 1933? Yet the evil is by no means confined to the financial interests of armament-makers.

Now it is obvious that, in so far as our political leaders *are* actuated by an excessive dread of socialism and an excessive fear of offending the controllers of high finance, it would not be worth their while to admit publicly that this was actually the case. They owe their tenure of office—which of course they regard, honestly enough, as indispensable for the welfare of the country—to the support of large numbers of people who do not

share their dread of socialism, who are far more afraid of Fascism and Nazism, and who would be revolted by the idea of a progressive step in international politics being stopped because a group of money-magnates did not like it. How inevitable, therefore, that these particular considerations should never appear in public speeches made by Cabinet-Ministers and their supporters, and that every available means should be used to disguise at least this aspect of the truth, and to find in defence of their political actions, when these are publicly criticized, such reasons as shall appear to the rank and file of the country as reasonably wise and (if it can be managed) ethically noble.

At the same time, it does not follow that, on a particular political issue (such as the present war), the political leaders of Great Britain—besides being for the most part honest in their class-prejudices—may not also be in quite sincere agreement with the nation at large. The virtual unanimity of all classes of the population as to the inevitability of the war, the indignant revolt of the national mind against the repeated aggressions committed by Hitler and against the inhuman cruelty of his government to the Jews and to his political opponents, and the universal readiness to rally round and take a full share in bringing the struggle to a victorious close—these things are unmistakable to any open-eyed observer in Britain to-day: and it may be taken as certain that the political party in power, and its leaders, however much they may be unduly influenced by considerations regarding which they are for the most part discreetly silent, share to the full the idealism and the passion with which the whole country regards the international struggle.

(3). The sincerity of the motives ostensibly avowed for our quarrel with Germany is criticized in much the same way (though in a very different spirit) from two different quarters—by the German Ministry of Propaganda (and the Press it controls), and by a certain type of British pacifists. Both these parties of course make the most of the facts and probabilities set forth in the immediately preceding pages; but they go further, and call in question Britain's right to offer any adverse criticism regarding Germany's doings, and they do this on the strength of Britain's record as an empire-building and empire-maintaining power. She has, they say, within the last couple of

centuries, built up by means of her naval conquests and colonial schemes an enormously extensive and wealthy empire. She employed in its creation all the resources of cunning and violence which have ever characterized the work of empire-builders. Wherever to-day her power is threatened—as it recently was in Ireland, as it has long been in India, and as at the moment it is in Palestine—she is found using the most ruthless weapons of repression: and it is nothing but disgusting hypocrisy for her to raise protests in the name of humanity at Italy's extension of her civilizing rule in Africa or Germany's drastic rectification of her national wrongs in Central Europe. Let her keep her own record clean and free from the vices of imperialism, and offer some tangible proof that the principles of humanity to which she appeals so loudly really mean something to her, when her own conduct is concerned; and then it will be time for her to start giving advice to her less-enlightened neighbours.

Now let it be admitted (a) that there was a fair amount of imperialist aggressiveness and a sheer lust for national expansion in the creation of the British empire, (b) that even at the present time there is much (e.g., in the administration of Palestine and India) which is open to legitimate criticism on the score of justice and humanity, and (c) that British people are all too prone to turn a blind eye to the shady patches on the national reputation. But do these three facts constitute a real disqualification for exercising any just criticism upon what has been happening in Central Europe? I would submit (a) that it is absurd to expect the present denizens of Great Britain or its Government to accept direct responsibility for the acts of our aggressive forefathers. If it were fair to demand that of us, it would be in point to charge us with the unwarranted attack made on this country by Hengist and Horsa and their fellow-tribesmen in the fifth century A.D.! Justice requires nations to provide decent conditions of personal, economic, social, and political life for all men living within their borders: it does not require them to undo the settlements made by their ancestors after military struggles, unless (i) manifest injustice still prevails as a result of them, and (ii) the situation can be rectified without making matters worse. That is the reply to those who argue that, having no right in India, the British should simply

clear out at once. (b) While doubtless there may be much to criticize in what Britain is still doing here and there, and urgent need for improvement in her policy, it is only fair to bear in mind, when assessing blame, that politics present men with sharper dilemmas than normally does any other walk in life: and those who, without bearing any practical administrative responsibility, see the evil or apparent evil which a practical administrator has committed, need to ask themselves what were the possible alternatives before him, and whether any one of them would have led to any better results than what followed from the course he actually took. (c) Even the most honest effort to take account of the real faults which undoubtedly do exist in the British national character and in Britain's behaviour as an imperial power, ought not to render the individual citizen, or even the nation as a whole, incapable, intellectually or ethically, of recognizing and protesting against heinous and inexcusable wrong, when it is committed by another nation.

Such, then, are the limitations within which and the conditions under which the private citizen has to endeavour to frame his judgment with regard to the war upon which this country is now engaged. We must begin with a consideration directly reminiscent of the matter last discussed, namely, the fact that the present mood of Germany, or rather (let us say) the present mood of the German Government and the willingness of the German people to support that Government, is very largely the inevitable product of the policy pursued by Great Britain and France for several years after the Armistice of November 1918. Of the general truth of that statement there can be no doubt, whatever else may need to be added to it to make the story complete.

Over and above that deliberate policy of penalizing and humiliating Germany, to which I have alluded somewhat more in detail a few pages back (pp. 159-163), there were four other factors at work in the post-War world, for which Germany could not be expected to accept responsibility, but which inevitably operated upon her own temper as an irritant.

(1). She feared, and that with good reason, the calamity of a Communist triumph. In the times immediately following the

signature of the Treaty of Versailles, the country suffered grievously from the violence of Communist agitators; and there was no little danger that a Communist revolution might have taken place. Knowing as she did what revolting atrocities had attended the victory of Marxism in Russia, Germany naturally shrank from the prospect of witnessing a similar blood-bath within her own borders. And until the onset of the present war made it worth her while to enlist Russia's support against Great Britain and France, a dread of Russian power and a hatred of Communism were among the dominant motives animating her policy, and necessarily accentuating in opposition her own national self-assertiveness.

(2). As a result both of the loss of her colonies and of the deliberate measures taken against her, and also in consequence of the general conditions of world-trade, Germany found herself badly handicapped in the economic struggle and, as she felt, unfairly excluded from advantages possessed in abundance by her competitors. It has indeed been conclusively proved that the possession of colonies and the access to raw materials are not as necessary for the economic prosperity of the mother-country as has been supposed. But the fact remains, not only that the forfeiture of the German colonies is felt in Germany as an undeserved injustice, but that, as a result of the prevalence everywhere of the tariff-system, and of the particular tariff-policies adopted by her neighbours, German trade has been hampered and throttled to a very serious degree. The sense of grievance thus engendered has inevitably stimulated Germany's quest for expansion and disproportionately roused her sense of amour-propre.

(3). It was definitely understood that the conclusion of the War in 1918 was to usher in a serious and combined attempt on the part of civilized nations generally to put an end once and for all to the ruinous and exhausting competition in armaments and to reduce their own armies and navies to a scale so low as to suffice for little more than indispensable police-duties. The Allied statesmen professed, in all probability not without some measure of sincerity, to share these hopes; and the disarmament-measures which they imposed on Germany were declared to be only the prelude to drastic reductions in the armaments of the

victorious nations. But for one reason and another, it all came to nothing. Britain, indeed, under the pressure of the widespread agitation for peace, effected certain considerable reductions in her army and navy; and some slight movements of a similar kind were made by France. But the powers of darkness triumphed. The United States refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles or to join the League of Nations. The occupation of the Ruhr-valley by France in 1923 embittered feeling between the two nations, and rendered France less disposed than ever to weaken her military power. In 1932-4 was held the international Conference on Disarmament, under the chairmanship of Mr. Arthur Henderson. A proposal made by the Soviet Government of Russia in 1932 for a universal abolition of armaments all round was coldly received by the Western Powers and led to no result. The latter doubtless suspected Russia's sincerity—whether justly so or not it would be difficult to say. Meanwhile Germany was getting on her feet again, and, notwithstanding the prohibitions of the Treaty of Versailles, was building up her forces to something approaching their former strength. An offer made by Hitler in 1933 to unite with Germany's neighbours in a general measure of disarmament failed—like the Russian proposals—through the strength of international suspicion. Repeated and prolonged efforts were made by the British Government and by others to bring about agreement on some practical scheme of reduction; but these foundered on (a) the disinclination (almost amounting to a positive refusal) of Great Britain to agree to a general abolition of materials for aerial warfare, in view of her supposed need of this particular fighting-arm in order to protect the north-west frontier of India, and (b) the unallayed mutual suspicions of France and Germany, France refusing to take any risks of an attack from Germany finding her unprepared, and Germany becoming increasingly indignant at the Allies' interminable procrastination and at their constant endeavour to prevent Germany escaping from her condition of relative military weakness. Meanwhile, the strings were being surreptitiously pulled, and the back-stairs assiduously ascended and descended, by the agents and in the interests of the Armament-manufacturers of the world. Britain, France, and Germany were all to blame for

the débâcle, whereby a golden opportunity for healing this open sore of the world was missed; but the terms and the spirit of Versailles still hung like a mill-stone round the world's neck, and went far to make any conspicuous success impossible. While Hitler's impatience (particularly his withdrawal from the League of Nations) added greatly to the difficulties of those who were striving to prevent the Conference from failing, the backwardness of the other Powers was not unnaturally interpreted by him as showing that they did not really mean business: and it is indeed to these Powers, as having long enjoyed the hegemony of Europe, that the main responsibility for the great opportunity being missed must be assigned. Probably the difficulties were great: at any rate Great Britain and France dismally failed to overcome them, and ere long the miserable old race in armament-building was again in full swing.

(4). A fourth and less direct factor which has operated unfavourably on the mentality of Germany has been the steady drop in the influence and efficiency of the League of Nations. She herself gave notice of withdrawal from the League in October 1933, in connexion with the disputes about limitation of armaments. But it had already failed to exercise any effective pressure on Japan in connexion with her aggressive attack on China in 1931-2, and in March 1933 Japan had declared her intention of leaving it. There was a similar breakdown nearer home in 1935, when the League, owing to hesitation on the part of Great Britain and France, refused to apply oil-sanctions to Italy on the occasion of her wholly unnecessary yet sanguinary attack on Abyssinia, though the League's protests against her action prompted her also to notify the withdrawal of her membership (December 1937). No doubt it is difficult to allot blame with any confidence for these successive lapses of international statesmanship: but they must all have contributed to lower the respect felt for the League throughout the world in general and in Germany in particular. The rapprochement between Germany and Italy known as "the Berlin-Rome Axis" registers another stage along the road of selfish and high-handed violence in the settlement of international affairs.

There was therefore, in the conditions prevalent in the world

from November 1918 onwards, a good deal that would account for the existence in Germany of a bitter and resentful spirit and a willingness to take drastic steps for the rehabilitation of her fortunes: and it is impossible to deny that Great Britain and still more France have to accept some of the responsibility for the prevalence of these conditions. When, however, the fullest reasonable allowance has been made for these provocative elements in the situation, and the fullest reasonable responsibility for them has been duly laid on non-German shoulders, the unmistakable fact remains that the Nazi government of Germany has behaved with a degree of pride, aggressiveness, and cruelty, which far surpasses anything which her neighbours' bad treatment of her could be held to justify. Her Government has succeeded in indoctrinating a large proportion of the population with a fatuous and hysterical sense of self-important nationalism and, corresponding therewith, a willingness to submit to an irresponsibly autocratic administration, and in terrorizing the rest of the population into a cringing and spineless acceptance of tyranny. The State—and the German State at that—has been exalted into the place of Almighty God Himself, and its interests take precedence of all other considerations of religion, liberty, and morals. The result has been an outpouring of crass folly and pitiless barbarism, such as has not been witnessed in Europe since the days of the Holy Inquisition and the Wars of Religion.

The theory on which this barbarism and folly are based is the fantastic assumption that, apart from the Jews, the German-speaking populations constitute a homogeneous racial unit. Such an assumption of anthropological unity is at variance with the findings of ethnological scholarship, which denies that the anthropological and the linguistic dividing-lines coincide, and knows that Germany is racially as heterogeneous as any other nation in Europe, perhaps more so. But in any case, what intelligible basis, other than the most benighted self-esteem, can be found for the idea that this wonderful German race deserves to be glorified and catered for with such supreme concern, that no considerations of religion, humanity, or justice can for a moment be allowed to interfere with the pursuit of its interests—nay, rather, that these interests are themselves the

basis and source of the very ideas of morality and reverence?

This pitiable and perilous erection of the "totalitarian State" in Germany is a morbid phenomenon similar in all essentials to the earlier but parallel development in Italy. In both we have the close censorship of the press, the ruthless incarceration of political opponents, the complete suppression of public liberty, the unconcern over human suffering, the conscienceless use of superior military power. In both we have the succession of truculent and bombastic speeches, and the defence of cruelty, aggression, and childish pettiness by the coining of stupid question-begging phrases like "sacro egoismo", "just aspirations", "historic destiny", "the virus of democracy", and the like. It was even reported that the Italian Government had forbidden Italian tennis-players in international contests to shake hands with their opponents, since to do so would foster "the weed of intimacy"!

It goes without saying that governments animated by this totalitarian spirit of vanity can hardly be expected to care much for peace or to make any great efforts or sacrifices for its preservation, so long as any material gain can be hoped for from the breach of it. Before we come, however, to consider the acts of aggression committed by Nazi Germany against neighbouring states, we must take note of certain grim features in her internal administration, which completely outweigh the otherwise admirable improvements recently effected in her national life.

To begin with, there is a censorship of the Press probably stricter and closer than in any of the non-dictator countries: by this means the people are kept in the dark as to much that is happening, and consequently largely unable to form any intelligent judgment on political and particularly international questions. Now, under war-conditions, it has been made a heavily punishable offence even to listen-in to a foreign broadcast. All education is forced to conform rigidly to Nazi views and ideals: no criticism of these views and ideals is allowed in public; and all the resources of an extensive and efficient system of secret police (including domestic spying, censureship of private letters, employment of agents-provocateurs, tapping private conversations by a special use of telephones, etc.) are

employed in order to discover any cases of private criticism or ill-will, with a view to its severe punishment. Teachers and university-professors whose views are distasteful to the Government have been dismissed from their posts, and some of them have had to take refuge abroad. Even academic theses are now censored, for the discovery of unorthodox views on political or racial matters, and for the proper segregation and limitation of quotations from Jewish authorities. Needless to say, all public work for peace on the part of individuals or groups within the country has been brought to a full stop: and when an oecumenical conference of Protestant Christians was held at Oxford in July 1937 for the discussion of problems connected with Church, Community, and State, no German delegates were allowed to attend, except certain Methodists, known to be favourable to Hitler's rule.

Inasmuch as certain features of the ideology behind this tyrannical administration are flagrantly incompatible with the elementary principles of Christianity (in any of its many forms), and since the professing Christians in Germany are numerous, the establishment of the Nazi power has led to some grave developments in the field of religion. The Government itself, through one of its spokesmen, has put forth a version of the religion now recommended—a kind of revival of the old Teutonic heathenism, involving a frank abandonment of the doctrines and morals of Christianity. The Roman Catholics have suffered severely from the repressive requirements of the Government. Considerable resistance has indeed been offered by the Lutheran churches to the restrictive conditions which the government has tried to impose; but it has been sporadic and partial, and on the whole ineffective as a real check to the Nazi political ethic. The needed spirit of revolt has been to a great extent sapped, partly by a natural terror of the consequences of resistance, partly by a genuine appreciation of the Government's achievements in the way of national stability and prestige, and partly by a sincere acceptance of Nazi principles. Some of the more enthusiastic and patriotic of these German Christians have adopted a form of Christianity in which Jesus is represented as an Aryan, and all the characteristic features of his life and teaching are ignored. A minority of

the Lutheran ministers and churches have to some extent maintained their resistance to the attempt of the State to establish a dictatorial rule over the Christian Church. As a result their ministers and representatives have been afflicted in various ways—spied upon, inhibited from preaching, deprived of financial support, arrested and imprisoned without trial (and often without their own families knowing their whereabouts), and brutally maltreated in Concentration-Camps.

Especially cruel has been the persecution of the Jews. Hitler and his party have held them up as worthy of public detestation and ostracism. They have been accused of being the source of all the main corruptions of modern life. The accusations levelled at them as a body have no more solid foundation in morals than the natural clannishness which binds the Jews as such together and erects a certain sentimental barrier between them and their Gentile fellow-citizens, and their native genius for commerce which produces in some of them a certain meanness in business-methods and in others a success and prosperity which tends to make their less prosperous and successful competitors jealous. Not content with legally restraining such characteristically Jewish failings as are socially dangerous or involve unfairness to others, the German Government has whipped up a nation-wide wave of virulent anti-Semitism, has done its best to banish Jews from the professions and from business, has robbed them of the means of livelihood, pillaged and burnt their homes and synagogues by exciting wild pogroms, clapped them into Concentration-Camps, broken up their families, driven them across their frontiers with no facilities for settling elsewhere—in a word, has robbed them, not only of their normal civic rights as German subjects, but of their elementary rights as human beings. As indicative of the spirit in which this ghastly persecution has been carried on, we may mention that, in connexion with the great assault on the Jews after the assassination of Vom Rath in November 1938, the notorious Dr. Goebbels announced on the Government's behalf that "compassion for Jews would not be tolerated"; in the same spirit a university-teacher was dismissed from his post because his wife was found helping a poor Jewess

in clearing up her wrecked home just after a pogrom. A lame Jew of nearly eighty years old was robbed of his crutches before being driven with others into no-man's-land. I doubt whether history has seen so wicked and needless an attack on a great multitude of mostly quite innocent people since the expulsion of the Armenians from Asia Minor in 1915. One shudders to picture the mass of sheer desperate human misery, the unspeakable anguish of mothers and little children, the great flood of tears and sorrow, the multiplication of acts of suicide—all wantonly and purposely created by the rulers of a great civilized country, in the pursuit of this phantasy of supposed national glory.

To crown the horrid tale of crime, there is need only of a brief word about the German prisons and Concentration-Camps. Here are gathered several thousands at least of respectable, law-abiding men, scholars, authors, ministers of religion, and members of other professions, as well, of course, as numbers from humbler walks of life, who—either because they are Jews, or because their political opinions are unwelcome to the Government—are confined under conditions of extreme brutality. Cut off from all contact with their friends or with the world outside, they are absolutely at the mercy of their guards, who use the liberty allowed to them to strike in the face, beat, kick, starve, maltreat, and even murder their defenceless captives. There is no protection, no redress, no tolerable comfort, no liberty, and—as long as Hitler and his satellites are in power—no hope. The British Government, shortly after the outbreak of war, published a White Paper containing well-documented evidence of the grossly inhuman methods adopted in the administration of these Camps. It makes, indeed, such sickening reading that one is almost tempted to doubt the all-too-reliable evidence, and can only recoil with horror from the detestable and diabolical cruelty of it. The main facts were fairly well-known before the British White Paper was published: and the Government has been criticized for publishing it, partly because the motive of publication was clearly propagandist, and therefore (it is inferred) could not have been humanitarian, and partly on the ground that the publication could serve only to increase hatred, and therefore must incur

the disapproval of the pacifist. From both forms of the criticism I emphatically dissent. If deeds like this, which cry aloud to high heaven for rebuke and correction, are committed, the mere commission of them is ample justification for their being blazed abroad, whether or no the particular persons who blaze them have another purpose to serve as well as the voicing of sheer moral indignation. As for the increase of hatred, that depends on the haters: but the removal of hatred from the world should be by process of repentance, amendment, and forgiveness, not by the concealment of crimes. One can only hope that the German people, when the real facts have come to their knowledge, and they have awaked from their drunken orgy of national self-infatuation, will not only put a quick stop to this abomination of brutality, and compensate the victims so far as may then be possible, but will have the decency and grace to repent in dust and ashes. Britain has no doubt many evil deeds to answer for, on account of severities practised by her representatives upon Indians, Irishmen, and Arabs ; but before the attempt is made to silence her protests with the cry of " hypocrite", let the crier say where in her history as a modern nation you can find any real parallel to the calculated cruelty practised by the Nazi Government on whole multitudes of its subjects, on, no other ground than that they are politically opposed to the party in power or else that they are of Jewish blood. Besides, is no one to be allowed to protest against an outbreak of savage barbarism in the midst of civilization, save him who bears the spotless record of an archangel?

Now we all know that it is contrary to diplomatic etiquette for any Government officially to make adverse comments on the internal administration of the Government of another country. But there are four points connected with the atrocities committed inside Germany which are relevant to our immediate interest.

(1). Notwithstanding the diplomatic rule just alluded to, it is impossible that a neighbouring population can be other than profoundly roused by these unparalleled cruelties: and, etiquette or no etiquette, it is too much to expect that the Government of that neighbouring population should be able to

maintain the normal amenities of diplomatic intercourse so long as these cruelties continue.

(2). Whatever excuses Germany may be able to offer for her actions with reference to Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Memel, and Poland, on the score of reclaiming rights of which she had been unjustly deprived at Versailles, no one can plead with any show of reason that the rectification of Germany's grievances really necessitated the domestic conduct to which I have referred.

(3). The character of the German home-administration forms a strong barrier to agreement on the part of her neighbours to the incorporation in the Reich of any mortals not already within its clutches, whatever their nationality or previous history. To hand over any inhabited portion of the earth's surface to a State which makes life not worth living for every Jew beneath its sway, and consigns all political opponents or malcontents to the living death of the Concentration-Camps, would be a crime against the most elementary principles of humanity, whatever the legal claim of such a state to such a piece of territory might be.

(4). It is in the light of the domestic atrocities that we have to try to form an estimate of the rightness or otherwise of Germany's acts in the international field. There is no need for me to recount the history of these. There seems no reason, in the nature of things, why the German-speaking population of Austria should not be incorporated in the German Reich: and it was probably a great mistake on the part of England and France not to have allowed it earlier in the interests of the contentment and stability of Central Europe. But this does not make the high-handed seizure of Austria by Hitler, and the unmeasured cruelties that accompanied it, other than a gross breach of international morals, and a violent blow at the power and dignity of international law. The armed occupation of Czecho-Slovakia, after the Sudeten-problem had been solved to Germany's avowed satisfaction, was a still more serious outrage against international decency, seeing that it involved the violent suppression of an unwilling non-German people. No doubt it may be said that Germany resented Czecho-Slovakia ever having been separated from Austria, and felt its independence to be a danger to her: but quite clearly, if proceedings of

this kind are to be regarded as allowable, Europe reverts at once to the state of the jungle.

It was that act of robbery on Germany's part which, more than any other single event, caused the British Government to abandon its patiently-tried policy of appeasement, and reluctantly to decide that it would resist the next German deed of aggression by force of arms. It was that act which swept numbers of pacifists into the non-pacifist camp. It crippled all peace-work for the time being. It virtually extinguished the last sparks of opposition to the Government's programme of re-armament. It created throughout the country a general conviction that any attempt to reach a conciliatory agreement with Germany was hopeless, and that whatever Hitler said he was not to be trusted. This inevitable loss of confidence made it impossible for Poland and her Allies to go as far as they otherwise might have done in meeting Germany's claim to Danzig. It is easy to criticize the Government's conditional determination to go to war, and its consequent pact with Poland, as due to one great Empire's jealous dread of the growing power of another: such criticism may or may not be deserved in the case of certain influential British politicians; but it is certainly not deserved in the case of the nation at large. The nation at large is honestly convinced that an unprincipled bully is rampant in Europe, whose word cannot be depended on, and that it is time that something drastic was done to put a stop to his detestable tyranny: and the facts of history plainly show that the nation's diagnosis of the situation is correct.

It will, of course, be said that, feeling thus about Germany, I ought in all reason to be prepared to join in the nation's effort to defeat her. The first seven chapters of my book contain my answer to that challenge; and I can hardly re-summarize it adequately at this point. I am debarred from participation in the fighting by the un-Christian character of the operation itself, and by my acquaintance with a better and positive method of tackling the world's evil—a method which will naturally be effective in proportion as men believe in it, and not otherwise. I know enough of the history and character of war to be profoundly distrustful of the possibility of getting

any lasting peace on the basis of a military victory, however complete it might be, and however sure we felt of winning it. But I do not expect the country at large to be able to pledge itself to adopt my method, and I am therefore ready to recognize as a second best its adoption of the only means of checking Hitler which as a community it knows—namely, by force of arms. I am quite sure that it will be much worse for the world if Hitler wins the war than if the Allies win it. I therefore have a conscientious objection, not only to fighting myself, but to obstructing the Government and my fellow-citizens generally in doing what they believe to be right.

The die having now been cast, and the appeal made to the arbitrament of the sword, the pacifist has to face the question what contribution it is still open to him to make along political lines. In the preceding chapter I urged that he should be willing, where feasible opportunity given to him, to work for the relief of distress, and to co-operate personally in any special service of a non-military character which the incidence of war might render urgently needful. Clearly also it will be necessary for many pacifists, who have important and useful work to do in the pursuance of their normal avocations, to continue to do them: and it is important that they all, whatever their customary or special task may be, should toil for truth and maintain their Christian witness. Such activities, however, are all of a distinctly non-political kind. We are concerned in this chapter to see what services in the field of international politics the pacifist can render, in other words how best he can bring to bear such influence as he possesses in his civic capacity on the policy of his own country (that being, at least during war-time, the only country he can reach).

While hostilities are actually going on, he can support and plead for such official measures as the undertaking to refrain from aerial attacks on civilians, and the adoption of a more generous policy in the reception and relief of refugees. But probably the most urgently needed political service the pacifist can render during war is to work so far as he possibly can for the conclusion of a really healing peace. Having before our eyes the sorry wreckage which is all we have to show as the fruit of

the high idealism with which the Great War was entered upon in 1914, and remembering how great a responsibility for this sad spectacle rests on the post-War temper of the victors, we cannot feel too concerned to prevent, if it is at all possible, any repetition of the great mistake. Those of us who can remember the state of public feeling during the Great War of 1914-1918, and can compare it with that visible in the present war, may well feel encouraged that, so far, the tone of the Press and of public leaders has been, by comparison, more restrained. We must not, however, hide from ourselves the danger that the prolongation of the struggle and the possible embitterment of it by severer enemy-attacks from the air will necessarily impose a violent strain on the patience and good temper of the British public: indeed it is not difficult to see already various signs of a hardening of feeling towards the enemy-people. It therefore behoves the pacifist, as it behoves all persons of good-will, to strive earnestly against all incipient or growing bitterness, frenzy, or vindictiveness, arising from the stress of the conflict. Unless that is done, there is grave danger that the struggle may terminate in another Treaty of Versailles, which will usher in another period of unsettlement, destined to eventuate in another and even bloodier war.

The demand has been raised in many quarters that the Allies should now state publicly their War-aims, that is, the conditions on which they would be prepared to make peace. The demand is a wise one, and should have the support of pacifists (on condition that the terms to be announced are wisely framed)—for, although all the world knows in a general way what the Allies are fighting for, it does not know, because it has not been told, what these general aims really amount to in black and white. It is all very well for British statesmen to deny in public that Great Britain has any intention of ever imposing another treaty of the spirit or kind of the Treaty of Versailles: but until this denial is expressed in more concrete terms, the German people can hardly be expected to lay aside their dread that, in the event of defeat, they will incur the full fury of angry victors.

While it is not the duty, just as it is not within the competence, of the non-expert to advocate any detailed set of peace-

conditions, it may be very much his duty and very well within his competence to urge the adoption of certain definite principles at the critical juncture which will arise at the termination of the war (supposing the Allies are victorious)—and to urge also the public announcement of the authoritative adoption of these principles while the struggle is still pending.

In framing the terms, both of the Armistice and of the treaty, the prime object should be, first, the rectification of those glaring injustices which provoked the war, and next to that, the clear demonstration of the disinterestedness of the Allies by means of the imposition of really generous and conciliatory conditions of peace.

Whatever else is or is not included in the terms of the Armistice, they ought not to contain (as did the notorious Armistice of November 1918) demands for huge supplies of various commodities from Germany under the pretext of compensating those who had suffered under her military attacks. It savours strongly of wanton and vindictive cruelty to exact by force-majeure from an exhausted and stricken country a large proportion of its means of livelihood and recovery. Nor must there be, as there was last time, a heartless maintenance of the food-blockade, rendered the more galling by the unfulfilled promise to the effect that "the Allies contemplate the provisioning of Germany" for the period of the Armistice. Nor is there any real need for the occupation of large sections of German territory by Allied troops (least of all, black troops in the service of the French Government), as a sort of guarantee that the terms of the Armistice will be kept.

The omission of these traditional severities against a conquered people would be the best possible means of securing Germany's real co-operation, while such guarantees for the observance of the terms, so far as these concerned the internal affairs of the country, could perhaps be provided by commissions consisting of friendly neutrals. But there should certainly be included in the terms of the Armistice an insistence on the immediate and permanent abolition of the Concentration-Camps, the release, care, and reinstatement of the persons confined in them, the instant cessation of the persecuting measures adopted against the Jews, the Roman Catholics, and

the Confessional Church, the drastic relaxation of the censorship of the Press, and the abolition of arbitrary imprisonment. One perhaps ought to add, the return and rehabilitation of the refugees. But in view of the prejudice likely to be felt towards any protégés of a victorious enemy (not to mention the vast complexity of the property-adjustments that would be involved), it might be better to leave the new Germany to set her house in order in her own way, in regard to the refugee-problem: and possibly the same principle would apply to the rectification of the affairs of the Church.

As for the peace-terms proper, these could not demand less than the full restoration of Czecho-Slovakia and of Poland, within the limits determined by the actual extent of the two races concerned, with proper access for Poland to the sea, and with financial and other aids granted to them by Germany in part-compensation for the cruel sufferings they have recently undergone at her hands. Danzig and Austria, as being mainly German in composition, might well be allowed to remain part of the Reich, provided the period of the Armistice had satisfactorily shown that the brutalities practised by the Nazi Government towards Jews and democrats had been finally discontinued. There should be no demand for an indemnity on the part of the Allies themselves, and no military occupation of German territory.

The conclusion of peace would inevitably involve some sort of a settlement of a number of other questions—e.g., the Polish boundary of Russia, and the problem as to whether the present heads of the German Government could be allowed to remain the leaders of the nation or whether means should be found to relegate them to the obscurity in which they could wreak no further outrages upon mankind. On these and other questions—and of course there would be an indefinite number of such—I would not presume to express an opinion or to advise pacifists as to what attitude they should take. In fact, I have gone so far as I have, in making concrete suggestions, rather with a view to illustrating what I have in mind as conforming to the general principles of generosity and conciliation, than with the idea of stating definitely what ought to be done. So long as the critical moment of cure is utilized, not as it was in

1918-19, in order to infuse new poison into the European system, but in order to convince Germany that everything is being done to release her painlessly from the disgrace of Nazidom—so long, I say, as that principle is loyally observed, the detailed measures taken can safely be left to the responsible administrative experts. On the subject of the German colonies I propose to add a word later.

One of the great obstacles which will have to be overcome in the pursuance of such a conclusion to the war is the probable temper of the French people and its Government. As the immediate neighbours on land of the powerful German state, as wedded traditionally to a hostile dread of Germany, and as perhaps more matter-of-fact in these affairs even than Great Britain, the French are only too likely to fall again into the Versailles-trap, and imagine that their wisest course is to impose another punitive peace-treaty, the more severe the better. It will need all the pressure and influence of which this country is capable, to prevent a repetition of the follies of 1918 and the ensuing years. The need is so serious that it is not too early for all persons of good-will to set to work in order to create in Britain so strong and sane a public opinion regarding the settlement of peace that, when the time comes, our Government will be able to count on so strong a backing in favour of a generous policy, that it will be able to exercise the needed pressure on our Allies in order to secure the triumph of that policy.

It would have been easy to yield to the temptation to pass by in silence the awkward question whether the pacifist should in time of war agitate publicly for its immediate cessation, especially at times when peace-feelers put out by the enemy seem to offer an opportunity for doing so. I have, however, made it my business to evade no pertinent difficulty or question of which I am aware; and I must not evade this one. The pacifist, of course, holds strongly to the general view that the method of war is not only costly, wasteful, and repugnant to human feeling, but is also incompatible with Christian standards of conduct when rightly understood. He also holds that conference round a table is better than conflict on the battle-field. But he has to recognize too that, when the war-issue is joined, other factors have to be considered in addition to those just named.

Supposing Germany announced herself prepared to agree to a set of peace-terms such as those already sketched (the Allied Governments having, let us assume, published abroad their intention of demanding them), or supposing per impossibile that in the course of a single night the dominant character of Great Britain and France were to change from that of imperialistic modern powers to that of humble followers of Jesus Christ—then, indeed, we could rightly urge upon our Government the immediate conclusion of peace. But—as we know perfectly well—there is not the slightest likelihood of either of these conditions being fulfilled. That being so, the pacifist has to consider how the case is affected by their unattainability. He knows that Hitler's cause stands for tyranny, aggression, and the bestial horrors of the Concentration-Camps. He rightly feels as a Christian that these hideous things can be finally abolished only by the extensive operation of the Christian spirit of love and self-sacrifice. But he knows that so few of his fellow-men in Great Britain and France share this conviction of his that Great Britain and France as wholes cannot act as if they did share it. Yet these countries are right in feeling that they cannot leave Hitlerism unchecked: they are therefore trying honestly and self-sacrificingly to check it in the only way clear to them as nations. If Hitler emerges from this struggle unbeaten, the evils he stands for will be established more firmly than before. Ought the pacifist in these circumstances to beg and press the Allies to stop the war at once?

It is here that the tension set up by the recognition of two divergent ethical ideals is seen at its sharpest. The acknowledgement on the pacifist's part that he does not feel called upon to agitate publicly for an immediate cessation of the war or for the acceptance of the first peace-feeler the enemy may put out, exposes him again to the natural though mistaken suspicion that he is simply evading personally what he recognizes as a common duty incumbent on his fellow-citizens generally. I have already endeavoured to show that there is nothing inconsistent or dishonourable in the *relative* justification of an ethic different from what one feels it incumbent upon oneself to follow. It must never be forgotten that what the wise pacifist mainly presses for is not the adoption of a particular practical

course of action, but the acceptance of a certain conviction, out of which alone that particular course of action can rightly spring. And if the reader has not already been convinced by my arguments along this line, he will not be convinced by any repetition or summary of them that I could give here. The risk of misunderstanding must therefore be run. I will, however, go so far as to adduce in my further defence a simple but I believe sufficient illustration.

The analogy between war and surgery has been often made, often misused, and often derided. It is clearly not one that runs on all fours. On the other hand, it is not wholly valueless, particularly if one is prepared, as I am, to recognize that war is a clumsy and costly method of vindicating certain rights and values, and sometimes at least does vindicate them successfully. In the treatment of disease—say a case of appendicitis—expert opinion often differs as to whether a surgical operation or a purely medical treatment is the better way of trying to cure it. Now imagine a case in which the wisest method would be purely medical treatment, but which has to be dealt with by a competent, though not supremely-gifted surgeon. He decides to operate, and starts to do so. If, when he has already begun, a more skilful man than he were to come in, possibly a man already acquainted with the case, he might well know that the decision to operate was not really the wisest; but since the operation had now begun, he would almost certainly refrain from urging that it should be discontinued. Having been decided on and commenced, it had better now be finished; for, although a purely medical treatment would have been wiser, the substitution of it now for the surgical treatment might possibly lead to worse results than the completion of the operation. So in the present war. If one recognizes, as I hold one ought to do, that the war is *relatively* justified (having regard to the moral convictions and capacities of the fighters), I do not see how one can refuse to admit that it is better that it should be victoriously carried through, than that it should be discontinued before the undertaking is completed. I cannot refuse to make that admission; and I make it without the consciousness, in doing so, of betraying my pacifism or forfeiting my right to propagate it.

There remains now to be briefly discussed the question as to the measures possible after the conclusion of peace with a view to permanently preventing the recurrence of war. The pacifist's duty with regard to these measures clearly needs to be treated separately from his responsibilities during the continuance of hostilities, inasmuch as the political possibilities in time of peace differ so greatly from those existing in war-time.

Our previous discussion will have made it clear that the *political* duties of a pacifist (as distinct from his personal conduct and social and religious influence) are largely dependent on the extent to which his convictions are, or in the very near future can be, shared by his fellow-citizens: for political change is impossible until the bulk of the people are ready to approve of it and carry it out; and the fate of Prohibition in the United States is but one of many instances showing the unwisdom of bringing about, even when it is formally and legally possible, legislative changes which run counter to the will of a very considerable proportion of the population. This limitation of political movement to things of which the public generally approves is a very important principle; and not a little pacifist agitation has in the past alienated rather than attracted sympathy because its promoters thought that loyalty to their own convictions entitled them to try to engineer an immediate legal acceptance on the part of all men of practical measures conformable to these convictions.

Common to all men of good-will will be the desire to initiate, as soon as peace is concluded, some international scheme which shall preserve peace for the future; and this will of course involve a discovery and removal of the causes of war. So far at least the pacifist will be able to count on a very wide measure of public support.

One of the very obvious causes of war is the existence of armaments: and it is not unnatural that peace-enthusiasts should think first of the simple process of abolishing them as the obvious means of abolishing war. Hence the cry for disarmament. And inasmuch as our own country is the only one from which we as pacifists can hope for a serious hearing, it is unilateral disarmament on the part of Great Britain which is advocated as the next step. Pacifists have before now been

elected as members of Parliament, and presumably have voted against the Army- and Navy-Estimates. Nor ought this practice and the demand for immediate disarmament to be treated with derision. There is a well-recognized place in political discussion and agitation for the advocacy of the full measure of reform in any direction, even although the chances of its being practically attained may be virtually negligible. A vote counts for only one, but it counts for one: and although the idealist may realize that a long time must elapse before a majority can possibly agree with him, yet in keeping the distant goal in this way before the eyes of his fellows, he fulfils a needed and valuable service. Miraculous and nation-wide conversions do not normally happen: but there is no necessity to assume that they cannot do so; and he who reminds us of our ultimate objective, who urges us to press towards it, and who explains intelligently the advantages that would ensue upon our adoption of it, is by no means wasting his time. The healing results of one great country disarming from motives of sheer good-will can easily be pictured: and to the threat that, on our own showing, disarmament might in a particular case be followed by a spell of foreign domination, the by no means irrelevant answer may be made that the idea of the martyr-nation has before now attracted the serious thoughts of men, and that the nation which had the grace to face the risks of such a disarmament would have also the moral and spiritual power to convert foreign domination into an ultimate benefit both to itself and to its conquerors.

At the same time, however, the practical difficulty of persuading Great Britain, say, to disarm unilaterally, and the extreme improbability of such persuasion being successful within any reasonable interval, must be borne in mind: for concentration upon it would mean that the practical duties of the immediate future would be left neglected, with probably tragic results. It is therefore wiser, while not losing sight of our ultimate objective, to explore very thoroughly the practicable possibilities of the present. The nations must not be allowed to forget the way of Christ, and the self-disarming policy which would follow if any one of them wished to take that way: and there are persons who may rightly feel themselves set aside for

the particular purpose of keeping that ideal before the world's mind. But the fact has also to be reckoned with, that the utmost to which they will probably in the proximate future agree is some measure of gradual and all-round disarmament as part of a generally-agreed scheme.

Persons who have given thought to the practicability of some such scheme have described the immediate objective of it as consisting of three mutually-interdependent attainments—arbitration, security, and disarmament. No one of these, it is held, can rightly be pushed ahead regardless of the others. What is needed, we are told, is

(1) an all-round agreement to submit *all* international disputes to an international court of arbitration;

(2) a scheme for the compulsory enforcement, first by peaceful sanctions (especially, perhaps, by what has been called "the Mineral Sanction"), and then (if necessary) military action on the part of the leagued nations generally, of the international court's decision, in the event of any party to a dispute declining to accept and abide by that decision;

(3) As soon as experience should show that such measures were likely to be observed, an all-round reduction of armaments, which could be extended in the light of gathered experience until armed forces generally were reduced to the modest proportions requisite for the fulfilment of police-duties.

Assuming that the nations can be prevailed upon to accept as much limitation of their national sovereignty as is involved in the adoption of such a scheme, we may say without hesitation that it would in all probability mean an immense advance on the sorry condition of things that has prevailed hitherto: and I can see no reason why every pacifist should not cordially acknowledge this, and take whatever individual political step such acknowledgement seems to justify. I must, however, utter a caveat at this point, not in order to pour cold water on men's enthusiasm for a promising scheme, nor in order just to "hit back" by way of inflicting reprisals on harsh critics of pacifism, but in order to get all the relevant data fairly before the mind.

Some recent critics of pacifism have exhausted the resources of language in emphasizing in opposition to pacifists the

absurdity of expecting obedience to a common arbitrator, unless the arbitrator has at his command power to enforce his decision. Imagine, say they, what a ridiculous farce it would be to judge a case in a court of law, unless the police were there to see that the court's award was duly carried out. So in international affairs: you must have an international police-force to impose the decision of the court of arbitration upon any power that is headstrong enough to refuse to accept it. Probably the need for the actual compulsion of such a recalcitrant power would never arise: but clearly the call for it might arise, and in that case the power of compulsion must be at hand for application. A pacifism, therefore, which stands in the way of the provision and use of an international armed force for this purpose, is simply standing in the way of the only practicable scheme for banishing war from the world.

In reply to this I would urge that the situation is really not quite so simple as the argument just sketched presupposes. For not only are the ethical and other differences between war and police-action considerable, notwithstanding certain real likenesses between them (see above, pp. 40-44), but the practical difficulties of carrying out an international act of military compulsion are also very considerable. I can find ten glib references in general terms to the obvious need of combined restraint of the aggressor for one practical suggestion as to how precisely it could be carried out. It would call for a degree of military ingenuity and of international loyalty far surpassing anything we yet possess or can easily imagine, to prepare and (in case of need) carry out schemes for the coercion of each conceivable national rebel against some joint decision of an international dispute. Supposing, as would be the most likely case, that the refractory nation were some great power like Germany or Russia, how would the effort to coerce her (even granting the practicability of such an effort) differ from a European War of the very kind which the whole scheme was framed to avert? It would simply be another world-war on the grand scale, and would labour under all the ethical and practical objections under which war always labours—not the least of them being the chance of ending with the defeat of the side which was in the right. I would not urge these considerations as a reason why no

effort along the proposed lines should be made: after all, all schemes have to face the risk of failure, or they would never be begun at all. I mention them as facts which really demand cautious thought, and which ought to make some of our well-intentioned champions of collective security less cock-sure about the practicability of the scheme and less contemptuous towards pacifists for not being more whole-hearted in their support of it.

In regard to the practical method of implementing some definite proposals for international action on behalf of the preservation of peace, it is natural to think first of the League of Nations as the fitting organ for the purpose. It has already been in existence for twenty years: it has built up a working machinery: it has dealt successfully with a very large number of questions of considerable if not of absolutely front-rank importance. On the other hand, it stands for the maintenance of the status-quo; the United States do not belong to it; and—worse still—it has already been left by several great powers, Japan, Germany, Italy, and now Russia. It is difficult to picture any one—still more so to picture all—of these powers so far humbling themselves as to re-enter an organization now long known to be largely dominated by England and France. Mussolini has in fact declared that Italy will never re-join the League.

As an alternative, therefore, some fresh and more ambitious scheme has been commending itself as the only method adequate to the situation. Some have not got further than to advocate a World-Conference, in the hope of thereby clearing up, once and for all, the unsettled economic and territorial problems of our world. The suggestion takes, I fear, little count of the immense number and complexity of these problems. Good as is the idea that the nations should meet in conference, and should table their grievances and their proposals fully, human nature will need more than the bare opportunity for a conference on an omnibus-scale if it is to succeed in laying all the world's international quarrels to rest.

The favourite alternative to the League of Nations, therefore, is Federal Union. So long as each nation that aspires to be a great power insists on retaining its national sovereignty unimpaired, the real outlawry of war is impossible. I believe modern

political thought is therefore on right lines in discerning in this unrestricted sovereignty of each great state the real enemy to permanent peace and in feeling that an effort should be made to establish some form of Federalism, i.e., a partial surrender of national sovereignty on the part of each constituent member of the Federation, in order that occasions of armed international conflict, with all the unmeasured evil that it always brings, may be finally eliminated from the world's life. It is an encouraging sign of the times that interest is being widely taken in some project of this kind; and even if the scheme includes, as it will probably have to, some provision for the use of armed force in certain eventualities, there seems no reason why pacifists cannot give real support to it as the next possible political step, without thereby betraying their personal rejection of war as inconsistent with the only version of Christianity which they can understand and accept. If our own country and France were to express their willingness to enter such a Federation, and were to give some practical token of their willingness to make sacrifices for its success, it seems by no means impossible that the other great powers of Europe might be induced to join it, provided the peace-terms at the end of the present war are conciliatory and not vindictive. The adhesion of the smaller powers could probably be counted on, if the stronger led the way.

The nice point would, of course, arise whether any provision should be made for the resignation of members who might wish to withdraw. I remember reading somewhere, à propos of the Confederacy of Delos and the subsequent Athenian Empire in the fifth century B.C., that a Confederacy depends for its success on nothing being said at the time of its initiation about the possibility of any member desiring to leave it. Provision for withdrawal was made in the case of the League of Nations; and we have seen how extensively use has been made of it. It might not be quixotic to propose that those joining the projected federation should bind themselves not to abandon it, the obligation to remain in membership being so obviously necessary for the success of the scheme. The appeal might be made that those sufficiently zealous to be willing to become members might well see their way to taking on an obligation clearly

necessary for the success of the body they were joining. The analogy of the United States of North America, though not exact, encourages the belief that some such scheme might possibly be made to work. In any case, it is one well worth pressing for.

I must now, in drawing this political discussion to a close say a word on three special topics connected with it.

Germany has long been demanding back the colonies of which she was deprived by the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler has declared that he does not regard the reversion of these colonies to Germany as a possible cause of war: he believes the question can be amicably settled by negotiation. Now that war has broken out, there can be no doubt that, if Germany wins, the return of her colonies to her will be among the first terms on which she will insist as the price of peace. On the other hand, if Germany loses the war, it is equally certain that the colonies will not at once be returned to her. The refusal, in that eventuality, to restore them will be based, not on any desire to humiliate or punish Germany, but on a realization of the fact that, by the hideous brutalities of her domestic administration, she has shown herself hitherto totally unfit to have the control of persons of primitive race. Considerations of common humanity will absolutely forbid the transfer to her of a single additional square inch of inhabited territory, until it has been made indubitably clear that the old virus of Nazidom has been completely removed. Inasmuch, however, as the refusal to return the colonies to Germany at once will inevitably expose the Allies to the charge of hypocritical self-seeking, advantage should be taken of the opportunity which the new settlement will offer, to introduce a fresh system of colonial administration generally, which should apply not only to the colonies of which Germany was deprived, but also to all the colonies of the great powers which are not already self-governing Dominions like Canada and Australia. The system I refer to is, of course, that of "mandates", a system already tried and familiar to us under the League of Nations, but to be improved by the provision of larger opportunities for criticism and oversight on the part of the impartial representatives of the League or Federation to

whom the powers receiving the mandates should be strictly responsible. Doubtless there are difficulties in the elaboration and application of such an improved mandate-system: but it seems the only method consistent with the new ideals as to how the native races should be treated, and with the demands of a final settlement of the problem of the colonies lately belonging to Germany.

I have said little so far on the subject of tariffs and trade-restrictions generally. Not being an economist, I can see that it will be wiser for me not to undertake a discussion of that aspect of the economic problem. But one does not need to be an economist to know that artificial trade-barriers, whatever may have to be said for them as temporary expedients, are in the main manifestations of national selfishness—a foolish selfishness which assumes that the interests of one's own country can be truly served while those of neighbouring countries are being ruthlessly ignored and impaired. They are one phase of that self-centred and unrestricted national sovereignty which, as we have seen, is the standing obstacle in the way of lasting peace. Close attention to the existence of these barriers with a view to their progressive removal, and therewith the removal of numerous dangerous grievances, would be one of the early concerns of the controlling powers in the forthcoming Federation.

The last detached point on which I venture to comment is the proposal raised in some pacifist quarters that a political party should be formed under the title of "the Christian Party", the members of which should strive to get elected to Parliament, not in the hope that they might be asked at an early date to undertake to form a Government, but with the idea that they would uphold before Parliament and the public generally the ideals of practical Christianity, as superior to the claims of any political programme or any party-discipline as such. The proposal has some attractive features, particularly in view of the shackles at present imposed on the judgment of individuals by the requirements of party-loyalty. But on the whole I feel disposed to deprecate the plan. There are capable and earnest Christian men in all the parties: and the formation of a fresh group styling itself "the Christian Party" would labour from the outset under the handicap of being thought

arrogant. Then there would be the further complication introduced into the already unsatisfactory three-party system. A far more promising reform would be the merging of the Liberal and Labour parties into one, having as its official programme those progressive measures on which Liberals and Labour-members agree, and the introduction of proportional representation, which would reflect in Parliament the approximate distribution of opinion in the country, and against which the only solid argument seems to be that it would bring to an end the chronic supremacy of the Conservative Party. Christian men of every party would be free to frame their political recommendations in conformity with the principles of their faith; and individual members of Parliament could be allowed more liberty than they have at present in determining how to cast their votes. If pacifists and other Christian men can succeed in getting into Parliament, they will have no real difficulty in making their influence felt, and they will not need a "Christian Party" to enable them to do so: whereas, if they cannot get into Parliament, no question of forming a Christian Party there could arise.

But when all is said, we have to come back at last to something other than political reconstruction. Important as improvements in our political machinery may be, they ought never to be regarded as a sufficient solution of our problem. No adjustments in machinery will avert war if mutual animosities and suspicions still prevail, if the thirst for vengeance and the sense of grievance remain unallayed, and above all, if the neo-paganism of our day goes forward conquering and to conquer. We shall therefore still want the full pressure of Christian propaganda, including the pacifist's confident advocacy, in convincing word and self-sacrificing deed, of the great principle of overcoming evil with good. There remains finally the fundamental need of a return to God. A recent critic of the League of Nations has observed that, being founded on no act of national or international repentance, it was only a premature scabbing-over of a septic wound which had never been radically treated. The criticism has truth in it, though to say this is not to lay blame on any of the persons who adventurously

planned and initiated the League. For it is a fact, however the wise politicians of the world may ignore it, that, just as a silk purse cannot be made out of a sow's ear, so a world wise and self-controlled enough to do without war cannot be manufactured, by means of improved political machinery, out of groups of unrepentant, self-assertive, and complacent sinners. Our political enquiry therefore drives us back once again to the task of evangelizing and converting men by means of the Gospel of God: and thus the age-long task of the Church of Christ, pursued in the lives both of individuals and of communities, is again revealed as the strategic and dynamic centre of the whole enterprise.

CONCLUSION

As I look back over what I have written, the only measure of success I can feel sure about is that I think I have said, at least approximately, what I wanted to say. I cannot, however flatter myself that I have seen, as my work went on, the great harmonious synthesis of thought, for which the Church and the World long and wait, rising up in glory before my astonished gaze. On the contrary, the repeated efforts I have made to do full justice to the arguments advanced by the two parties may, I fear, have the result of destroying my credit with both of them. Some at least of my pacifist friends may feel that I have virtually sold the pass by my theory of relative justification and the conclusions I have drawn from it in my seventh and eighth chapters. My non-pacifist friends will be tempted to cry out that, if I can go so far in recognizing the justice of the present war and in wishing that the Allies may win it, I ought in all reason to be willing to help practically to that end. I fear I shall incur the old reproach of falling between two stools.

Yet I deem it better to expose myself for the time being to misunderstanding and adverse criticism for attempting to treat the subject comprehensively, than to make sure of the applause of at least one camp by confining myself to the rôle of counsel for its defence. I have at no point pretended—or felt—that the question (so far as its solution is dependent on clear thinking) is a simple one. Neither side, as I have urged, has a “walk-over”. The day on which the denunciation of either by the other could do any good is long past. I do not contend that there are no strong arguments for the rightness of engaging in war under certain conditions. But whenever I feel disposed to agree to them, and to draw the conclusion to which they point, I am held up by two stark facts which no non-pacifist argument I have ever seen helps me to surmount. One is the diabolical savagery of the acts of fighting, a savagery which makes any plea for their compatibility with Christian love an ethical farce. The other (reflected all too unmistakably in the ever-advancing size of the world’s armaments) is the chronic tendency of war to beget more war.

I sometimes wonder whether the agony laid on Christian hearts by the occurrence of one bloody struggle after another is not very close to that agony which brought tears to our Redeemer's eyes as he came within sight of Jerusalem, and reflected on the city's blindness to the things which make for peace and on the dreadful consequences which that blindness was to bring. Be this as it may, there is surely no ethical problem which has so repeatedly and so deeply challenged and divided the mind of the Church as has this problem of the right Christian estimate of war. Doctrinal issues have been raised, have raged for a time, and have been settled. Other ethical issues have engaged Christian thought, and led to this or that conclusion becoming the dominant or accepted view: but no ethical question has for so long a period and so repeatedly cropped up, and done so in our own day with such growing urgency, as the problem handled in this book. Perhaps that very fact ought to make us willing to exercise a little more patience, in the hope that, if we remain loyal and diligent,

"Surely at last, far off, sometime, somewhere,
The veil will lift for our deep-searching eyes".

Meantime, our labour has not been lost if we have succeeded in paving the way in some small degree for that larger vision which shall embrace all the truths for which men of differing stamp but with the same honesty of conviction have so long contended.

It is, indeed, a time of bewilderment for many. The air around us is seething with new theories—in religion, in ethics, in philosophy, in politics; and only he who is purposely sheltering himself in a funk-hole of his own timid devising can pretend not to be feeling the draught. Under these circumstances, it is little use hoping to arrive at some neat formula, or to discover some marvellous short-cut, which will dispose of every difficulty, and commend itself spontaneously to every one concerned. At the same time, though we move about in the midst of so many and such great perplexities, and know our vision to be so limited and confused, yet surely there is a way wherein he who wills may walk and know that he will not go astray. Reliance on "the truth as it is in Jesus" undercuts all perplex-

ities of intellect and conflicts of sentiment; and, as there has ever been, so there is still a side of things in which we must rest on faith rather than on sight. It has been good to travel all round our problem, and make use of all the help intellect could offer. But that very trust in the intellect rests after all on an act of faith; and it is at bottom the same faith which bids us do the best we know, and leave the issue thereof in God's hands. He who has begun a good work in us will go on to perfect it until the day of Jesus Christ, however its precise course be modified in detail by the limitations of our conflicting vision.

APPENDIX

ORIGEN'S DEFENCE OF EARLY CHRISTIAN PACIFISM

TOWARDS the close of the reign of Marcus Aurelius, say 177-180 A.D., the eclectic Platonic philosopher Celsus, probably a friend of the heathen satirist Lucian, composed a lengthy attack on the Christian community. It was entitled 'A True Discourse', and was perhaps written in Egypt. Celsus produced it during a period of fierce persecution; and he voiced in it the contempt and dislike felt for Christianity by the educated classes of his day. The treatise does not seem to have attracted much notice at the time; but about seventy years later, the great Alexandrian scholar Origen, then living in old age at Caesarea in Palestine, had his attention drawn to it by his convert, friend, and patron, Ambrosius, who suggested to him that he should write a reply to it. This Origen did, and published his eight books 'Against Celsus' in or about 248 A.D. He took up the critic's accusations one by one in the order in which he found them, and quoted the most significant passages in extenso, so that, although no manuscript of Celsus's work has survived to modern times, we can reconstruct from Origen's reply the course of his argument and large parts of his actual text.

With the bulk of Celsus's attack we are not here concerned: but towards the close of his treatise, he dealt with the customary refusal of the Christians to serve in the Imperial legions and to hold public office. He was concerned for the safety of the Empire in face of the attacks of the barbarian tribes of central Europe: and, indignant though he was at what he regarded as the selfish lack of patriotism on the part of the Christians, he mingled appeals with his reproaches, and begged them to abandon their fanaticism and take their share in the common task of defending the civilization of the Empire from destruction. Origen's reply appeared about the time when the Emperor Philip the Arabian was celebrating with great "Secular Games" the thousandth anniversary of the foundation of Rome, and when consequently public feeling against the Christians might be expected to be particularly strong.

It is noteworthy that both Celsus and Origen write here as if the refusal to serve in the army was the universal attitude of the Christians. We know that this was not quite the case; for as early as about 173 A.D. a considerable number of Christians were serving in the Imperial army, and there is evidence that this state of things prevailed right on into the time of Diocletian. Origen himself refers to the existence of Christian soldiers in his 'Homilies' on Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians, written some years before 234 A.D.¹ Still, the language of these two writers is significant as showing what at both their dates (178 and 248 A.D.) was understood by well-informed persons to be the normal Christian view and practice. It is also interesting that neither Celsus, nor Origen in replying to him, alludes explicitly to the fear of contamination with idolatry as the Christians' reason for refraining from military service: Celsus does not say what their ground was; but Origen makes it perfectly clear elsewhere in this treatise that it was the moral objection to bloodshed by which they were mainly actuated.²

I print below a translation of the last nine chapters of the eighth and last book of Origen's apologia—the part of it, that is, in which he replies to Celsus's criticism and challenge on the score of the Empire's need. The defence which he here gives of the pacifism of the early Church is unique in ancient Christian literature. Its unmodern style of thought and expression has largely prevented students of Church-history from understanding it and doing justice to it. It has indeed been grievously misinterpreted in many ways. In putting the present book together, I have ventured to regard myself as in a way executing Origen's last will and testament—his reply to Celsus was as it happens among his very latest works—and stating his main argument in a fuller and more modern form. This fact relieves me of the necessity of furnishing the subjoined translation with numerous explanatory notes, in order to make his argument

¹ See *Journal of Theological Studies*, ix (1907-8), pp. 366, 369.

² See Orig. *Cels.* ii. 30, iii. 7f., v. 33, vii. 26. In viii. 65 he speaks of the Christian refusal to swear by the Emperor's "Fortune"; but that is in connexion with ingratiating oneself with the Emperor, not specifically with service in the legions (see also below, p. 232 n. 1). He does, however, refer disapprovingly (in the *Homilies* on Corinthians mentioned above) to the willingness of Christian soldiers to offer the customary sacrifices and incense: their excuse was that they would endanger their lives by refusing.

more intelligible. I have used the best modern edition of the Greek text, that edited by P. Koetschau for the Berlin Academy's series, 'Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderten', and published at Leipzig in 1899. The translation is my own; but I have also consulted that of the Rev. F. Crombie in vol. xxiii (1894) of 'The Ante-Nicene Christian Library'. For the sake of clarity I have kept "thou", "thee", etc., for the second person singular pronoun; but otherwise have avoided archaisms. Double inverted commas are used for direct quotations from Celsus, Scripture, and other sources, and single inverted commas for indirect echoes of such quotations—except that quotations within quotations receive whichever of the two sorts of quotation-marks the latter do not receive.

ORIGEN, 'AGAINST CELSUS',
book viii, chapters 68–76.

68. Celsus next¹ says that "it is not right to disobey the ancient man who said long ago, 'Let there be one king—he to whom the child of crooked-counselling Kronos has granted it'";² and he goes on, "If thou disregard this ruling, the King will naturally punish thee. For if all men were to do the same as thou, there would be nothing to prevent him from being left alone and deserted, and earthly affairs from falling into the hands of the most lawless and savage barbarians, and the glory both of thine own worship and of real wisdom from being no longer left among men". Therefore, indeed, 'let there be one master, one king', not however 'he to whom the child of crooked-counselling Kronos has granted it', but he to whom the One who "appoints and removes kings"³ and "raises up on earth

¹ In the preceding chapter, Origen had replied to Celsus's plea that there was nothing wrong in swearing an oath by the Emperor or his "Fortune", and contradicted his claim that it was from the Emperor that men received all that they did receive in this life.

² The quotation is from Homer, *Iliad*, ii. 205: "the child of . . . Kronos" (Saturn) is the supreme god Zeus (Jupiter). Kronos is called "crooked-counselling" probably because of the cunning with which (according to the story) he disabled his over-prolific father Ouranos. In the eastern half of the Roman Empire, the Emperor was regularly referred to as "the King"; and this is the usage followed by both Celsus and Origen.

³ Daniel ii. 21.

the suitable ruler at the right time"¹ 'has granted it'. And it is not the son 'of Kronos'—the god consigned to Tartarus, as the fables of the Greeks say—who, after driving him (Kronos) from power, 'appoints kings', not even if one were to allegorize what is said on those topics, but the God Who governs all things. He knows what He is doing in the matter of 'appointing kings'. So we do 'disregard the ruling, "He to whom the child of crooked-counselling Kronos has granted it"', convinced as we are that neither God nor the father of God plans anything 'crooked' or perverse. But we do not 'disregard the ruling' concerning Providence and the doing of things by It both purposely and also as the results of other events. Nor is it 'natural' for 'the King to punish' us for alleging that it is not 'the child of crooked-counselling Kronos' who 'has given' him the royal power, but He Who 'removes and appoints kings'. At any rate, let 'all men do the same as' I do, 'disregarding the' Homeric 'ruling'—but observing the Divine ruling—about the 'King', and keeping the precept, "Honour the King".² And on such a supposition as that, 'the King will' not 'be left alone', nor will he be 'deserted', nor will 'earthly affairs' be 'in the hands of the most lawless and savage barbarians'. 'For if', to quote Celsus, 'all men were to do the same as' I do, clearly 'the barbarians' also, surrendering to the Word of God, will be most law-abiding and mild. And every 'worship' will be abolished, and that of the Christians will alone prevail—and indeed it alone shall one day prevail, since the Word goes on taking possession of more and more souls.

69. Then Celsus, not realizing that he had himself spoken what was inconsistent with his own words, 'For if all men were to do the same as thou', says, "Thou wilt surely not say that, if the Romans are persuaded by thee, and neglect the services customarily rendered by them to gods and men, and appeal to thy 'most High (God)', or whatever thou wishest to call him, he will descend and fight for them, and will need no other might than his own. For this god himself, as ye say, formerly promised this, and much more than this to those who worshipped him—yet see how much help he has been to them and to yourselves. To them, instead of their being masters of the whole

¹ Ben Sirach (Ecclesiasticus) x. 4.

² I Peter ii. 17.

earth, there is left not so much as a clod or a hearth, while as for you, if one of you does wrong even secretly, yet is he sought out to be punished with death”.

Now since he enquires, by way of a supposition, what would happen ‘if the Romans were to obey’ the Christians’ teaching, ‘and neglect the services’ paid to the ‘customarily’-worshipped ‘gods’ and the former laws regarding ‘men, and were to’ worship ‘the Most High God’, listen to what satisfies us on these matters. We say that, “if two” of us “agree on earth regarding any matter for which they shall ask, it will come to them from the Father” of the righteous “Who is in heaven.”¹ For God rejoices in the agreement of rational beings, and dislikes their disagreement. What then must we expect, if not only as now very few, but if the whole Empire under ‘the Romans’, should agree? For they will pray to the Word who ‘formerly’ said to the Hebrews, when they were being pursued by the Egyptians, “The Lord will fight for you, and ye shall hold your peace”;² and praying with full agreement, they will be able to overthrow far more of the enemies who pursue them than those whom the prayer of Moses when he cried to ‘God’ and of those who were with him put down.

Now if what ‘God promised’ to those who observed His Law has not happened, this is not because God has spoken falsely, but because the promises were made upon conditions, conditions regarding the observance of the Law and of life according to the Law. And if ‘there is left neither clod nor hearth to’ the Jews who received the promises upon conditions, the blame must be laid on their disobedience to the Law in general, and on their transgression against Jesus in particular.

70. But ‘if’, according to Celsus’s supposition, ‘all the Romans are persuaded’, they will by praying overcome their enemies, or rather they will not make war at all, being guarded by the Divine power, which promised to save five whole cities for the sake of fifty righteous persons.³ For the men of God are the salt that preserves the ‘earthly’ institutions of the world, and ‘earthly affairs’ hold together as long as the salt does not turn. For “if the salt gets spoilt, it is no longer any good for the earth

¹ Matt. xviii. 19, quoted roughly.

² Exod. xiv. 14.

³ See Genesis xviii. 24, 26.

or for the dung-heap, but it will be thrown away and trodden down by men".¹ "Let him who has ears hear" what this means. When God gives the Tempter authority and allows him to persecute us, we are persecuted. But when God does not wish us to be so treated, we possess peace in a marvellous way, even in the midst of the world that hates us; and we take courage because of him who said, "Take courage! I have conquered the world!"² And truly he 'has conquered the world'; wherefore the world has strength only as long as he who 'conquered' it wishes, for he received from his Father the power to 'conquer the world'. And we take courage in his victory.

But if he wishes us again to contend and struggle for our religion, let our antagonists come, and to them will we say, "I have strength for all things through Christ Jesus our Lord who empowers me".³ For when "two sparrows are sold", as the Scripture has said, "for a penny, not one of them falls into the snare without the Father in the heavens".⁴ And to such a degree does the Divine Providence embrace all things, that not even "the hairs of" our "head" have escaped being "numbered" by Him.⁵

71. Then Celsus, as his custom is, again gets mixed up, saying in the sequel what none of us has ever written. For he says as follows: "It is absolutely insufferable that thou shouldst say that 'if those who now reign over us are persuaded by thee, and so get captured, thou wilt persuade those who reign next, and then others also, if they too are captured, and so on'—until, when all who are persuaded by thee are captured, one wise ruler, foreseeing what is happening, will completely destroy all of you, before he perishes himself".⁶ But there is no point in

¹ A loose quotation of Matth. v. 13 and Luke xiv. 34f. The comparison of Christians to a preservative holding the world together recalls the striking passage in the *Epistle to Diognetus*, vi. 7.

² John xvi. 33.

³ An amalgam of Philipp. iv. 13 and 1 Tim. i. 12.

⁴ Luke xii. 6; Matth. x. 29.

⁵ Luke xii. 7; Matth. x. 30.

⁶ It is almost inconceivable that any *Christian* could have spoken the words that follow the dash. I take them to be Celsus' own indignant and contemptuous retort to the foolish words preceding the dash, which may represent, perhaps in a garbled or exaggerated form, what Celsus had heard of some simple-minded Christian saying, though Origen proceeds to disown them. It is not easy to tell from what Origen says whether he thought the words about the wise ruler were meant by Celsus to be a Christian quotation, or a threat uttered by Celsus himself. Perhaps Celsus did not make his meaning sufficiently clear, or possibly Origen for some other reason misunderstood him.

speaking about this, for none of us Christians says, concerning 'those who now reign over us', that, 'if they are persuaded by' us, 'and so get captured', we 'shall' again 'persuade those who' come after them, and when 'they too are captured', we 'shall' again 'persuade those' who succeed them. But where did he get the bright idea that, when the later rulers are successively 'persuaded by' us and are being 'captured' through not warding off the enemy, 'one wise ruler, foreseeing what is happening, will completely destroy' us? Here apparently he is stringing together a series of stupidities, and blurting it out on his own initiative.

72. After this, he utters a kind of prayer: "If only it were possible for the Greeks and barbarians that occupy Asia, Europe, and Libya to their furthest limits to agree to come under one law!" But regarding this as impossible, he continues, "The man who thinks this possible, knows nothing". Now since one has to discuss this point, a few words shall be said on the subject, which needs much investigation and care, in order that what is said about the whole rational creation 'agreeing to come under one law' may be seen to be not only possible, but even certain. The Stoics say that, when the strongest of the elements has so far as is possible prevailed, the Conflagration will occur, all things being turned into fire. We on the other hand say that the Word at some time or other does prevail over the whole of rational nature, and transforms every soul into his own perfection, when each man, in the exercise simply of his own free will, chooses what he desires and comes into possession of what he has chosen. And we say that it is not probable that, as in the case of bodily diseases and injuries some of those that befall men are too strong for any medical art, so in the case of souls there is any evil thing which cannot be healed by God the Word Who is over all. For the Word, being stronger than all the evils in the soul, and the healing that is in Him, in conformity with God's will, applies healing¹ to each man; and the end of all things is that evil should be destroyed. But whether or no this will be done in such a way that evil is never able to

¹ Origen's grammar seems to halt here. The word here rendered "healing" is in Greek "it" (*αὐτοῦ*), which *grammatically* ought to refer to "will". But the *sense* seems to require a reference to the "healing" mentioned in the previous line.

return again anywhere, it is not the purpose of the present discourse to teach.

* * * * *

This much I thought well to put down, briefly and without precise explanation, on account of what Celsus says, when he gives it as his opinion that it is impossible for 'the Greeks and barbarians' inhabiting 'Asia, Europe, and Libya to agree'. And perhaps such a thing really is impossible for those still living in bodies, but not at all impossible for those who have been released from them.

73. Celsus next urges us "to assist the King with all our strength, to toil with him in the maintenance of justice, to fight on his behalf, and to render military service and hold military command along with him, if he press us to do so". Now in answer to this it has to be said that we do 'assist the Kings', as occasion requires, with what I might call a Divine assistance, and putting on "the full armour of God".² And this we do in obedience to the Apostolic voice which says, "I therefore exhort you first of all to make supplications, prayers, intercessions, thanksgivings for all men, for kings and all who are in high station".³ And the more religious a man is, so much the more efficient is he in 'assisting' those who reign, in comparison with the soldiers who march out into the battle-lines, and destroy as many of the enemy as they can.

And then we should want to say this as well, to those who are strangers to the faith, and who ask us to render military service on behalf of the public welfare, and to destroy men: even the priests among yourselves attached to certain statues, and the temple-wardens of the gods ye worship, keep their right hands undefiled for the sake of the sacrifices, in order that they may offer these customary sacrifices to your so-called gods with hands unstained by blood and pure from human slaughter. And not even when war has come upon you, do ye make the priests also render military service. If then this is a reasonable thing to do, how much more reasonable is it, when others are rendering military service, that these) Christians) also should

¹ I omit the next paragraph of the Greek text, which consists mainly of a quotation in extenso of Zeph. iii. 7-13, together with a few conjectural comments.

² Ephes. vi. 11.

³ 1 Tim. ii. 1f.

render (*their*) military service as priests and servants of God, keeping their right hands pure, but striving by means of prayers to God on behalf of those who are rendering military service righteously, and on behalf of him who is reigning righteously, in order that all things opposed and hostile to those who act righteously may be put down? Moreover, in putting down by means of our prayers all the dæmons who stir up wars, get oaths broken, and disturb the peace, we bring more help to those who reign than do the men who aspire to render military service. And we do 'toil with him' in the public affairs, we who offer up prayers with righteousness, along with such discipline and practice as teach us to despise pleasures and not to be controlled by them. And we 'fight on behalf of the King' even more than others do: we do not indeed 'render military service along with him', even 'if he press us to do so'; but we do 'render military service' on his behalf, by marshalling a private army of religion through the prayers we offer to the Divine Being.

74. And if Celsus wishes us also "to exercise military command on behalf of our fatherland", let him know that we do this too, not in order to be looked at by men and to enjoy vainglory before them when we do it. For "in secret" are our prayers,¹ in the mind itself, sent up as by priests on behalf of the people in our fatherland. And Christians benefit their fatherlands more than do the rest of men, by educating the citizens, and teaching them to be religious towards the God of the State,² and taking up into a sort of Divine and heavenly State those who have lived well in the smallest States. And unto these latter it might well be said, "Thou hast been trustworthy" in a State of the "smallest" size;³ come also into the Great State, where "God stands in the assembly of gods, and in the midst does He judge gods", and He will number thee along with them, if no more thou "die as a man" or "fall like one of the rulers".⁴

¹ Cf. Matth. vi. 6.

² The Greek adjective here translated "of the State" is a technical term used to designate a particular god as the tutelary or guardian deity of a particular city-state. The reading, however, does not seem to be quite certain, some authorities reading "the God of all things".

³ Luke xix. 17.

⁴ Psalm lxxxii (Sept. lxxxi) 1, 7. Origen's thought in making this obscure quotation seems to be that the convert to Christianity receives thereby promotion into a higher realm, where he can remain only if he does not relapse into heathen sin.

75. And Celsus urges us "to exercise magistracy over the fatherland, if it be needful to do this also for the sake of the security¹ of the laws and of religion". But we, knowing that in each city another organized form of 'fatherland' has been founded by the Word of God, exhort those who are capable—by wholesome speech and life—of 'exercising magistracy' to 'exercise magistracy over' the churches. We do not receive those who love office; but we constrain those who, because of great modesty, are reluctant to take on hastily the public management of the Church of God. And those who worthily 'exercise magistracy over' us are themselves under constraint, for the Great King, whom we believe to be the Son of God, God the Word, compels them. And if those who worthily 'exercise magistracy' in the Church 'exercise magistracy over' the Divine 'fatherland'—I mean, over the Church—whether by being simply chosen or by being constrained, they 'exercise' it also according to the ordinances laid down by God, besides infringing nothing in the established laws.

And the reason why Christians avoid the public services of earthly life is not because they want to evade them, but because they are reserving themselves for the more Divine and more needful service of the Church of God, taking the lead—at once needfully and righteously—in the 'salvation' of men, and being concerned for all men, for those within the Church—that they may live better day by day, and for those who prefer to stay outside—that they may be engaged in the reverend words and deeds of religion, and thus, truly worshipping God and educating as many as they can, may be linked with the Word of God and with the Divine 'Law', and so be united to the God Who is over all, by means of the Son of God—His Word and Wisdom and Truth and Righteousness—who unites to Him everyone who is eager to live according to God in all things.

76. So here thou hast, my revered Ambrosius, the completion of the task assigned by thee, according to the ability available and given to us. In eight books we have included everything which we thought it was proper to say in reply to the work of Celsus entitled 'A True Discourse'. And it is now the business of him who comes across his treatise, and what we have said

¹ Or, "salvation".

against him, to judge which of the two is most redolent of the true God and of the method of religious devotion to Him and of the invasive truth of wholesome doctrines which urge men to the best way of life.

Thou must know, however, that Celsus promises to compose "another treatise after this one", in which he has promised to "teach those who desire and are able to follow" his "instructions how they ought to live". If, therefore, having promised this second discourse, he did not write it, we should do well to rest content with the eight books composed in reply to his discourse. If, however, he did begin and complete it, seek for the treatise and send it, that in reply to it also we may write whatever the Father of truth grant us, and may thus overthrow the false teaching in it, but that, if anything true is anywhere said in it, we may uncontentiously testify to it as worthily spoken.

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Class No..... Book No.....

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Author..... Cadoux, C. J.

शीर्षक

Title..... Christian pacifism.....
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